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The ‘East-West dichotomy’ is a philosophical concept of ancient origin  
which claims that the two cultural hemispheres, East and West, developed  
diametrically opposed, one from the particular to the universal and the other 
from the universal to the particular; the East is more inductive while the West 
is more deductive. Together they form an equilibrium... 
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East is East, and West is West, 
and never the two shall meet.                       
       —— Rudyard Kipling (1895) 
 
A dichotomy – is any splitting of a whole 
into exactly two non-overlapping parts. 
Nothing can belong simultaneously to both parts. 
 
       ——Wikipedia (2008)  
CHAPTER 1 
HisTory 
8 
Herodotus (484-425 BC), the ‘father of history’ (The Cambridge  
Dictionary, 1999), was possibly the first recorded historian who  
deliberately portrayed the ‘East’ (Persians) and the ‘West’ (Greeks)  
as mutual antagonists, thereby proposing the nucleus of all ancient 
history. Others, Thucydides (460-400 BC), and Xenophone (430- 
354 BC), similarly, found it natural to employ strong polarities  
and concentrate on the ‘otherness’ of the East, while accepting the  
necessity of resistance to external force by defining a Western ‘self.’ 
Thus came into being the first system of the so-called East-West  
dichotomy. 
In another part of the world, meanwhile, the ideas of Confucian  
China (551-479 BC) and unification prevailed in the feudal states  
of the Eastern Zhou period (starting in 770 BC), spurred by the  
constant menace of invasion by exterior barbarians. 
Meanwhile, the Aryan masters of the Indus Valley who had long  
merged with the Dravidian inhabitants started to unite their tribes  
and founded kingdoms (1500-400 BC), and as a matter of survival  
against aggressors from the West created their own classical Indian 
culture and identity in opposition to the categorical otherness of the 
West. 
As I see it, there have been only two configurations of the East- 
West dichotomy throughout history. The first one was Western- 
centered (Eurocentric, c. 500 BC-AD 1950), the second one is Eastern- 
centered (Asiacentric, c. 1950-present). The former can be divided  
into Hellenic-Greek (c. 500 BC-AD 0), Judeo-Christian (c. from the  
birth of Jesus Christ to AD 1500) and North-Atlantic (c. 1500-1950);  
the latter one exclusively relies on the growing influence of China  
and its periphery (c. 1950-present) alone. To my knowledge, no  
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other ‘centrism’ has ever prevailed in world affairs. It is said in some 
academic circles that there has been a time when China was believed  
to be the supreme civilization, with all her great inventions like  
paper (220 BC), gunpowder (900), printing (1040), and the compass 
(1100) (Needham, 1964). Yet, to my understanding and despite those 
obvious accomplishments, China’s contributions to the external  
world, her encounter with and influence on the Western hemisphere 
have been scarce and almost insignificant. Some have argued that  
the “invention of the sciences” was the single decisive advantage  
that put the West ahead of all the other civilizations. We should have  
serious doubts about this. Thousands of Greeks marched into Persia 
to aid Cyrus (c. 400 BC); the conquest of Alexander the Great (356-323  
BC), the Romans and their emperors (27 BC-AD 395), the crusades  
(eleventh-fifteenth centuries), the explorations and conquests by the 
Mediterranean world (fifteenth-sixteenth centuries), the missionaries  
(sixteenth-seventeenth centuries), the colonial powers (sixteenth- 
nineteenth centuries), the subjugation of the New World (fifteenth- 
sixteenth centuries), the invention of the sciences (seventeenth  
century), and now globalization – all are products of the West. In a 
distinct succession, the West had always descended upon the ‘others’  
before they did the same: The envy of the world was the Greeks, the 
tormentor of the world was Christianity, and the leader of the world 
was Europe/America, more or less indisputably so until the second 
half of the twentieth century. 
I would like to argue then, that with the shattering of Europe during 
the two world wars (1914-1918 and 1938-1945), the collapse of the  
colonial empires, the rise and (later) fall of the Soviets, and with  
China’s first experiments with Western ‘narratives’ (e. g. Marxism/ 
Communism), Asian dominance had silently set in the second half  
of the twentieth century. History speaks for itself: In the following  
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50 years, according to the United Nations (UN), there were 118 wars 
(compared to just 55 in the first half of the century), not surprisingly 
most of them driven or fueled by anti-Western sentiments, most  
notably the Cold War (1950-1989). The USA, at least involved in  
60 of these wars, was defeated in Korea (1950-1953, officially a  
UN operation), Vietnam (1965-1972), during the Suez-Crisis (1956,  
together with Britain and France), and, most recently, failed in  
Afghanistan (2002-2006) and Iraq (2004-2013, both with the UK and 
other nations). In the meantime, we have seen the rapid economic  
development of no less than nine Eastern ‘tiger-states’ or regions:  
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,  
Thailand, Dubai and the Philippines. 
Some people say that the two poles of the East-West dichotomy had 
shifted twice to the outmost peripheries of the world, in the East to 
Japan (c. 1868-1945) and in the West to the USA (c. 1950-2006). I have  
strong objections against this. Japan, despite her relative military  
and economic power, like Great Britain, is an island state with the  
historical function of manipulating power structures between the  
divided forces dwelling on the massive neighboring continent.  
However, being descendants of the great landmasses themselves  
(Germanic and Chinese/Korean), with relatively small populations, 
neither of them fits the East-West equation by itself. The USA, on the 
other hand, is not a civilization but a (Western) culture, living on the 
outer crescent of the world’s pivot: Eurasia. 
Halford Mackinder had suggested as early as 1904 that the natural  
seat of power of all existing civilizations (except Latin American  
civilization) – Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic- 
Orthodox, African, with a combined population of 5.6 billion (or 85 
percent of the Earth’s population) – is the continuous landmass of  
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Eurasia and the subcontinent Africa, often referred to together as the 
‘World Island’ (Mackinder, 1904). Let us say then that for the past  
2,500 years, the history that mattered most was that of the European 
people, continuously reinventing themselves either through their  
struggle against Asiatic invasion (Persians, Ottomans, Arabs, etc.),  
or through conquest and colonization, and consequently exercising  
their authority over all defining paradigms in any East-West dispute,  
be it on a philosophical, scientific, economic, or ideological level. 
Now, as all theses tend to have antitheses, the balance for supremacy  
over the other civilizations is going to tip in favor of the ever more 
influential power blocks of Asia: China (with Taiwan, Hong Kong,  
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam,etc.), Japan, and soon  
India. And, because of their different cultural outlooks and sets of  
beliefs and values, these Eastern peoples will inevitably redefine  
history and reevaluate the East-West dichotomy according to the  
needs and benefits of their own triumphant civilizations. 
Naturally, it won’t take long until they will try to dominate. 
CHAPTER  2 
Induction 
anD DeDucTion 
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西方文化注重分析，一分为二； 
而东方文化注重综合，合二为一。 
The West is deductive, from the universal to the particular; 
The East is inductive, from the particular to the universal. 
——(JiXianlin,2006[1]) 
 
According to the universal historians Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975),  
Samuel Huntington (1927-), and Ji Xianlin (1911-2009), the world’s  
states form 21, 23, or 25 spheres, nine civilizations, and fall into  
four cultural systems: Arabic/Islamic, Confucian, Hindu/Brahmin,  
and Western/Christian, with the former three forming the Oriental 
cultural system, and the latter one the Occidental cultural system  
(Toynbee, 1961; Huntington, 1993; Ji, 2006). The main difference  
between the Orient and the Occident, so people say, lies in their  
different modes of thinking: The East is inductive; the West is  
deductive. 
Hence, the Orient’s search for universal formulas describing balance,  
harmony, or equilibrium: For example, in Chinese philosophy, the  
two lines in Chinese 二 (er, two) mean weight and counterpoise.  
Similarly, we find入入 (ru-ru, enter-enter) meaning equal weight on 
both sides,巾 (liang, equilibrium) representing scales in equilibrium 
(Wieger, 1965), or阴 阳(yin and yang) meaning two opposing but 
complementary primal forces. There are also Japaneseぜん (禅, zen) 
and 空 (sūnyata, emptiness) meaning everything is interrelated. In 
India we find seva-nagri (the universe and I are one and the same)  
and tat tvam asi (thou art that) meaning that the soul is part of the 
universal reality. 
By means of continuously inducing the universal, Confucianism,  
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Daoism, Shintoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism – as a rough guide – 
all ultimately arrive at the universal concept of ‘the One,’ ‘oneness of 
heaven and man’ (天人合一, tian ren he yi), the ‘divine law’ behind 
theVedas, the ‘merger of Brahman and atma’ (Brahmatmaikyam)  
or ‘ultimate reality’ (Ayam atma bhrama), the underlying inductive 
principle being that ‘All observed things are connected, therefore all 
things are one.’ 
In inductive reasoning, one induces the universal ‘all things are one’ 
from the particular ‘all things’ that are ‘observed.’  The conclusion  
may be sound, but cannot be certain. 
In theBodhicaryavatara, a key text of Mahayana Buddhism, Santideva  
(c. 650) teaches us that the fate of the individual is linked to the fate 
of others (Williams, 1998): "Although our human body is made of various 
parts we do not feel them as separated. Likewise this world is made of 
various elements but it is inseparable – it is one." (Santideva, 650). 
In theAbhidarma Sutra (The Higher Teachings of Buddha) of the Tipitaka  
(c. 100 BC), Lord Buddha says there is no ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ or ‘I’ 
in reality – it is all one ‘Ultimate Truth’ (Tipitaka, 2008). Nagarjuna 
(c. 200), writer of the Madhyamika-karika, adds: To attain Nirvana  
is to achieve ‘absolute emptiness’ (Bapat, 1956). For D. T. Suzuki (鈴 
木 大拙, 1870-1966) ‘Zen’ is about the ‘Ultimate Nothingness’ (Suzuki,  
1994). In Hinduism, the great epic Mahabharata (c. 600 BC-AD 400)  
reads: “Yad ihasti tad anyatra yan nehasti na tat kvachit” or “What 
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is found here, can be found elsewhere. What is not found here will 
not be found elsewhere” (Mahabharata, 2009). In the Bhagavadgita  
(ca. 150 BC), Krishna says to Arjuna: “Mamaivamsho jiva-loke jiva- 
bhutah sanatanah” (“The living entities in this conditional world are 
my fragmental parts, and they are eternal”) (Bhagavadgita, 2008). 
In theBook of Changes(I Ching,易 经; c. 1050-256 BC) ‘One’ is the 
supreme ultimate. In theDao De Jing (道德经, c. 600 BC), Lao Zi (老子) 
says “一生二，二生三，三生万物” (“One gives birth to two, two gives 
birth to three, three gives birth to all things”) (Lao Zi, 42). Confucius, 
too, discovered the oneness of heaven (天, tian) and man (人, ren) 
and rejoiced: “五十而知天命” (“At fifty I understood the decrees of 
heaven”), and later: “天生德于予” (“Heaven produced that virtue in 
me”) (Confucius, Lun Yu, 2;4, 7;23). We find similar notions inThe  
Book of Mencius: “尽其心者，知其性也；知其性则知天矣” (“If you fully 
explore your mind, you will know your nature. If you know your  
nature, you know heaven”) (Mencius, 7A.1), Dong Zhongshu: “天 
人之际，合而为一” (“Heaven and men are a unit; they form the one”) 
(Dong, 13; 56), and Lao Zi again: “人法也，地法天，天法道，道法自然” (“Man  
takes his law from the Earth; the Earth takes its law from Heaven;  
Heaven takes its law from the Dao. The law of the Dao is its being  
what it is”) (Lao Zi, 25). 
Note the implied universality: In the search for absolute  
interconnectedness, induction does not rely on categorical (formal)  
logic, hence the ‘particular West,’ by inductive inference, is included 
in this universal ‘oneness,’ or, as Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) once  
nicely put it (Sueki, 2004): “Western modernity is to be overcome by 
the Eastern religious mind.” 
While the vigorous deductive West occupied foreign terrain, built  
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churches, and spread the Gospel, the inductive East entertained a  
certain passivity, albeit with a long-term holistic world view: 
We firmly believe, no matter how long it requires, the day will be  
with us when universal peace and the world of oneness will finally 
come true. (Ji Xianlin, 1996) 
The West, on the other hand, separates God and the world. After all, 
we are not Him, but created by Him: “Then God said, Let us make 
man in our image; in the image of God he created him” (Genesis 1; 
31). 
Accordingly, in Western classrooms we teach an analytical ‘concrete 
reality’ based on conditioned textual analysis and interpretation of  
the world, rather than a holistic ‘absolute reality.’ Some examples of 
major works of analytical reasoning are Euclid’sElements (c. 300 BC),  
Immanuel Kant’s Copernican Revolution (1787), Charles Darwin’s 
theory of evolution  (1859), Albert Einstein’s Logic of Continuity (1905), 
or Adam Smith’s The Wealth  of the Nations (1776), the underlying 
deductive principle (as old as  the Greeks themselves) being that: 'All 
observed men are unique, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is unique.' 
In deductive reasoning, one deduces the particular ‘Socrates  
is unique’ from the universal ‘all men are unique,’ relying on  
the premises ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘All men are unique.’ The  
conclusion is sound and valid. 
A world thus described by deductive reasoning reaches new  
conclusions from previously known factsad infinitum. A world  
by inductive reasoning, on the other hand, allocates relations to  
recurring phenomenal patterns. We may call the former a “string of 
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cause and effect,” whereas in the latter we see a “puzzle made of its 
parts.” 
Accordingly, in the same way as some cultures believe in one, many,  
or no gods at all, they also have different ways of perceiving the  
world and reasoning about it: Western civilization becameanalysis- 
based, while the Orient becameintegration-based.       
I believe in this peculiar difference, and I suppose that most of those 
acquainted with Oriental thought do too. Yet I do not believe the  
West and the East are two mysterious forces bound for confrontation  
as in The Clash of Civilizations by Samuel P. Huntington (1993), nor  
do I believe that one is inevitably superior and the other necessarily 
inferior in accumulating either wealth or wisdom as inThe Protestant 
Ethic by Max Weber (1930) or in The Eastern Religious Mind by 
Nishitani Keiji (1942). For my part, I believe there has been a  
difference in the independent development of the two great cultural 
systems, deeply embedded since their earliest histories, in symbiosis 
with their peoples, and arranged according to their cultural outlooks 
–deduction andinduction.       
In La Route de la Soie Aly Mazahéri quoted this ancient Persian and 
Arab saying from the Sassanian Dynasty (226-c. 640): 
The Greeks never invented anything except some theories. They  
never taught any art. But the Chinese were different. They did teach 
all their arts, but indeed had no scientific theories whatever.  (Ji  
Xianlin, 1996) 
I will not go so far as Mazahéri to say “they do only this, and we  
do only that,” nor will I claim that someone is definitely deductive  
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in outlook just because he was born in London. It is not that easy.  
The making of every civilization’s treasures and contributions to  
history is determined by its methodology for explaining the world’s 
phenomena according to its own experience and mode of rational  
interpretation: The East became more inductive, while the West  
became more deductive – this appears to be borne out by all the  
evidence. 
Let us next discuss how there has been an imbalance in the  
equilibrium and how Asiacentrism, after the first half of the  
twentieth century, has played a role in correcting this imbalance,  
and the history that led to it. 
CHAPTER 3 
The  DichoTomy  WiTh 
asiacenTrism 
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Manisthemeasureofallthings.——(Protagoras,c.480BC-410BC) 
In the early twentieth century, the influences of such great (read:  
radical) narratives’ doctrines such as Herbert Spencer’s ‘Social  
Darwinism’ in “Process: Its Law and Cause”  (1857), Friedrich  
Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ inHuman,All Too Human (1886), and  
Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto (1848) could be felt in most  
Western academic writings on the East-West discourse. There  
was no sense of equilibrium and balance. In that great Darwinian  
struggle among nations for survival, any inferior culture was – at  
the slightest sign of weakness – believed to be surely eliminated.  
This gave rise to those misguided beliefs about superiority of race,  
culture, and civilization, for example in Nazi Germany (1933- 
1945) or militarist Japan (1932-1945), but also during Stalin’s  
revolution (1928-32), the 1915-1917 massacres of Armenians under  
the Ottoman Empire, or Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  
American cultural militarism (c. 1991-2013) is another case in point. 
Fortunately, another world war now seems unlikely. The world got 
a rude but timely awakening in August 1945, when an American  
bomber dropped a plutonium bomb, the so-called ‘Fat Man,’ over  
Nagasaki and ended World War II. Waging war on a grand scale, it 
seemed, stopped short at the prospect of total annihilation of entire 
civilizations. With Europe on her knees and the victorious USA well 
disposed to face the disciplined nations of the East (identified by  
the Warsaw Pact [1955-1991] and other communist nations), soon a 
new warfare had been created. This time, the warfare was merely  
ideological, if not intellectual: 
According to the intrinsic powers of Western analytical reasoning  
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over history, the East had to become gradually Westernized by law 
of nature. 
Similar to the extension of the universe, demonstrable after the  
discovery of the ‘Planck Constant’ (Planck, 1901), or the direction of 
time, demonstrable by applying the ‘Special Theory of Relativity’  
(Einstein, 1905), for theanalytically-based West history has a  
qualitative nature. It has aim, it is progressive in nature, it can only  
improve in one direction, from a general (the universal) to a more  
complex stage (the particular), and advance with one truth only. 
For theintegration-based East, on the other hand, what might be  
called ‘truth’ is given at any time (the ‘one’) and is always justifiable 
through ‘being a part of the whole.’ In other words, there are many 
truths, many more than the West can bear, and the mere existence  
of the more inductive East as an alternative a priori to the more  
deductive West qualifies it to provide a genuine, believable non- 
Western experience of history: history as a non-directional but  
timeless tangible realm. 
Theintegration-based East, for the greater part of its 5,000 years of  
extraordinary civilization (in the case of India and China, certainly  
even more), nurtured the importance of inductive reasoning by  
placing a strong emphasis on broadening all traditional knowledge, 
increasing its peoples’capacity for memorization, favoring the ability  
to learn from analogy, and promoting the skill to understand what  
is implied (for example, in Asia, ‘yes’ is the universal confirmative  
answer in formal dialog, even if ‘no’ is implied). 
And then there is the Asian ‘love of learning.’ The subject of  
philosophical discussion as early as Mozi (墨 子, 470 -391 BC),  
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the love of learning was officially politicized during the Legalist  
Movement (770-221 BC). The Legalists stressed the universal  
importance of promoting capable people as officials, regardless  
of their confession or creed. Throughout history, the inductive  
way in Asia manifested itself in an ever-increasing ability to  
reason inductively and, consequently, in cultural output (in art,  
religion, music, literature etc.) that values ‘oneness,’ ‘balance,’  
and ‘harmoniousness’ (Gu, 1922; Sen, 2006; Wu, 1997, 1998). This  
overall output of Asian diligence, high achievement, and ancient  
commitment to study is best exemplified by Confucius’Analects (Lun  
Yu,论语, 8;17): 
学如不及，犹恐失之。 
Study as if you were never to master it; 
as if in fear of losing it. 
So, that is essentially what the intelligent Asian people were doing  
in the twentieth century: studying as if they were never to master it. 
And, indeed, after prolonged flirtations with Western culture and  
values, especially during the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth  
Movement (c. 1919-1921), which were essentially anti-Confucian  
and partly pro-Western, in the 1920s to 1930s virtually every  
Chinese, Japanese, or Indian intellectual was embroiled in a series of 
controversies about Eastern and Western cultures (Ji, 2006). 
Although Western theories, science, and technology were  
appreciated, most Eastern intellectuals were convinced that Asian  
values and wisdom were unique and so clearly diametrically  
opposed to many values and wisdoms of the West, that they needed 
to be preserved, even at the cost of an inevitable intellectual clash  
with the West. In the fields of art, literature, and science, especially 
after the founding of the Communist Party in 1921, Chinese writers, 
politicians, and historians stood up for their views on the East-West 
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dichotomy and patriotically defended their own civilization and the 
‘essence of the East’ (e. g. Asian thought and culture) against the  
infiltration of Western “scum and dregs” as asserted by Ji Xianlin: “只 
要拿得不过头，不把西方文化的糟粕和垃圾一并拿来，就是好事” (“As long as 
we do not take in Western scum and dregs, it will be a good thing”) 
(Ji, 2006 [2]), Western preoccupation with ‘ontological beingness’  
as asserted by Nishida Kitaro 1870-1945 (Abe, 1988), and Western- 
fabricated ‘Orientalism,’ as Edward Said called it (Said, 1978; 1995). 
Following the example of Japan’s modernization efforts during  
the Meiji Restoration from the late ninteenth to the early twentieth  
century to absorb Western thought and technology (‘Wakon yosai’  
or ‘Western techniques, Japanese soul’), China and her neighbors,  
according to their 5,000 years of history of learning and self- 
cultivation reactively studied and Easternized virtually each and  
every Western theory. Hands down, I mean it: virtually everything. 
Notwithstanding its love of learning, Confucian China, Imperial  
China, and now communist China nevertheless believed that the  
most important thing it already owned was  中国为本 (Chineseness 
at the root). If only she could acquire from the deductive, scientific- 
oriented USA and Europe their useful techniques and theories, the  
so-calledxifang wei mo (西方为末, Westerness as a means)! In order 
to prevail over the West (Ji, 2006), do as the Master said: 
三人行，必有我师焉； 
择其善者而从之，其不善者而改之。 
In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound  
to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them,  
and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.  
(Confucius,Lun Yu, 7,12). 
Under ‘Orientalization’ we now understand the process in which  
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Western knowledge and techniques are acquired without giving  
away the Asian soul – in essence a form of ideological self- 
reliance (自力更 生), as opposed to reliance on Western ideology or 
Westernization. 
Not only China, but East Asia in general, consequently ‘borrowed’  
from the West whatever seemed fit: from aestheticism in a  
Wildean or Byronic sense (Zhou, 2000), architecture, art and  
cinema, economics, film and documentary, law, literature, sports,  
music, post-modern theory, through Darwinism, Marxism (e.g.  
the Sinification of Marxism), to socialism (e.g. Socialism with  
Chinese characteristics) and new forms of democracy. The People’s 
Republic of China today openly acknowledges the Democratic  
People’s Republic of Korea, the Russia Federation, and Myanmar  
as ‘democratic’ nations and sees itself as ‘democratic, with Chinese  
characteristics,’ according to each country’s own definition of what  
constitutes a legitimate democracy (China.org., 2005; Lynch, 2007).  
Remember the Eastern notions of many truths? That’s a no-no in  
the Western world, where we expect the unwavering truth, and one 
truth only. 
China in particular never made any great attempts at concealing  
her own truths and her aim to uphold Eastern values and wisdoms 
– why should the East throw away its five millennia of successful  
history and culture? – and at the same time profited from the  
practicability of foreign learning and her ability to adapt herself,  
even if it meant aggressively copying from the West: 
师夷之长技以制夷。 
Study the foreigners so that you will have the upper hand over  
them. (Wei Yuan, 1843) 
All things Western became fashionable. However,  the influence  
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of Westerners on China’s soil –  as some patronizing American  
or European would like to imagine  – as was truly the case with  
Buddhism in China (c. 68-800) or the introduction of Western  
sciences by European missionaries (c. 1575-1702) before, is wishful  
thinking. That ‘Great Learning’ from the end of the Qing Dynasty  
(清 朝) onwards to the beginnings of the Republic (1911-1949) is  
unmistakably ‘made in China,’ her ‘intellectual property,’ so to  
speak. I feel the urge to repeat this important historical fact: The rise 
of China is inherently Chinese, just as the Meiji Restoration (明治维新, 
Meiji Ishin, 1868-1912) was inherently Japanese. 
Yes, Lu Xun (鲁 迅, 1881-1936) adopted some ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
and developed them further. So did Li Shicen (李 石 岑, 1892-1934) 
and Mao Dun (矛盾, 1896-1981). Hu Shi (胡适, 1891-1962) espoused 
William James’sand John Dewey’s ideas on education and pragmatism and  
developed them further. Mao Zedong (毛 泽 东, 1893-1976), Chen 
Duxiu (陈独秀, 1879-1942), and Li Dazhao (李大钊, 1888-1927) were 
influenced by Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin and developed their ideas further. 
I could go on. Yet no foreigner was involved in the intellectual output of those 
great cultural figures. The Chinese intellectuals – no less engaged in protecting 
their cultural sovereignty with nationalism than the Japanese before them  –  
read Western theories, studied, improved, and Sinosized them. 
In theintegration-based East, where knowledge comes from tradition, 
ancient concepts of the inductive Eastern ‘moral superiority’ vs.  
Western deductive ‘scientific superiority’ were soon identified  
as the nucleus of the East-West dichotomy and the struggle for  
the ‘Eastern soul.’ By all means, Western technology and ways of  
rational inquiry, i.e. the deductive way, had to be acquired in order 
to defend against Western imperialism, yet it was the humanitarian 
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Eastern soul and its wisdom, i.e. the inductive way, that should  
guide the East: 
对西方的文化，鲁迅先生曾主张“拿来主义”。这个主义至今也 
没有过时。过去我们拿来，今天我们仍然拿来，只要拿得不过头， 
不把西方文化的糟粕和垃圾一并拿来，就是好事，就对我们国家 
的建设有利。 
In the case of Western culture, Lu Xun earlier proposed the ‘take-in 
approach.’ This has ever since been our practice. In the past we took 
in, and today we are still taking in. As long as we steer calm, not  
taking in the waste and garbage of Western culture too, this will be a 
good thing for the construction of our nation. (Ji Xianlin, 2006 [3]) 
Lu Xun proposed to “return a plum” (Ji, 2006). 
So does the Chinese 
tradition in theBook of Songs, Da Ya (诗 经,大 雅): “投 我一桃，报 之 
以 李” (“If you give me a peach, I shall return a plum”), meaning a 
give-and-take approach (送 去 主 义). Unfortunately, Mao Zedong, 
realizing that the capitalist West would never accept his plum – with 
reference to Luo Guanzhong’s (罗贯中) war epicRomance of the Three 
Kingdoms(三国演义, San GuoYanyi, c. 1330-1400) that reads: “三十 
年河西，三十年河东” (“Thirty years West of the river, thirty years East 
of it”) (Luo, 1998) – mocked Lu Xun’s give-and-take approach and  
disposed of tolerance altogether: 
我认为现在国际形势到了一个新的转折点。世界上现在有两股风： 
东风，西风。中国有句话：“不是东风压倒西风，就是西风压倒 
东风。我认为目前形势的特点是东风压倒西风，也就是说 
社会主义的力量对于帝国主义的力量占了压倒的优势。" 
I believe that the international situation has now reached a new  
turning point. There are two winds in the world, the East Wind and 
the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying that “either the East Wind 
prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the  
East Wind.” I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that  
the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the 
forces of Socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the  
forces of Imperialism. (Mao Zedong, 1957) 
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In the latter half of the twentieth century, just as the West  
aggressively propagated its own political values, so did the East.  
The ‘soul of Asia’ had to be internalized by each and every member 
of its collective Eastern societies obedient to a universal Asiatic ‘code  
of conduct’ (e.g. Confucian conduct) driven by the Eastern notion of 
‘oneness.’ Some may call it a collective defense mechanism against  
the Western ‘particulars,’ only this time using neo-Darwinian  
terminology in the spirit of Charles Darwin (and later Herbert  
Spencer) and their prophetic biology that “bids all to eat and to  
be eaten in their turn” (Darwin, 1859 [1]). If interest in biological  
survival embraces political resolutions, one may call it ‘nationalism.’ 
Finally, the spiritual East identified the material West as its sole  
competitor for everything that is worthwhile in life: culture, values, 
wealth, and, yes, dignity. Yet, because of the limits of the inductive 
way, the East could only make sense of the West as a short- 
sighted, destructive force composed of millions of self-determined  
individuals who spread out and conquer nature, who undermine  
the ‘great harmony,’ thereby constantly neglecting the ‘oneness of  
all things’ and dwelling in the ‘minuscule particular.’ What was  
worse, back home the West had formed nation states as political  
tools to bundle and channel the disruptive forces of its armies of  
independent, egoistic, shameless, and often lonely individuals. 
Not surprisingly, European-style nationalism and concepts of  
cultural superiority soon became very fashionable in the East, too,  
for example with eugenics in China. Until recently, the prevailing  
notion among many Chinese anthropologists, the Communist  
Party of China, and Chinese college textbooks well into the twenty- 
first century was that the Chinese race exclusively developed from  
the ‘Peking Man,’ orhomo erectus, whose remains were, so we are  
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told, first discovered in 1923 to 1928 by Davidson Black (1884- 
1934) and Pei Wenzhong (裴 文 中, 1904-1982) during excavations 
in Zhoukoudian (周 口 店), now a UNESCO World Heritage  
Center near Beijing that dates back roughly 500,000 years ago.  
Meanwhile, the European races were believed to be the result of  
interbreeding betweenhomo sapiens and the lesser Neanderthal  
man. This interpretation of history was challenged twice in 1985  
by Lewis Binford (1930-) and Chuan Kun Ho (1945-), who argued  
that the Peking Man was a scavenger (Binford and Chuan, 1985),  
and finally in 1998 to 2004 by a team of computational biologists  
and anthropologists around Jin Li (金 力), who used methods from 
molecular genetics to demonstrate that the Chinese race, like everyone  
else too, descended fromhomo sapiens and the African continent in  
accordance with the ‘single-origin hypothesis’ (Jin, 1998). 
That Chinese dream of racial exclusivity, held mostly by the Han  
Chinese, didn’t differ significantly from that of the British, Germans, 
Japanese, and Americans before them, and was motivated by a  
similar desire. Fortunately, it was proven that this theory lacked  
any scientific evidence. Yet other forms of cultural superiority in  
Asia remain, such as ‘Dahanzuzhuyi’ (大 汉 族 主 义, the chauvinistic 
Han), ‘Nihonjin-ron’ (日 本 人 論, Japanese uniqueness), the ‘Vasudeva’ 
(the supreme man) etc. – all highly complex models not so much of  
biological, but more of moral or even intellectual superiority (we  
will come to that later).  This superiority has been refflected in party 
slogans, public policies, and literary movements. 
In order to successfully wed man to ideology (again, the concept of 
‘the one’), not an industrial revolution that manipulates matter, but 
a cultural revolution that manipulates minds had to take place. 
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What followed, in the spirit of a neo-Darwinian’s ‘biologized’  
society, I call the “husbandry of ideas.” This is the notion that ideas 
can be refined and perfected, just as domestic animals were over the 
last 2,000 years, by a strict and controlled selection and maintenance 
process: 
如此循环往复，一次比一次更正确，更生动，更丰富。 
And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas 
becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. (Mao  
Zedong, 1943; 1967) 
The above quote from Mao Zedong sounds ruthless, mainly perhaps 
because he speaks in his function as a political leader. Who wants  
to be so openly manipulated by a politician? Nevertheless, what  
Mao said is essentially at the core of all religious movements and  
any other mass movement you and I can think of, and, of course,  
repetition is the very essence of all behavioral modification and  
psychological conditioning. It is the simple act of value creation.  
Any personal action causes a result, and that result itself is the truth 
about the direction and intention of the cause. The repetitive action 
then constantly confirms our direction and intention. Hence, it does 
not matter how much a scientist denies the existence of God: As long  
as some people believe in God, that God is the truth about the cause 
that leads to Him. 
Could the principles of husbandry and selection, which we have  
seen to be so potent when exercised by a breeder, apply to social  
and political affairs? They did so in the former Soviet Union and  
Germany’s Nazi government under Hitler; both explicitly used  
propaganda that favored Communism or Fascism in all forms of  
media, literary and public expression. 
In China’s case, we see the systematical ideological indoctrination  
of Chinese pupils in over 500,000 schools and 1,750 universities and 
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colleges till today (2007) during weekly political classes at junior  
high school and university levels in毛 泽 东 思 想 概 论 (Thoughts of 
Mao Zedong),思 想 道 德 修 养(Moral Education),邓 小 平 理 论 (Deng 
Xiaoping’s Theory),马克思主义哲学原理 (Marxism),社会主义初级阶段 
(Introduction to Socialism), and at primary school level in思 想 品 
德 (Character and Moral Education). Here, the exam results are as  
crucial for children as the ones in mathematics or physics. Finally,  
we have the Ministry of Education’s ‘model scholars’ (模范学者) out 
there virtually proclaiming new Chinese nationalism and unity: 
As far as East-West issues are concerned, we practically know the  
West like the palm of our hand, but the West’s vision of the East  
is a murky confusion. It is thus self-evident who would hold an  
advantageous position should there be any conflict in the future  
between the two. (Ji Xianlin in Lin, 1996) 
Meanwhile, after jointly winning the Great War in 1948, those self- 
exiled remnants of European civilization, calling themselves the  
USA, by now militarily and economically evolved into a European  
warrior-based culture. They returned to Eurasia and essentially  
revived Europe, swept through this former cradle of capitalism,  
democracy and the free market economy, refined all theories, and  
built its military and cultural bases all over the place, yet with eyes 
fixed firmly on the perceived menaces from Asia.   
East and West as a result became competitors for better theories,  
with an Eastern affinity for hyperbole, gigantisms, and holistic  
totality – the glorification of idols and leaders, state monopolies,  
authoritarianism, and autarchy: “东方红” (“The East is Red”;  
Mao Zedong, 1960), which was also the name of the anthem of the  
Communist Party of China during the '60s and the name of a satellite 
that carried a radio transmitter broadcasting the song in 1970; and  
a Western affinity for a historical ‘sense of mission’ to dissolve and 
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deconstruct the seemingly coherent Eastern cultures and take the  
lead: “The United States is the locomotive, the rest of the world is  
the caboose” (Dean Acheson, 1940). 
As a result of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao  
Zedong, in his famous essay “On New Democracy” (新民主主义论, 
1964), called it “新 的 世 界 革 命” or “The New World Revolution.” 
Moreover, during the ‘de-Westernization’ of Asia and ‘de- 
colonialism’ in other parts of the world in the second half of the  
twentieth century (Han, 1998; Sisci, 2008), the two hemispheres  
East and West drifted apart, with the remaining inflow of Western  
ideas and standards (e.g. trials of re-Westernization) often seen as  
the gongs and drums of a recovering barbarian, more or less until  
China’s opening-up in 1978 and the fall of the communist Soviet  
Union in 1991. 
When Donella H. Meadows’ TheLimits to Growth was published  
in the USA in 1972 – the first scientific study on the decline of the  
West that was not purely philosophical and speculative like the  
theories of Herbert Spencer (1857) and Arthur Toynbee (1958), but  
computational and methodical – it became clear to the West that its 
deduction-based ‘materialistic civilization’ would one day reach its  
limits. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
equilibrium 
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This so-called ‘Crisis of the materialistic Civilization’ (Meadows,  
1972; Husserl, 1970) of the West was supposed to go hand in hand  
with the ‘Revival of the spiritual Civilization’ (Kim, 2006), namely  
the East. In order to prevent our planet’s ecological system from  
ultimate collapse, the deductive-based and nature-abusing West  
had to learn – so goes Donella Meadows’ argument – four important 
lessons (Meadows, 1972): 
1) The world is but one. 
2) The earth is limited, resources are limited, and therefore  
economic growth is limited. 
3) All the temporal alterations are going in circulation. All  
phenomena are but alterations rather than developments. 
4) Human interference with the ecological order will harm nature;  
balance is needed to maintain universal evolution and harmony 
in nature. 
Needless to say, the four points above neatly correspond to those  
induction-based, more intuitive Eastern concepts such as ‘oneness  
of heaven and man’ (天 人合 一), ‘harmonious society,’ ‘recurrences 
in history,’ and ‘the non-linear concepts of time.’ With only two  
alternatives, the Eastern and Western way, it seems necessary that if 
the West stopped being Western, it would have to become Eastern. 
Conversely, that is exactly what the West thought the East was  
supposed to become, namely a carbon copy of the West. 
Meadows’ The Limits to Growth was published during the Cold  
War (1950-1989). Imagine the uproar in some Western intellectual  
circles! Millions of Asians and their sympathizers certainly felt  
schadenfreude upon hearing that there would be a ‘reckoning’ for  
the sins of the Western colonialists, imperialists, and capitalists.  
Soon, sensationalism on either side prevailed, with media and  
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intellectuals picking up clichés such as ‘Confucian Renaissance,’ ‘the 
enlightenment of the West towards a more harmonious society,’  
or the triumph of ‘Asian values.’ The hasty – if not premature –  
conclusion of many scholars was this: 
The declining West seemed morally bankrupt. That was believable  
because, like all other human relationships, the East-West  
relationship should have been based not only on mutual respect  
(which in this case it never was) but also should have offered the  
simple lesson of reciprocity, e.g. ‘give-and-take’ or ‘for every gain  
there is a loss,’ or ‘baoying’ (报应, retribution), or just ‘good or bad 
karma.’ But with its attitude of divide, conquer and rule, the West  
had simply gone too far (Spencer, 1857). 
Ever since the European Enlightenment and the Industrial  
Revolution, the technologically advanced West subjugated the  
spiritual Eastern nations and taught them scientific ways, thereby  
inevitably helping Asia and all other nations to develop (助长) 
and grow. However, “the teacher had refused to appreciate his  
pupils,” to engage with them, and learn enough in return from their 
intuitive, induction-based traditions. 
We have already mentioned the profound love of learning and  
respect for traditions in Eastern societies. As a consequence, the  
teacher-student relationship in Asia has always been far more  
spiritually important and guided by mutual respect, love, and  
humility than in Western societies. One can only imagine the  
emotional abuse Asia – a kind, ancient, proud, and exceptionally  
intelligent civilization – suffered at the hands of her often unfriendly 
and very oppressive Western master. This brings to mind the song  
“Mad World” by Gary Jules: 
Made me feel the way that every child should, sit and listen; Went to  
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school and I was very nervous, no one knew me; Hello teacher tell  
me what’s my lesson, look right through me. (Gary Jules, 2006) 
Western societies “looked right through” their Eastern pupils; there 
was simply nothing to learn from “a boy of twelve years old,” as  
General Douglas MacArthur said about the Japanese civilization, “as  
compared to our own (Western civilization’s) development of forty- 
five years” while testifying in front of the US Senate Committee on 
“Army and on Foreign Relations” (Shibusawa, 2006). 
Now that Meadows’The Limits to Growth was published, many  
Asians believed that the day their Western masters’ material growth 
stagnated would be the day when their faithful Asian pupils would 
offer their spiritual advice and wisdom (about harmoniousness,  
alternative world views, the oneness of nature and man, etc.), at  
least in theory (Toynbee, 1958; Zaehner, 1976; Thoreau, 1988; Ji,  
2006). The very opposite occurred, of course. 
In practice, as we all know, economic growth – although more or  
less stagnant in Western Europe and America – is still rampant and 
plentiful in the developing parts of ‘Westernized’ Asia, albeit with  
the looming presence of Western companies and corporate money.  
The West, it seems, isn’t exhausted as long as there are still growth 
opportunities, overseas markets, and material resources to lay its  
hands on. Therefore, in this twenty-first century, in Asia some are  
still asking the same question they asked in the 1970s: When will  
Asian values or belief systems finally start to have a measurable  
impact on those Western invaders, and, even more important: Will  
the East be able to ‘give’ as much as it is able to ‘take’ in (Wu, 2007)? 
Evidence shows the East has some influence on the West. A  
strengthening of the East is already in the making, although the  
36 
deduction-based narcissist West, which got itself lost, to use the  
words of Aby-Lughod, in a universe of “vulgar and utterly finicky, 
atomistic details,” for the time being is unable to see through  
the natural greater scheme of things (Ng, 1998; Wu, 1997, 1998;  
Wallerstein, 2005; Chirot, 1991; Aby-Lughod, 1989). Similarly,  
the ‘white West’ failed to anticipate its ethnic suicide (Heinsohn,  
2003, 2005) and its failure (or the failure of its economic and social  
theories) to predict the rise of East Asia (Lin, 2006). 
For, in having been able to resist Western imperialism and  
colonialism – above all a moral victory – and easily forming by far  
the most populous nations on the ‘world island,’ Asia now accounts 
for 65 percent of the world’s population and Europe for only 11  
percent. With contempt for Western aggressions and, in the case of 
Russia and China, no longer intimidated by the Western powers,  
Asiacentrism in geopolitical terms had set in after the 1950s – in my 
estimation long before the two giants, China and India, had their  
respective economies (c. 1990-2007) to prove it. 
Today’s de-Westernization is not only taking place in obvious places 
like China, Japan, Russia, Korea etc., but also in the Middle East,  
Africa, and South-East Asia. Many people have serious doubts about  
the West, its intentions and deeply flawed views. Ultranationalist  
bestsellers likeThe Japan That Can Say No (1989) by Akio Morita and 
Shintaro Ishihara, and China Can Say No (1996) by Song Qiang (宋 
强) are among the milder ones of their kind, both strongly opposing 
the Caucasian world order and Western values (Morita, 1989; Song, 
1996). Why should Japanese culture bow down to the whims of  
America’s corporate culture? Why don’t China and India with their 
histories of 5,000 years and combined population of 2.5 billion resist 
this pre-adolescent monkey business of the USA with regards to  
teaching Asia a lesson in human rights, democracy, and statecraft?  
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After all, the USA ‘pre-emptively’ bombed the Middle East and  
tortured ‘enemy combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay Detention  
Camp on the shore of Cuba (Human Rights Watch, 2003; Amnesty  
International, 2005). 
Remarkably, the East-West dichotomy, as if an invisible hand has  
dealt the right cards, still determines world affairs and history  
despite long and enduring phases of centrism, trials of expansion,  
colonialism and empire, alliances and ganging-ups, rivalry and false 
beliefs in superiority. What makes us think then that the disparity of 
East and West can be best explained by anything other than a law of 
nature? Is there a scientific ‘dualism’ similar to the one recognized  
by Valentinovich G. Plekhanov (1856-1918), founder of ‘dialectical  
materialism,’ who says that science entails contradictions inherited  
in all natural and social phenomena called ‘laws of dialectics’ [science  
of contradictions] (Plekhanov, 1891)? Is there are law of ‘difference’ 
similar to Jacques Derrida’s (1930-2004) concept of ‘différance’  
suggested in his masterpieceDe La Grammatologie (1967), in which  
he argued that the prime function of all languages and thoughts is  
‘differing’ – the ‘differentiation’ of signs from each other (Derrida,  
1967)? 
As for common sense, a people’s good intentions, or bad ones,  
are useless when it comes to interfering with scientific laws. If  
there is a scientific reason behind why the omnipotent West never  
wanes, yet on the other hand, despite countless trials of conquest,  
colonialism, and intimidation, never turned the East into the West  
either… doesn’t this suggest the very dichotomy of East and West is 
essentially a natural trait of the human race? Is there a law of nature 
that pushed East and West in diametrically opposed directions,  
making one become more inductive, and the other more deductive, 
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while keeping both hemispheres in balance? Does psychology, 
the two cognitive hemispheres of our brain, affect the making of 
culture (McGilchrist, 2012)? 
Alas, no humanist wants to hear a theory that equates the evolution 
of our precious homo sapiens with the development of a dualism  
that somehow achieved a perfect East-West equilibrium. (Most 
historians would rather prefer some sort of hierarchial master and 
servant relationship of East and West.) The day  
we discover such a rare dualistic creature in the animal kingdom,  
however, might change all that. 
Until then, in order to answer those questions, some key areas can  
be discussed in which a possible unintended yet synchronized  
behavior of the integration-based East and analysis-based West has 
clearly played a role in keeping a relative equilibrium during the last  
50 years of ‘catching-up-with-the-West’ Asiacentrism. 
CHAPTER 5 
DemograPhy 
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Why are the people thus busily moving? 
For food they are seeking, children they fain would beget, 
Feeding them all as they can. Traveler, mark this well, 
And when thou art home, do thou likewise! 
More can no mortal effect, work with what ardor he will. 
——(JohannW.vonGoethe,1790) 
 
With the decline of Europe during the Great War, the multiethnic  
USA survived as the only counterweight to the overwhelmingly  
racially homogeneous countries of the East: China was 92 percent  
ethnic Han, Nippon was 99 percent ethnic Japanese, and Korea was 
99 percent ethnic Korean. Meanwhile, the (coherently perceived)  
Muslim world, the Hindu world, and the Soviet empire together  
comprised over two billion people. During the next few decades of 
reconstructing Europe, all major Eastern cultures, often driven by  
political utopian dreams, increased their populations so dramatically  
as if to prove Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) wrong: 
中国人口众多是一件极大的好事。再增加多少倍人口也完全有办法， 
这办法就是生产 . 
The massive population of China is our greatest good. Even a  
further increase of several times the population is entirely possible, 
possible through productivity. 
(Mao Zedong, 1960, Vol. 4) 
Thomas Malthus, an English philosopher, made his famous  
prediction in 'An Essay on the Principle of Population' (1798) that  
population growth would at some point in time outrun food supply, 
and hence that the world population must have a maximum limit  
of between nine to twelve billion. Naturally, until that final limit is  
reached, some nations would try, almost fanatically as in the case of 
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Maoist China until the early '80s, or not try at all, as in case of post- 
war Germany after the '50s, which officially discouraged children,  
to outperform each other – for instance by forbidding contraception, 
ruling out gay communions, encouraging matchmaking, rewarding 
‘patriotic’ baby-making, or discouraging women from joining the  
labor force (Heinsohn, 2003 [1]). Japan’s population increased from  
60 to 127 million, India from 550 to 1,100 million, China exploded  
in population from 600 to over one billion and 350 million, the  
citizens of the Soviet Union grew from 100 million to 450 million  
(by annexation), and finally the entire Arab/Moslem population  
almost tripled to one billion 400 million (with Indonesia from 75 to 
220 million, Pakistan from 39 to 167 million etc.) (GeoHive, 2008;CIA 
Factbook, 2008). 
As I write this paper, the populations of China and India have each 
increased by 20 million in the past 18 months, close to the size of  
that of Australia. That is of course a far cry from back in the year  
2000, when China reported 36 million ‘millennium babies’ (China  
Daily, 2012/02/01). By modern European standards, such figures  
are utopian and utterly mind-boggling. And it does not stop here: In 
2007, in just one of its 22 provinces, namely in Henan, China saw a 
birthrate of roughly 1.2 million Chinese babies, some 500,000  more 
than entire Germany in that same year  –  however, 28 percent of  
the ‘German babies’ were of non-German ethnic descent (destasis,  
2006). Tens of thousand million babies is a post-modern sin, even  
for a proud and wise civilization like China. So, Henan’s local  
authorities, in order to counter their outrageously high birthrate of  
1.6 million annually during the ‘90s, had to promise Beijing not to  
exceed the province’s projected population of  110 million before the 
year 2020 (China Daily, 2008/04/20). Hurray to that! To put this into 
perspective: During the Olympic Year in Beijing in 2008, 20 million 
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Chinese were born in Chinese mainland. And this, despite the ‘one- 
child policy’ from 1979, although heavily relaxed, still being in  
place (there are many exceptions to the policy, and minorities and  
rich folks are exempted anyway, but we won’t go into that here).  
Growing at this rate, the world’s entire World War II casualties  
(roughly 72 million people, including all casualties of famine!) are  
replaced by China alone in a little under four years. Add the babies 
from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and the World War II losses  
are remedied in just under 18 months. In this context, Darwin’s  
words sound ironic: 
In this case we can clearly see that if we wished in imagination to  
give the plant the power of increasing in number, we should have to 
give it some advantage over its competitors. (Charles Darwin, 1859 
[2]) 
However, in the short run between the years 1950 and 2000, the  
doctrine of Darwin (and, in politics, Karl Marx) had disappointed the  
people, and so did the practice of Social Darwinism as a nominal  
imperative: Numbers (and mind you, it is always about numbers!)  
of citizens did not immediately translate into global dominance.  
Something rather counterintuitive happened, as the believed  
outcome of the struggle for survival against the West failed to  
materialize: 
If two great regions had been for a long period favorably  
circumstanced in an equal degree, the battle would be prolonged  
and severe; […]. But in the course of time, the forms dominant in  
the highest degree, wherever produced, would tend everywhere to  
prevail. As they prevailed, they would cause the extinction of other 
and inferior forms, […]. (Charles Darwin, 1859 [3]) 
What Darwin had anticipated for the plants and animal kingdom,  
namely that biological mass or discipline (instinct) of a group leads 
to victory, seemed technically absurd: Although the Caucasian  
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population in the USA, Great Britain, Germany, and France declined 
in relation to most other great Asian nations, these countries  
assimilated quite well the mass migration from East to West. On  
the contrary, the West was able to profit from its newly won 
diversity, calling it ‘multiculturalism,’ the only ‘minor’ problem  
being that of successful integration: Already in the year 2007, in  
Amsterdam, the capital of The Netherlands, almost 40 percent of  
its 750,000 inhabitants were ethnic minorities, and 60 percent of  
children in primary schools were of non-Dutch descent. The influx  
of Asians, and also of Eastern Europeans and Africans, had made a 
great impact on the USA, the European Union, Canada, Australia,  
and other Western countries, which also led to pressure as these  
immigrants often have more children than the domestic populations 
(Heinsohn, 2005). 
Soon, critics were wielding clichés such as ‘moral conquerors’ and  
‘spiritual invasion’ (Freytag, 1940; 2004), ‘Counter-Colonialism,’  
‘the Gradual Orientalization of the Western Culture’ and  
‘Pacific Century,’ meaning that the twenty-first century will be  
dominated by the Pacific Rim states, including China, Japan,  
and the USA (Gibney, 1992; PBS, 1993; Borthwick, 1998), ‘The  
Chinese Enlightenment of the West,’ ‘Eastern takeover’ or ‘Clash  
of Civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993; 2000; 2004). All these notions,  
supported by popular academic data, suggest that conformist  
East Asians and individualistic Westerners – apart from having  
shaped two entirely different civilizations, one induction-based, the 
other deduction-based – indeed seem to produce different general  
cognitive styles too. The latter tend to reason more analytically, the 
former tend to reason more holistically (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). 
The demographic changes in Europe are irreversible, and the  
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former feelings of Western superiority – the analytical mind, the  
linear approach to time and history, the soul of the conqueror, the  
deductive ways – over time will proportionally decrease in favor  
of a newly felt Eastern superiority – the intuitive mind, the holistic  
approach to time, the non-Western experience of history, the soul of  
the sage, the inductive ways. 
As a matter of perception, till today, the Western ways are  
universally associated with ‘war, ’‘aggression,’ and ‘exclusiveness,’  
(which is reserved for 'the few') while the Eastern ways are associated 
with ‘peace,’ ‘tranquility,’ and ‘inclusiveness’ (which is reserved for 
'the many') – notwithstanding both hemispheres showing the  
tendencies to project their own psychological outlook onto the other. 
For the vast majority of Americans and Europeans, Asia is a place  
for all those fanatics, dictators, terrorists, and immature cultures.  
For the Asians, the West – despite its cruelties and flaws – is often  
seen as the savior who brings stability, happiness, and peace to the 
world. 
As a consequence of ‘psychological projection,’ the West does not  
clearly see its own vices, and the East does not clearly see its own  
virtues. 
Due to current demographic developments, Europe is going to  
change and will have to accept more of the Eastern inductive  
ways. Or does it? It will take some time, to say the least. The non- 
integrated, non-secular Muslims in Germany, Austria, and The  
Netherlands still feel they are second-class citizens: As a minority,  
they are not alone in Europe (Times, 2008/07/27;taz, 2008/02/12).  
In Great Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, too, most of their Muslim, 
Asian or East Asian counterparts (may they be Turks, Algerians,  
Chinese, Sikhs etc., who will anyway represent 53 percent of the  
European population in the year 2100) still report they are having  
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a hard time  adjusting to the – from their perspective – very limited 
ways of Western thinking. Many Eastern immigrants, including most 
Europeans themselves, believe that European culture has killed  
the Indians, developed slavery, colonized and exploited the Third  
World, brought war and misery to the human cause, and should  
thus disappear from the surface of the Earth, obviously not by war, 
but by silent assimilation. In Berlin, it is not uncommon for a white 
German woman to be labeled ‘snobbish’ or even plain ‘racist’ just  
because she chooses a white German partner, instead of showing  
her ‘tolerance’ by choosing a non-white spouse. It has become, in the 
language of the youth, “hip” in Europe to “go non-white.”     
The new spiritual conquerors, with their Eastern religions, values,  
and world views, as well as their inductive ways are demanding  
more power and influence in their host countries of choice, and they 
are lobbied by approximately three billion other Indians, Chinese,  
Muslims, South-East Asians etc. While Europe and North America  
are volunteering to ‘transform’ their indigenous cultures, China,  
India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and others are all happy to assimilate 
those few (relative in number) ‘Western runners’ –Westerners hardly 
ever call themselves immigrants; they prefer the exclusive, high- 
status term ‘expatriates’ or ‘expats’ while abroad- who turn their  
backs on their deconstructed, apparently moribund civilization, and 
search for refuge in the strong and massive Eastern hemisphere.  
But, alas, despite finding themselves admired and useful due to  
their deductive, analytical ways and deconstructive skills, as lone  
individuals they have an impact no less but also no greater than a  
water drop in the vast sea of Eastern inclusive ‘harmoniousness’ and 
universal ‘oneness.’ 
In the short run, the few young indigenous Europeans who have  
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not yet immigrated into the Anglo-Saxon world (Heinsohn,  
2003; Breithaupt, 2000) or found some purpose in the East, will  
stay on their home turf and indeed benefit from their continent’s  
accumulated wealth, with fewer and fewer people sharing that  
wealth. In the long term, however, their parents, companies, and  
governments will have to make a painful but crucial financial  
decision: 
There is nothing complicated about finance. It is based on old people  
lending to young people. […]. Never before in human history,  
though, has a new generation simply failed to appear. (David P.  
Goldman, 2008/05) 
The aging Europeans’ search for their ‘next generation,’ may it be  
citizens for their cities, tenants for their houses, consumers, students, 
employees, spouses, or just new ideas, has already begun – they  
look to the East. 
Whoever said that “victory makes you liberal while defeat makes  
you conservative” must have had an in-depth understanding of the 
laws of sociology. The Europeans in the twenty-first century are  
suffering from low birth rates, defenselessness, and dependency,  
and thus have developed a pervasive fear of everything Asian.  
Does this new twenty-first century existential angst resemble that  
old twentieth-century existential angst, so accurately portrayed in  
images of the “Yellow Terror” such as Wilhelm II.’s paintingVölker 
Europas,Wahrt Eure Heiligsten Güter (People of Europe, Safeguard Your 
Most Valuable Goods), which depicts the European nations standing  
on a cliff guarding against a mighty Buddha and his thunderstorm  
(Wikipedia, 2008)? Or as exemplified by the short stories written at 
the end of the nineteenth century by Matthew Phipps Shiel, who  
brutally familiarized Westerners with the termThe Yellow Peril? 
How about the fear of Islamic Extremists? Or the fear of mass  
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immigration out of Africa and the Middle East? Is there anything in 
this century that Europeans are not afraid of? Does this new twenty- 
first century existential angst resemble the old pessimism of an  
Oswald Spengler or an Arnold Toynbee, both of whom summarized 
angst in theirThe Decline of the West (1918) andCivilization on Trial  
and the World and the West(1958)? How about the paranoid ‘angst’ of 
a Willhelm Marr in his Finis Germaniae, a manifesto about the decline  
of the Germanic race(s) to which also the Anglo-Saxons belong  
(Marr, 1879; Heihnson, 2006; Fülberth, 2007)? If angst still reigns  
over Europe, it comes as no surprise that the Christian Democratic  
Union and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria in Germany have  
published their “Asia-Strategy Paper” (October 23, 2007), which  
officially labels China a “threat to European values, economic and  
political development” (Schroder, 2008;Spiegel, 2008/07/15). Is that 
paper reflecting mere diplomatic foolishness, the insecurity of its  
authors, or does it just smell like honest, genuine fear? Presumably, 
it is a bit of all and shows that Germany is spiritually on the retreat. 
She is not prepared to compromise her Western values, despite the 
fact that 98 percent of humankind is not German, would not want  
to join Germany or be labeled German, and already regards the  
Chinese as Europe’s valuable economic and political partners, not as 
a threat. But the above example gives us an idea of the ‘psychology 
of failure’ (in this case, two world wars) and the wish to stand up  
for something meaningful again, in this case for ‘Western values,’  
while at the same time discrediting or even denying such a thing as 
‘Asian values.’ That this entails rendering all non-Western societies 
as inferior or immature, does not and will never come naturally  
to Germany’s cultural mind, if you recall European history – and  
especially eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century German  
Orientalism (Marchand, 2001). Anything close to a ‘revolution  
of the spirit,’ a change of attitude towards China on the part of  
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Germany (or any other European society for that matter), must  
come first and foremost from within the heart. In this case, it comes 
from the blending of Eastern and Western spirits that slowly sink  
into the hearts and minds of the European people. In reality it’s  
all happening through the physical migration of more and more  
Easterners into the European heartland. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century and in this century, the  
new spiritual strength of the integration-based Orient, derived  
from the explosion in population, manifested itself in a new self- 
confidence and assertiveness and the re-affirmation of (superior)  
Asian values and pan-Asianism, the old notion that Asia indeed is  
the unifying ‘one,’ while the West is the destructive ‘other’: 
[...] that broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal,  
which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race,  
enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world,  
and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the  
Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular,  
and to search out the means, not the end, of life.  (Okakura Kakuzo, 
1904) 
[...] no description of Hinduism can be exhaustive which does not  
touch on almost every religious and philosophical idea that the  
world has ever known… 
(M. Monier Williams, 1894) 
[…] It is all-tolerant, all-compliant, all-comprehensive, all-absorbing.  
(S. Radhakrishnan, 1929) 
[. .] European culture has the ability to master energy and mechanics,  
but has only elementary knowledge regarding the human body and 
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the concert of mind and brain. The Middle and the Far East (however)  
have an advance of thousand years on the West. (Claude Lévi- 
Strauss, 1952) 
The modern idea of ‘pan-Asianism’ and the slogan “Asia is one”  
were first discussed in Okakura Kakuzo’s groundbreaking book  
The Ideals of the East (1904), but became really popular again in  
the nineties during the academic discourse on ‘Asian values’:  
‘Asian values’ is a vague concept of certain religious and spiritual  
tendencies, traditions, and virtues like filial piety, love of learning,  
collectivism, and inner-world dependency that are shared by  
most Asian (some say only Confucian) cultures, but are not –  
or not equally – stressed in most Western societies (Han, 1998).  
By definition, Asian values form a self-affirming psychological  
counterpoise, and thus conflict with those Western values of Judeo- 
Christian historical revelations, liberalism, individualism, and  
dependency on the outer world. 
Another major blow to Western hubris was the genetic challenge.  
According toThe Wall Street Journal, “American-Asian minorities  
make up three point five percent of the country's population, but  
they account for more than twenty to thirty percent of students  
in America's top universities” (Golden, 2006; 2011), and since the  
1920’s, the beginnings of research on race differences, it has been  
known, and has been proven independently by psychologists such  
as Jean Philippe Rushton and Arthur Robert Jensen (2006), Richard 
Herrnstein and Charles Murray (1994), James Robert Flynn (1980;  
1994), and Ian Deary (2001), among others, that East Asians on  
average do score six to seven points higher than Anglo-Americans,  
and 20 points higher than Afro-Americans on most (Western-)  
standardized intelligence tests (Rushton et. al., 2006; Herrnstein et.  
al., 1994; Flynn, 1980, 1994; Deary, 2001; Steinberg, 1994). This is  
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readily available science; no one is in the dark any longer. Indeed,  
the cognitive preeminence of East Asians in several intellectual  
and artistic disciplines is as fascinating and terrifying to look at as,  
for instance, watching the awesome dominance of Afro-American  
basketball players in the National Basketball Association (Flynn,  
1994; Ledderose, 2005). 
When we combine the high test results of East Asians with student 
numbers, we get even more impressive results: In the year 2005,  
China, still offically a developing country, announced it had 19  
million undergraduate and graduate students enrolled on the  
mainland, without Hong Kong and Taiwan (CNET, 2005/08/30).  
Great Britain, in the same year, had hardly 2.3 million students, of  
whom 300,000 were foreign nationals, over 51,000 of them ethnic  
Chinese (BBC, 2007/03/27). 
The cultural and economic penalty for not recognizing Asian  
talent is immense, and it therefore comes as no surprise that in this 
century, we have witnessed in particular the Anglophone world  
recruiting Chinese and Indian students in unprecedented numbers. 
In the year 2005, 65,000 Chinese and 75,000 Indians studied in the  
USA; and 60,000 Chinese and 20,000 Indians in Great Britain (IIE,  
2006;People’s Daily, 2006/04/05). In the record year of 2012, it was  
estimated that 157,558 Chinese students attended school in the  
USA (Mellman, 2012). By comparison, when we look at American  
students studying in China, that number had barely reached 14,000 
this year (Siow, 2012), many of whom are American-Chinese or  
‘hai gui’ (海 龟, sea turtles). With this trend of recruiting more  
Asian talent came ‘political correctness’ and the need to talk about  
differences in culture andcultural values (e.g. Fukuyama, Huntington 
etc.), rather than differences inrace andphenotypes (e.g. Herrnstein,  
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Flynn etc.): 
Genetic differences among individual human beings account for  
up to eighty-five percent of the entire genetic spectrum, while the  
genetic differences in the world population are only about fifteen  
percent. No matter which ethnic group you come from, we’re all  
pretty much the same. (Jin Li [金力], 2006) 
To conclude, in discussing demography, ‘cultural evolution’ is so  
much better to explain group differences than her abusive father,  
‘Biological Evolution,’ and her damaged mother, ‘Social Evolution.’ 
The huge transformation of key Western societies into fissiparous,  
multicultural hubs fits the equation of the East-West equilibrium  
as a global theory: Migration is in direct reciprocity, for the greater 
good, a strategy of mutual cooperation and – unconsciously, but  
we’d rather say voluntary – the natural response to any human  
demographic shortcomings on this planet. Without having to care  
about race, by carefully only talking about culture, Western ranks are  
slowly but steadily being filled with the surplus of human capital  
produced by Eastern societies –  as diverse as possible, please.  
It serves both hemispheres, and thus benefits the equilibrium:  
The analytical, deductive West increases its diversity, tendency  
for devolution, and multiculturalism, and is thus profiting from  
Eastern ‘overproduction’ of human capital that is required to keep  
Western culture alive (but few in numbers), while the integration-based East 
increases  
its ethnic dominance and geopolitical reach (politicians call it “soft  
power”), thereby forcing ever greater levels of peace, tolerance, and 
harmoniousness onto the West. 
CHAPTER 6 
migraTion 
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As a rule, any society that is single-mindedly interested in its own  
promotion and thus in the survival and preservation of its culture  
would have to have a huge population and send its people out, not 
letting too many others in. 
The European nation states send a lot of people out, but do not  
have huge populations, and let everyone in. The USA has a huge  
population, but sends not enough people out, and lets everyone in. 
Japan has a big population (twice the size of Great Britain or France),  
lets no one in, and sends few out. China, India, and the Islamic  
world come very close to the ideal of a society that has the means to 
let its culture survive for a very long time. 
CHAPTER 7 
culTural  effecTs 
of 
The  DichoTomy 
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In 1275, Marco Polo famously reported about Cathay’s (China)  
pompous cities, stupendous power, and incredible wealth (Pelliot  
& Moule, 1938). But the first encounters of scale and cultural  
significance between East and West were the many Jesuit missions  
during the late Ming Dynasty. Indeed, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610),  
Francis Xavier (1505-1552), and Jean Adam Schall von Bell (1519- 
1566), like most other Jesuit missionaries in Asia, came, saw, and  
wrote extensively about the Chinese civilization that – despite its  
numerous follies and shortcomings – in many ways was not only  
superior in size and number. Its people were also “more polite,  
delicate and gentle in nature,” and thus outclassed the West not  
only “in scope of its economies” and in terms of its “sympathetic,  
true human intelligence” (Gu, 1922), but also in its awareness of its 
sophisticated moral code and perceived antiquity (Hart, 1999): 
It is a well-known fact that the liking – you may call it the taste for 
the Chinese – grows upon the foreigner the longer he lives in this  
country. (Gu Hongming, 1922) 
Despite the achievements of the Jesuits in China in the seventeenth 
century, one should not merely attribute their successes to the  
curiosity of the Chinese intellectuals, or to the expertise and  
advanced scientific training of the Catholic Church, but perhaps  
more so to the cosmopolitan mind of China’s emperors. It was not  
uncommon for the ‘Huangdi’ (Emperor) to employ foreigners (Li,  
1998). For example, it was the Shunzhi Emperor (顺治帝, 1638-1661) 
who promoted Cologne-born German Jesuit Johann Adam Schall  
von Bell to a Mandarin of first class; and it was the Kangxi Emperor 
(康熙帝, 1654-1722) who frequently summoned the Vlaanderen- 
born Belgian Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) to the Forbidden City  
(紫禁城). Shunzhi and Kangxi both were keen on having the Jesuits 
bring new science and technology to China, not necessarily because 
they felt China was desperately in need of Western technology,  
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but because that was what vassal states were supposed to do in  
those days of ‘tianxia’ (天下, The Celestial Empire or All under  
Heaven): The non-Chinese scholars, disarmed and mesmerized by  
the immense power and might of the Chinese civilization, out of  
humbleness and submission, were simplyexpectedto (and really felt 
obliged to) contribute to the Empire and in return were rewarded  
privileges and official postsquid pro quo. 
“It is power that makes one benevolent” – that same kind of fair- 
minded atmosphere of tolerance, academic freedom, and mutual  
dependency during the Ming Dynasty would have been difficult to 
achieve in nitpicking, prejudiced Europe. Or can anybody imagine  
the impossible scenario of some Chinese Daoist monks walking into 
Vatican City of the Dark Ages and negotiating alternative world  
views with the clerics? Not even the Church’s own people, not even 
the Jesuits could do that, if one recalls Galileo Galilei (1564-1642),  
who happened to spend the latter part of his life under inquisitional 
house arrest. 
Thus, I imagine the Jesuits had an extraordinarily good time in  
Asia while living under ‘tianxia,’ built some churches but also  
translated Chinese literature, and respected the Confucian code of  
moral conduct and learning, in exchange for an equally curious and 
tolerant Chinese audience (Li, 1998; Jami, 2001). 
With wave after wave of Jesuits flocking into China, embracing the 
Chinese, and ‘mysteriously’ turning into ‘apostles of Confucius’  
(Hart, 1999), it is not difficult to understand why, in 1704, Pope  
Clement XI finally intervened and issued his notorious papal bull,  
condemning all Chinese beliefs and ritesper se. It was outrageous  
and plainly inconceivable to the Catholic Church “how a system of 
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filial piety and state morality called Confucian could take the place 
of a proper religion, could make men, even the mass of Asia, do  
without religion” (Gu, 1922). Of course, the fascination with Chinese 
culture would never decrease in Western academic circles. It could  
only increase. 
The Germans admired Asia immensely. Johann Wolfgang von  
Goethe rejoiced: “They have another peculiarity; in China men and 
nature are inseparable.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz wrote that this  
by far most populous nation on Earth, with a highly ordered civil  
structure, must have achieved that population and civil structure  
through some identifiable means. Satirically, Leibniz suggested that 
Chinese missionaries should be invited to instruct the European  
people (Cook & Rosemont, 1994). 
After two opium wars, the British imperialists of those days  
–  otherwise totally convinced of their new ‘religion’ ofAnglo- 
Saxon Capitalism andindustrial superiority – nevertheless still  
found occasional sufficient praise for their ‘conquered.’ In 1922,  
after spending a year lecturing at Peking University, the British  
philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell, despite his  
ludicrous criticism of the “cowardice, callousness, and voraciousness  
in the average Chinaman,” still found mostly words of admiration  
for China’s cultural industrialism and overeager hospitality (Chinese  
intellectuals literally bent over backwards to please foreigners,  
and treated Russell courteously), and, naturally, the Imperial  
examination system (c. 605-1905) or ‘ke ju’  [科 举] (Russell, 1922). 
This gargantuan system of totalitarian proportion yet universal  
meritocracy (in theory, but in practice there is abuse in any system) 
had, over the course of 1,300 years, co-shaped Confucian China  
and Imperial China, and, although formally abandoned in 1905, in  
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Russell’s time still dominated people’s minds and attitudes towards 
learning and career. The Imperial system, unlike the European one  
of those days, was theoretically blind to the social class or creed of  
its candidates, and was solely designed to find the most intelligent  
and diligent contenders among the huge Chinese gene pool. 
Russell’s analysis of China and its people concludes with a  
prophecy, namely that the Chinese civilization alone has the  
power to easily supersede, both economically and intellectually,  
all European states combined if only they adopt Western science to 
defend themselves against aggression, but otherwise stay faithful  
to their own fine civilization (Russell, 1922). For those who did not  
believe in China’s potential ‘other’ civilization, Russell had this  
warning: 
The Chinese demand Western science. But they do not demand the 
adoption of the Western philosophy of life. If they were to adopt the 
Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made  
themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression 
on their own account. (Bertrand Russell, 1922) 
Unfortunately, to this day, this is exactly what half-educated  
Western policymakers encourage China to become. Ignoring any  
information about China is not knowledge about China. With their  
often reckless demands for ‘The American Dream,’ the ‘Rechts- und 
Verfassungsstaat,’ ‘Democracy,’ and ‘Human Rights,’ the Western  
nations of today are aiming at establishing a Middle Kingdom in  
their own image: “Hey, China, you look like one of us. Look what  
we’ve made you!” 
CHAPTER  8 
TWo  successful 
moDels 
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Despite evidence for the ‘other humanity’ in the East, a civilization  
that went down the inductive path, ship after ship of enthusiastic  
but ignorant Western scholars set their sails for Asia, their eyes  
fixed on analyzing and deconstructing the hype and propaganda  
of ‘the exotic Other’ and proving that the East is a mere repressed,  
introverted Sleeping Beauty, denying the existence of the East-West 
dichotomy, ignoring all warnings, only to discover the same old  
truth over and over again: The East constitutes an entirely different 
type of humanity. It is holistic, non-analytical, and spiritual – it is  
integration-based, and it is very capable and strong. We come back 
to that in a minute. But first some more facts: 
Most sinologists and universal historians today more or less agree  
that before Xu Guangqi (徐光启, 1562-1633) published his translation 
of the first six books of Euclid’sElements of Geometry in 1607, this  
kind of Greek/Hellenistic, analytic-deductive driven mathematics  
and axiomatic proof-findings had been systematically unknown  
to Asia (Needham, 1964; Hart, 1999; Spence, 2001). Indeed, it took  
China’s mathematicians roughly 250 years, until in 1851 Alexander  
Wylie (1815-1887) and Li Shanlan (李善兰, 1811-1882) published 
the second half of the translation of Euclid’sElements of Geometry, 
to realize the practicability of axioms at all (Horng & Wann-Sheng,  
2001). 
What started off as cooperation between Xu Guangqi and Matteo  
Ricci in 1607 later became the nucleus of an entirely new branch of 
Western scholarship – ‘The History of Science in China.’ Why is that 
such an interesting new branch of scholarship? Well, since it was  
European missionaries who proactively entered China and taught  
the Chinese, not some Chinese missions to Europe, and since the  
Western missionaries were believed to possess the religion of truth  
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and analytical sciences, how was it possible that an atheistic, non- 
analytical civilization like China nevertheless had developed into  
an intelligent, fully-functional society that in countless fields like  
art, agriculture, astronomy, economics, logistics, medicine, and  
mechanics was more advanced than its European counterparts?  
That is why the ‘History of Science in China’ had to be carefully  
reconstructed in the West in order to make sense of it all; the only  
problem was that Western scholars translated almost all of China's  
socio-cultural originality – its concepts and non-European ideas –  
into convenient European taxonomies (a fascinating topic and text- 
book case of cultural imperialism which unfortunately we cannot  
discuss in detail here). 
The Jesuits in China, as I said elsewhere before, were mostly  
successful simply because they did not insist on forcing the  
whole of Eurocentric catechism on the ordinary Chinaman; on the  
contrary, they even adapted to Confucian scholarship. However,  
what they reported back to Europe about the kind, good-hearted,  
intelligent, and confident Chinaman and his unique state morality  
and Confucian/Daoism/Buddhism mode of conduct often nurtured 
a certain dislike for the ‘second humanity.’ In comparison to  
Muhammad’s teachings in theQuran, which is after all a relatively  
young religious canon (c. 600), Islam is essentially dogmatic but  
practical, thus having turned into a physical competitor, whereas  
the much olderI Ching (易经, c. 1050 BC-256 BC),Dao De Jing (道德 
经, c. 600 BC), the Buddhist sutras (佛经, c. 500 BC), orThe Analects 
(论语, ca. 479 BC-221 BC) seem to cover deeply philosophical  
issues, metaphysics, difficult mathematics, and a complex moral  
system, much of it posing some serious challenges to some of  
those ambivalent wisdoms offered in the Bible. In other words,  
Christianity had found some sort of enlightened competitor. 
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The German philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) was  
convinced that already in prehistoric times, China became unique,  
‘the other humanity,’ distinct from the rest of the world, and,  
furthermore, that it was the only living remnant of a time before the 
world was divided into two different humanities (Schelling, 1842).  
He also branded China “un univers sans Dieu.” Johann Gottfried  
Herder (1744-1803) labeled it “an embalmed mummy wound in silk”  
and the Chinese “corner people.” Finally, Alain Peyrefitte (1925- 
1999), author ofThe Collision of Two Civilizations, famously called it  
“l’empire immobile” (Bernie, 2005) because of its compliance and,  
ultimately, meekness. 
Same Europeans who believed in God and the scientific ways,  
sensing a lack both of religion and science in China, assumed there 
had been no scientific advancement in China before the Europeans  
arrived. Not quite a fair observation, as we know today. It is true  
that before the introduction of Western sciences, there had been  
indeed no need for foreign axioms. But that was simply because  
East Asia had cultivated its own practical brand of mathematics,  
primarily relying on induction and analogical reasoning. In fact, this 
stubborn and very different ‘scientific’ approach of the Chinese has 
infuriated the European Imperialists ever since, culminating in the  
famous, almost hysterical saying by Sir Reverant Arthur Smith in  
The Chinese Characteristics(1890) that “the Chinese mind absolutely  
must be algebraic, while the Western mind is arithmetical” (Smith,  
1890). 
The Chinese Characteristics, mainly because of its style, is probably the  
single most outrageous book on the peculiarities of the Chinaman  
ever written, causing waves of anti-Western resentment among  
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the Chinese leading up to the Boxer Rebellion against the Western  
imperialists at the turn of the nineteenth century (1899-1901). Yet,  
Smith simply recounted what every scientist in the field already  
knew: There is the integration-based East, and there is the analysis- 
based West, and no third mode of reasoning other than that of the  
inductive and deductive modes has ever been achieved by human  
beings. It seemed incredible, but here was Asia, which excelled more 
in the inductive ways, and there was Europe, which excelled more  
in the deductive ways. And that was it. 
Gems of ancient Chinese inductive-driven mathematics are:The  
Book of Changes [易 经], written during the Zhou Dynasty (1050-256 
BC, possibly originated around 2800 BC by Fu Xi [伏 羲]);the Book 
of Poetry [诗 经] with pieces written around the year 1000 BC; the 
Mo Jing [墨 经] (470-390 BC);The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art [九
章算术] (c. 200 BC-AD 179). Here I should add thatThe Nine Chapters had a 
great influence on the Japanese scholar Seki Takakazu who developed – during 
the Edo Period (1603-1867) – another arithmetical, idiosyncratic mathematics 
called ‘wasan’ (和算 ). Other valuable works on Chinese mathematics include 
theZhoubi Manual [周髀算经] written during the Han period (c. 202 BC-AD 
220); theSea 
Island Manual [海岛算经] written during the Three Kingdoms period 
in the year 263; and theJade Mirror of the Four Unknowns [四元玉监] 
written in 1303. Zhu Shijie [朱世杰] (1303) once said, in the tradition 
ofThe Book of Changes: “‘One’ is the source of all mathematics” and 
that those words of theDao De Jing(道 德 经, c. 600 BC): “The Dao 
begets the One; the One begets the Two opposites” really summarize  
(Chinese) mathematics: “All stems from the number ‘one.’” By this, 
Zhu Shijie perfectly harmonized Chinese mathematics with the  
Eastern concept of ‘oneness,’ thus once more effectively defining the 
essence and story of most Eastern ‘philosophies’ – be it the teachings 
of Siddhartha Buddha (563-483 BC), Vyasa of theMahabharata (c. 800 
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BC), orThe Four Confucian Classics (四書五經, before 221 BC). 
Someone who is genuinely interested in mathematics may as well  
call the cited works above the “Chinese Computation Classics.”  
Xu Guangqi made some genuine attempts to integrate Western  
and Chinese mathematics, but ended up being all too pragmatic  
about it – if a Chinese equation led to the same result as Western  
mathematics did, it was there to stay, if not, it was to be abandoned 
(Engelfriet & Siu, 2001). 
Chinese mathematics, which had a great influence on mathematics  
in Korea and Japan as well, flourished until approximately the  
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, fell into decline after the arrival of 
the Jesuits and Westerners and their teachings about arithmetical  
mathematics and science, and became almost forgotten during the  
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Jami et al., 2001; Engelfriet &  
Siu, 2001). But that does not necessarily mean that it was all ‘no  
good’ – on the contrary: 
Zhu Shijie, in his Jade Mirror, for example, teaches a diagram  
similar to that in Blaise Pascal’s Traité du triangle arithmétique, the  
latter of which was not published until 1665 in Europe. Why had  
the world waited 362 years for Pascal’s triangle when Zhu Shijie’s  
diagram could have initiated the same mathematical revolution?  
A convincing answer to that is given in the Study ofthe Fourteenth- 
Century Manual on Polynomial Equations by John Hoe: 
Chinese written language enabled Chinese mathematicians to  
express themselves with a conciseness that is almost impossible  
to attain in highly-inflected natural languages, using an alphabet,  
such as prevailed in Europe. Thus, Chinese were able to deal with  
problems which in the West could not be tackled until a suitable  
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mathematical symbolism had been developed. At the same time,  
this meant that the Chinese mathematicians never had the incentive 
to develop a fully symbolic algebraic notation, since the need for one 
was never as acutely felt as in Europe. (John Hoe, 2007) 
Language barriers, cultural prejudices, ignorance, or pure spite?  
Most likely, these were all factors, among others. In this regard, not 
a lot has changed in the last 400 years. Don’t expect many American 
or European citizens, even the more educated ones, to master their  
host country’s language or to know anything about their host  
country other than the information they have obtained from English- 
language sources and textbooks. It is not going to happen; it is  
wishful thinking. As the German-Swiss writer Hermann Hesse once 
wrote: “We cannot and we must not become Chinese, and at heart  
we don't want to either. We must not seek ideal or higher meaning 
of life in China or in any other thing of the past; otherwise we lose 
ourselves and adhere to a fetish" (Hesse, 1921). 
Already in 1627, Xu Guangqi [徐光启] applied scientific methods 
and conducted experiments – as demonstrated in the vast corpus of 
his works leading to hisAlmanac of Agriculture (农政全书, 1627)  
–  on crops, sweet potatoes, and water irrigation, to name but a few 
(Jami, 2001). The results were impressive. In 1630, China could feed its 70 
million people. Some 120 years later, when Great Britain was forced 
to think scientifically about how to improve her agriculture in order 
to feed her ‘overpopulation’ of some 5.7 million, China was already 
feeding a nation of roughly 200 million. 
Similarly, theChinese Traditional Calendar by Guo Shoujing (郭守敬, 
1231-1316), which is based on the synodic month, or time taken 
by the moon to make a complete circle around the Earth, had been  
invented at least 300 years before the Gregorian calendar, which is  
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in effect a solar calendar, in Europe (Hashimoto, 2001). 
Talking more about sciences, Liu Hui [刘 徽] in hisSea Island  
Manual (海岛算经, c. 263) measured the sun’s height by the lengths 
of a shadow cast on an upright rod. By comparing geographical  
distances and spaces, the Chinese employed their own mechanical,  
scientific methods that relied on empirical proofs devised by their  
ancestors, rather than axiomatic proofs preferred by the ancient  
Greeks and devised by their ancestors (Jami, 2001). As a rule, in  
traditional Chinese mathematics, a geometric problem was almost  
universally converted into an algebraic problem, quite different  
from the geometrical approach used in Euclid’sElements. 
Surprisingly, today traditional Chinese mathematics like mechanical 
proofs or ‘Wu Wenjun’s method’ are experiencing a revival  
in computational sciences, just as Chinese medicine, Chinese  
education, and Chinese politics are in their respective fields; all these  
disciplines are now striving again for recognition in world science. 
To sum up, only after the West, culturally and scientifically, invaded 
the Eastern hemisphere, did mathematics in China become the  
universally axiomatic-deductive driven vehicle it is today. But  
Western invasion was not the precursor for sciences in China.  
Science had been in East Asia before, if only in a different, unique  
fashion (Needham, 1956; Jami, 2001). 
Fortunately, in this century, the Western-fabricated fairy tale of  
former Eastern ‘backwardness’ and Western ‘glory’ has been  
dispelled. In reality, Eastern knowledge and Western knowledge are 
fairly balanced and complementary, and always have been. 
As Francis Bacon(1521-1626) and James Clerk Maxwell (1831- 
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1879, mathematician and theoretical physicist) have sufficiently  
explained, ideally, the most sincere science is done today when both 
the inductive and the deductive methods find their due application. 
In some disciplines we prefer the inductive way, namely in the arts, 
while in many disciplines we tend to use both, like in sociology,  
archaeology, psychology, philosophy – the humanities. In others  
still we prefer the deductive way, like in mathematics, physics,  
biology, chemistry – the classical sciences. Yet ideally, induction and 
deduction should be used in a more balanced way. 
Maxwell’s equations are a good example of a successful synthesis:  
He carefully applied first the deductive method in proving several  
equations in seemingly separate fields of research, then the inductive  
method to demonstrate that electricity, magnetism, and even light  
are all manifestations of the same phenomenon: the electromagnetic 
field. It is like seeing each tree, and then the whole forest, but never 
both quite at the same time. This demonstrates an ‘ideal’ way of  
problem-solving by picking up a single successful case out of a  
million yet undecided ones. 
A discovery of revolutionary proportions in the evolution of culture: 
An entire civilization, the East, goes down a more induction- 
based path, arriving at universals; while another civilization, the  
West, goes down the exact opposite, a more deduction-based path,  
arriving at particulars? If that is indeed what happened, it would  
constitute a discovery of great consequence: It would mean that  
‘superior’ Western history has been ideologically and methodically  
biased, if not inherently flawed, throughout the ages: 
The academic discipline of history is inevitably ideological in  
essence. Regardless of what might be the case with individual  
historical events, historical narration is always the result of a series 
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of selective choices, so that the influence of the historian’s standpoint  
is inescapable. (Kuroda, 1990) 
Universal history, as explained in this book, requires at least two  
points of view. As Joseph Needham (1951), Sir Geoffrey Ernest  
Richard Lloyd (1996), and Jonathan Spence (2001) – all three were  
married to Chinese women – demonstrated to Western audiences,  
China’s contributions to humankind in traditional mathematics,  
medicine, statecraft, and agriculture had developed even before the 
First Qin Emperor’s unification of China up to the Song (宋960- 
1127-1279) and Yuan dynasties (元 1271-1368) (Wu, 2007). In the  
course of just over one publication series,Science and Civilization  
in China (1954-2000), European scholars were up in arms at the  
sensational, if not horrifying news that Europeans owe their paper  
money, matches, umbrellas, playing cards, and whisky all to some  
blueprints of an unfamiliar Chinese mastermind (Temple, 2007).  
It comes as no surprise that the Chinese Communist Party and  
Chinese Ministry of Education readily adopted Needham’s thesis  
that so more often than not eulogizes those good old daysWhen Asia 
Was the World (Gordon, 2007). 
In addition, and to the embarrassment of serious scholars, the  
‘History of Sciences in China’ became the hobbyhorse for tens of  
thousands of amateur scholars, exchange students, tourists, and  
backpackers from around the world who tried to trace anything  
European or American back to its alleged Asian roots. Today,  
newspapers, computers, soccer, even German sauerkraut and  
sausages, Italian pasta and pizza, Reggae and Bob Marley have their 
firmly established Chinese progenitors (among the latter of whom  
are Vincent and Patricia Chin of Randy’s Records in Jamaica, if you 
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insist on knowing). 
Yet, whatever this new wave of  twenty-first century ‘Eastern  
enlightenment of the West,’ often mixed with institutionalized  
overstatement and euphemism in sensation-seeking media or  
some individuals’ fancies –  even the most frivolous ambition to  
remedy the past failures of Asia for the glory of her future cannot  
hide the fact, as the historians Joseph Needham, Catherine Jami,  
Peter Engelfriet, Geoffrey Lloyd, and Li Tiangang described it, that  
China in particular had not developed or not sufficiently developed 
anything in the way of science and technology that could compete  
with the Western Imperialist’s model, which in turn attested the  
Chinese were a people of ‘arrested development’ (Gu, 1922). I call  
the Western Imperialist’s model “rather lucky than good,” because  
some scholars, by bending history to the point of breaking, want  
us to believe that ‘evil’ Western dominance in Asia can only be  
explained by the lucky insensitivity of scientific discoveries like  
rifles and cannons (Chirot, 1991), surpassing the firecrackers made  
of China’s gunpowder. Others, like Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) for  
example, point to the ‘moment of China’s political weakness’ during 
the fall of the Mongols in the thirteenth century and coined the  
phrase ‘bad luck for Asia,’ which was “exploited by the Europeans 
who lacked any singularly innovative entrepreneurial scientific, or  
otherwise worthwhile advantages, except perhaps an exceptionally  
nasty tendency to conduct their large-scale trade as piracy” (Abu- 
Lughod, 1989). 
Despite Western dominance, the Chinese ‘civilization’ (the correct  
name is wenming [文明]) had its advantages. The strong Confucian 
tradition of self-cultivation, learning, and memorization, with the  
translation and integration of foreign thoughts "for the purpose  
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of understanding the West on Chinese terms" (Malhotra, 2011)  
reaching back to the early Buddhist monks during the Six Dynasties 
(222-589), has a remarkable consistency that ultimately proves a  
point: 
It is important you should remember, that this nation of children,  
who live a life of the heart, […] have yet the power of mind and  
rationality […] which has enabled them to deal with the complex  
and difficult problems of social life, government and civilization  
with a success which, I will venture to say here, the ancient and  
modern nations of Europe have not been able to attain. (Gu  
Hongming, 1922) 
I could go on, but before I do: It might strike some Europeans as  
outright offensive, but the truth is that they are not the only ones  
claiming the title of the fittest when it comes to ‘surviving’ history. 
As Edmund Wade Davis, the Canadian anthropologist and ethno- 
Grapher recently said: "If we accept that we are all cut from the 
same genetic cloth, all cultures share the same genius. And whether 
that genius is placed into technological wizardry which has been 
our great achievement, or, by contrast, placed into the unraveling 
of complex threads of memory inherent in a myth is simply a 
matter of choice." (Davis, 2011) 
To put it into historical perspective: The Chinese Empire was united 
in the year 221 BC under the Qin (秦) Emperor, some 1,997 years  
before Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence  
for the USA in 1776. India’s sense of unity, ethnic diversity and, yes, 
democratic roots grew out of necessity because of her ‘composite  
religious culture’ some 2,500 years ago. By contrast, the Europeans  
today are struggling even with a constitutional treaty. 
CHAPTER 9 
TWo  incommensurable 
realiTies 
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Discussing the East-West dichotomy in cultural terms became  
popular again in social science in the ‘80 and ’90, with the revival of 
the ideas of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Auguste Comte (1798-1857),  
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), and Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975). The 
goal of international scholarship was nothing less ambitious than to 
categorize all the world’s cultures, to evaluate them, to dissect them, 
to discover and reveal patterns, and to make predictions about  
when they peak, when they struggle, and when they inevitably fall 
(Kennedy, 1987; CCTV, 2006). 
The father of sociology, Ibn Khaldun, wrote: 
The goal of civilization is sedentary culture and luxury. When  
civilization reaches that goal, it turns toward corruption and starts  
being senile, as happens in the natural life of living beings. (Ibn  
Khaldun, 1377) 
Comparing cultures to living beings has been the scientific trend  
ever since Khaldun. In today’s Western sociology, we now have  
plenty of exciting – if not incredible – choices (read: interpretations) 
of a culture’s ‘rise and fall’: 
> “youth, growth, maturation and decline”  (Spengler, 1917) ; 
> civilizations “taking turns or going in circles” (Ji, 2006); 
> a “masculine West vs. a feminine East” (Garrison, 2000); 
> nations “marrying and divorcing” each other (Griffiths,  
1982); 
> countries “collecting and redistributing credits for scientific 
discoveries” among them in a “Grand Titration”(Needham, 2004); 
> an insurmountable “Great Divide” (Horton & Finnegan,  
1973); 
> either a “psychic unity” or a “secularization” (Berger, 1966; 
1974); 
> a “de-secularization” (Berger, 1999); 
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> a “flat world” (Friedman, 1962; 1990; 2006); 
> “globalization” or “many globalizations” (Berger &  
Huntington, 1974); 
> brutal and straightforward “neo-Darwinism” (Heinsohn,  
2003); 
> plenty of “Empire” (Hardt & Negri, 2001), produced by 
> one ‘kind’ of corporate man – preferably one of 
Aryan descent (Gellner, 1979). 
This twentieth century “Cultural Heat” (Ji, 2006) that is reaping  
social theories by the bushel is well documented, and it is impossible  
to discuss them all. 
What all theories have in common, however, and what has not  
changed in this new twenty-first century, as it has never been  
seriously challenged for the last two millennia, is a universe of facts 
from philosophy, politics, and now evolutionary biology, social and 
linguistic anthropology that seems to suggest that the history of  
civilization – and thus all human identity – is built on and around  
thefundamental differences and interaction among and between  
groups, populations, and cultures, and that the one difference and  
the one interaction that matter the most are those ofthe two great  
cultural systems: the West and its Other. 
Perhaps the most striking phenomenon in cultural studies today is  
the revival of Max Weber’s ‘ideal types of cultures’ that do facilitate 
progress and those that do not. Arnold Joseph Toynbee loved those 
cultural league tables, too. A new blame game was launched to find 
the latest ‘sick-men-of-Europe,’ the next ‘youth bulge’ (Goldstone,  
1991; Fuller, 1995; Heinsohn, 2003), ‘another failed (Arab) state,’ a  
‘left behind,’ an ‘axis of evil,’ an ‘empire in decline,’ the ‘Chinese  
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Century’ (Shenkar, 2004), the ‘New Asian Hemisphere’ (Mahbubani, 
2008), the ‘yellow peril,’ or just another victim for the ‘War on  
Terror.’ 
Sensationalist literature about cultural comparison is abundant: In  
the West we have Samuel Huntington (1993; 2000; 2004), Francis  
Fukuyama (1992), Jared Diamond (2003; 2006), Milton Friedman  
(1962; 1990; 2006), Daniel A. Bell (2000; 2012), and Jürgen Habermas 
(1996; 2003; 2006). In the East we have Ji Xianlin [季 羡 林 ] (2006), 
Gu Zhengkun [辜 正 坤] (2003), Tu Weiming [杜 维 明] (2000; 2003), 
Kishore Mahbubani (2008), and Rajiv Malhotra (2011), to name but a 
few important contributors. 
According to Max Weber (1864-1920), Western standards,  
institutions of law, science, education, and economics reflect Western  
analysis-based rationalism, and this may explain why the West  
got rich and technologically advanced before the East did (Weber,  
2001). That underlying promise proved to be believable. Today,  
virtually every historical piece of scientific and economical evidence 
has been used against the Eastern people to demonstrate the –  
seemingly irrefutable – fact that the West was and (still) is the single 
most important and the only leading creative force of humankind.  
In fact, the only way for an Indian, Arab, or Chinese person to get  
some personal integrity in this world was to become Westernized,  
study at a Western university, or work for a Western international  
cooperation. The East, it seemed, was never in the position to ask for 
anything except for trouble. 
Unfortunately, Max Weber could not read Japanese, Chinese, Hindi, 
Urdu, Arabic, Korean, Thai, or any other Eastern language. In fact,  
he who was arguably the world’s greatest Orientalist had never been  
75 
to the Orient. We could say then that he was a German rationalist at 
the time when Germany was an Imperial power (1871-1918). In those  
old days leading up to two devastating world wars, it was entirely 
sufficient for a German rationalist and “sociologist” (for that’s what 
they call Max Weber) of his affluence to explain the mechanics of  
world history not by empirical investigation or observation, but –  
just like the other occasionally sinophobic Germans Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), Friedrich  
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), Johann Gottfried Herder  
(1744-1803), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) before  
him – by miraculous, rational inquiry from the comfort of his study. 
 
How was that possible? Let's start with the simple language trick. 
Few people realize that the Bible discourages people from studying 
foreign languages. The story of the Tower of Babel teaches us  
that there is one humanity (God’s), but that “our languages are  
confused.” From a historical European perspective, that has always 
meant that, say, any German philosopher could know exactly what 
the Chinese people were thinking, only that he couldn’t understand 
them. So instead of learning the foreign language, he demanded a  
translation. 
Coincidentally, or maybe not quite so, History with a capital ‘H’  
followed the Bible. The first German philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716),encouraged his fellow Germans to do research on 
China, yet at the same time he warned against the use of foreign or 
‘un-Teutsch’ [un-Germanic] words and concepts (Leibniz, 1677). This  
business of trying to understand China without taking the pains to 
study the Chinese language is well documented. When the German 
logician and first German ‘China expert’ Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
got his hands on Latin translations by François Noël (1711) and  
Philippe Couplet (1687) of the Confucian Classics (Wolff was a Latin 
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speaker), his reaction, I imagine, may have been something like this: 
He reads the Lun Yu in Latin and exclaims something like “Great,  
that looks very familiar; I have the feeling that I totally understand 
this Confucius!” (Wolff, 1721). Disturbing, isn’t it? 
Wolff was so confident about his newly-won knowledge about  
China that he went on to lecture about the Chinese as if he was the 
expert on all things China. Among his unforgettable findings were  
“Motiva Sinarum” (“The Motives of the Chinese”), “Summum  
bonum Sinarum” (“The Highest Good of the Chinese”), or “Finis  
Sinarum ultimus” (“The Final Purpose of the Chinese”), and so  
on (Wolff, 1721). And, of course, when somebody occasionally  
asked Master Wolff why he didn’t visit China (to his defense, that  
was almost unthinkable in 1721), the greatest sinologist of all time  
dismissed the question with a wave of his hand by replying, “the  
wisdom of the Chinese was generally not so highly valued that it  
was necessary to travel there for its sake” (Albrecht, 1985). 
Other historians followed in Wolff’s footsteps. After all, why learn  
Chinese to become a pundit on China if Wolff took a shortcut? In  
fact, Wolff sufficiently demonstrated that just about any European  
could become a “China expert” without learning a single Chinese  
character. 
This attitude prevailed regarding just about any foreign language.  
Now we know why the German philosopher Immanuel Kant could 
reasonably announce the “End of All Things” and Georg Hegel  
could proclaim the “End of History.” Both learned men were very  
much aware that they had not mastered any non-European language  
in their lifetime, and they simply assumed that History was a bit like 
that, too. 
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This haughty attitude in the Western hemisphere has not changed;  
most Europeans still labor under the illusion that the Chinese “speak  
their languages,” only that they “talk” in Chinese. Take the case of  
‘democracy’ and ‘human rights.’ Those are terms that originated in 
Europe and do not have 1:1 equivalents in Chinese. Imagine China  
turned the tables and demanded that Europe apply more wenming 
(文明, civilization) and tian ren he yi (天人合一, oneness of heaven 
and man). 
The European attitude is reflected in its translations. Most  
Westerners simply translate every key Chinese concept into  
convenient biblical or philosophical terminology. As a result, the  
Western image of China is literally Chinese-free. 
Which brings us to the machine model (McGilchrist, 2009) in Western thinking 
to manipulate its object of study. In comparative cultural studies, if you had  
given Max Weber a fictional race, let’s say the Smurfs (a tiny blue creature 
who lives 
in the forests), undoubtedly 
he would have produced a very elegant argument why the Smurfs  
never built a financial empire and got rich, as the Protestants in  
Europe so splendidly did, based on the simple and irrefutable fact  
that Smurfs are not Protestants. This, of course, is a tautology of  
epic proportions (e.g. Smurfs are no Protestants), and, consequently, 
a proposition true under any possible circumstance, while at the  
same time utterly useless for achieving true knowledge about the  
empirical world. For that reason, Max Weber’s theory in sociology  
– like Sigmund Freud’s in psychology or Karl Marx’s in economics  
– has fallen out of favor. This is not so much because his work is  
inherently dull and mechanistic, but more because his dialogue with other  
cultures is really aself-serving,tedious monologue. 
Another, perhaps more elegant, explanation of Western historical  
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dominance over world affairs was given by the late Edward Said  
(1935-2003), founder of ‘post-colonial theory’ in his masterpiece  
Orientalism (1978) and – independently – by Linda Hutcheon in  
The Politics of Post-Modernism (1989). Post-colonial theory essentially 
says that Orientalism, the study of Eastern cultures, religions, and  
languages, is the creation (‘brain-child’ is the fashionable term, I  
believe) of Western scholarship. Western scholars had written Asia’s 
history through the lens of their Eurocentric world view, just like  
the Greeks did with the Persians, thereby only enhancing the exotic 
‘otherness’ of the Eastern hemisphere. Said and Hutcheon argue that 
‘post-colonial’ and then ‘post-modernist’ theories are both Western  
concepts. Moreover, they argue they are syntheses of the European 
Enlightenment’s bourgeois rationalism as thesis on the one hand,  
and modernism as the antithesis on the other. 
Bourgeois rationalism, modernism, and post-modernism could be  
categorized as the Age of Reason (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries), 
the Age of Totalities (nineteenth to mid-twentieth  
century), and the Age of Uncertainty (mid-twentieth century). As  
Said and Hutcheon would agree then, the East did not experience  
any of these categorizations, just as the West did not experience a  
Bolshevik Revolution (1918), Communism (1918-1989), the Chinese  
Revolution (1911-1949), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), or the  
opening-up era under Deng Xiaoping (1979-1997). 
I thereby conclude that neither hemisphere necessarily has to  
experience the other hemisphere’s history in order to proceed with  
its own. There is aphilosophical misconception in the writings of  
many Western scholars that seems to suggest that China and India  
will never catch up, because they only recently reached an early  
industrial age and missed out on the (Western) Enlightenment. 
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If the development of culture were, like most Western scholars  
would have it, essentially a one-way causal process like climbing a  
ladder, why did the Romans or Greeks on their way to becoming  
a proper civilization never produce Confucius, Mencius, the Tang  
Dynasty, theRgveda, theBrahmanasor theMahabharata? Surely,  
if we take the simple metaphor of history as a life-tree, similar to  
Ernst Haeckel’s ‘Tree of Life’ (1897) in biology, in its earliest stage  
it could well have branched into two separate directions, with no  
subsequent coalescence possible (Haeckel, 2004). One branch could  
have developed into the Western hemisphere and represented  
history in a manner based on deduction, causality, and rationality.  
The other branch could have developed into the Eastern hemisphere 
and represented history in a manner based more on induction,  
interconnectedness, and universality. But it would still be ‘one’  
history-tree, or maybe two different trees, albeit not too far apart. So, 
what makes so many Western sensationalists think that these trees  
or branches could possibly ‘clash,’ as inThe Clash of Civilizations 
(Huntington, 1993)? Isn’t it more reasonable to think that branches  
or sub-branches of history may die off, wither, break, become lost or 
forgotten rather than ‘to clash’? Surely, if the militant West wishes  
a clash of civilizations, a clash it will be, albeit an uninspiring,  
unimaginative, and utterly senseless one. This because the Western 
hemisphere still does not wholly appreciate the grand alternative  
and worthy goal of engaging the East based on mutual respect and 
using an ‘inclusive approach.’ Instead, the West grafts Western  
branches on the Eastern tree by applying Western terminology to  
Eastern concepts. This way the entire tree of history shines as a  
product of Western scholarship. The question remains: 
[w]hether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the  
birth of Greek philosophy […] is merely one among many other  
civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not  
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rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as  
such. (Edmund Husserl, 1970) 
The receptive, integration-based East has learned to appreciate the  
Western branch of knowledge for its very different views on many  
things. Yet, in turn it has been exploited, colonized, and humiliated 
by the West: 
This is the character of the Chinese people […] to cherish the  
meanest opinion of themselves, and believe that they are born to  
drag the car of Imperial Power. 
(Georg Hegel, 1821) 
The crux of the whole question affecting the Powers of the Western 
nations in the Far East lies in the appreciation of the true inwardness 
of the Oriental mind. 
(Alexis Krausse, 1900) 
Isn’t it important in any relationship that both sides learn from each 
other and respect each other? If not, Johann W. von Goethe had this 
warning for those who cared to listen: 
The Philistine not only ignores all conditions of life which are not his  
own but he also demands that the rest of mankind should fashion its 
mode of existence after his own. (Estelle Morgan, 1958) 
Regrettably, it is persistently this Philistine element in her soul that 
dominates Europe’s actions. As a result, it is not unusual to meet a 
Western ‘expert’ in the streets of Shanghai or Beijing who has never 
heard of Si Maqian (司马迁), Xu Guangqi (徐光启), Lu Xun (鲁迅), 
Hu Shi (胡适), Ji Xianlin (季羡林), or Guo Morou (郭沫若). Yet, if 
asked for his opinion on the Chinese language and culture, his chest 
will swell and, having himself mastered not more than a dozen  
Chinese characters, he will reply that his own failure in mastering  
those 65,000 Chinese ideographs begs the question of whether the  
ultimate cause of China’s backwardness in the sciences is her very  
‘Chinese-ness’ itself. China, Japan, India, and their neighbors are all 
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seen as being at the receiving end of history; they receivemore and 
(inherently) giveless(Krausse, 1900; Husserl, 1970; Pyle, 2007). 
Western nations seek a global civilization, which they believe is an  
extension of their own; while the Eastern nations, still cherishing their 
traditional cultures, will feel the ‘rage of the Western destabilizers’ if 
they do not comply with Western aggression: “Chinese society bears 
a function of ‘interior self-stability,’ while the European society  
possesses an ‘interiorly-installed unstable factor’” (Needham, 1964). 
Accordingly, Western nations act as if they ‘own’ the globe, history, 
and all material objects. As soon as Asian nationals lay hands on  
any matters, material or any theories about matters or material, that 
very action is deemed a service to ‘Westernization,’ as if there was a 
Western patent on matter and modernity. There are Western tourists 
in Singapore, Shanghai, and Yokohama who genuinely believe  
that every house, bank, pair of high heels, traffic light, newspaper,  
computer, train, or automobile is a genuine extension of Western  
civilization. 
Young Anglo-American visitors are especially quick to remind  
Asians that every English-language billboard marks Anglo-Saxon  
cultural territory. Few of them have learned in school that their own 
language is a relatively young branch of the Germanic language  
family, with those Germanic tribes, the Angles and the Saxons, being  
their immediate ancestors. 
We may forgive those clueless, young Asia-bashers. But for the sake 
of dignity and cultural diversity, they should be properly educated 
that the chief end of Asian man is not to glorify the Anglo-American 
way of life, or any other Western model. A global language,  
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exchange, and economy are good things, but ‘globalization’ as the  
mediator between East and West will not make East into West,  
nor West into East. Buddhism has not made China an India, and  
Capitalism has not made Japan an America. To annihilate ‘cultural  
diversification,’ accumulated in thousands of years or more, might  
not be as easy after all, not even in an American corporate dream.  
Isn’t a ‘common sensibility’ preferable to all this American talk  
about global culture and values (Zhao, 2005)? How about ‘All under 
Heaven’ (天下, tianxia), 'humanity' (仁, ren), or ‘harmonious society’ 
(和谐社会, hexie shehui) – are those not more honest guarantors for 
mutual respect and dignity among civilizations?   
An example of East and West talking at cross purposes would be the 
memorable conversation between Albert Einstein and Rabindranath 
Tagore on July 14, 1930. It shows, quite nicely I think, Einstein’s  
limits to fully appreciate what Tagore wants to communicate,  
namely that the Western notion of causality has its limits.  
Consequently, Einstein quite diplomatically dismisses Eastern  
mysticism as unscientific and, implicitly, as rather unhelpful: 
Tagore: “I was discussing with Dr. Mendel today the new  
mathematical discoveries which tell us that in the realm of  
infinitesimal atoms chance has its play; the drama of existence is not 
absolutely predestined in character.” 
Einstein: “The facts that make science tend toward this view do not 
say good-bye to causality.” 
Tagore: “Maybe not, yet it appears that the idea of causality is not  
in the elements, but that some other force builds up with them an  
organized universe.” […] 
Einstein: “I believe that whatever we do or live for has its causality; 
it is good, however, that we cannot see through it.” (Rabindranath  
Tagore, 1931) 
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One can see from this “whatever” Einstein “cannot see through”  
that, in his Western view, it must be linear and causally related.  
Einstein apriori rules out – as it seems fit for any proper scientist – 
any alternative to Western-style causality. It also seems out of the  
question for Einstein and the culture he represents to think that  
there is any concept other than a scientific, rational Western one  
–  let alone that of an ‘ancient Oriental wizard’ (Kawabata, 1969).  
Rudyard Kipling’s poem “East is East, and West is West, and never 
the two shall meet” easily comes to mind (Kipling, 1999). 
What would have happened if Tagore had brought up the  
continuum of ‘samsara,’ ‘non-violence,’ ‘free will,’ ‘karma,’ the  
function of impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty, and lacking-a-self  
‘dharmas,’ or just ‘good poetry’? Surely, there must be more wisdom  
than Western science in this world: 
Perhaps in return for conquest, arrogance and spoliation, India will 
teach us the tolerance and gentleness of the mature mind, the quiet 
content of the unacquisitive soul, the calm of the understanding  
spirit, and a unifying, a pacifying love for all living things. (Will  
Durant, 1930) 
Land of religions, cradle of the human race, birthplace of human  
speech, grandmother of legend, great grandmother of tradition.  
The land that all men desire to see and having seen once even by a 
glimpse, would not give that glimpse for the shows of the rest of the 
globe combined. (Mark Twain, 1897) 
In my understanding, the two global hemispheres experienced  
different, unique histories, and this made them what they are today. 
What did the existentialists teach us about identity? Isn’t it the case 
that the beginning of human history determined what we are, but  
our historical experience determineswho we are? Shouldn’t we all  
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agree that we are a – more or less identical – human race? However, 
thousands of years of unique history have made uswho we are:  
Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Germans, French, British, etc., and,  
eventually, we shaped the East and the West. 
I will not attach importance to every cultural leaf or twig and say  
that any particular culture should be preserved, nor will I harbor the 
illusion that everything can be preserved. Having said this, however,  
the smallest leaves and twigs will bend and break when the weather 
becomes harsh, and wither when the tree is not well nurtured. If our 
criterion was ‘longevity,’ however, we would be safest to bet on the 
two great cultural systems: the East and the West. 
To conclude, the argument that East and West look at history from 
different angles is to be refuted: History is local, and lends itself to  
different points of view. We have every reason to believe that the  
two hemispheres not only look at and interpret history differently,  
but irreversibly experience their very own local version of it. In  
addition to experience, the different cognitive preferences of the  
Easterner and Westerner inevitably let them, in a metaphysical  
sense,prefer their own version of history andmisinterpretthe other’s. 
This predicament, I believe, is impossible to overcome because  
Easterners and Westerners cannot experience each other’s histories  
nor see them through the same eyes. The East perceives history to be 
more holistic, broad, open and interconnected, while the West regards history 
as more linear, narrow, sharp and fragmented. 
CHAPTER 10 
The  Theory  of  
PoWer 
anD  To 
Whom  iT  belongs 
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Western analytical-based societies, with their emphasis on achieving 
‘useful’ knowledge, became masters of nature, with the perspective 
of active domination over other civilizations. 
While in the integration-based societies knowledge came from  
studying the classics, the wise, and the kings of old, the analysis- 
based West started to categorize and deconstruct nature and all  
things. Periodism, for example, is characteristically related to  
Western rationalism, as opposed to non-event related dynasties  
named after Chinese emperors, so is categorization as a method  
to acquire new knowledgead infinitum. Western societies dress  
themselves in the mantle of knowledge, and knowledge is linked to 
power, which has been the very source of European predominance: 
We should admit […] that power produces knowledge […] that  
power and knowledge directly imply one another […] that there is  
no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of  
knowledge. (Michel Foucault, 1977) 
The concept of power in the integration-based East, however, is  
sheer might in numbers, uniformity, and thus consistency. This  
spiritual ‘moral power’ drove out the Imperialists in the first half of 
the twentieth century: 
The truest test of civilization, culture and dignity is character, not  
clothing. (Mahatma Gandhi, 1938) 
To sum up, Western power in my taxonomy is related to  
analytically-based deductive knowledge, whereas Eastern power is  
related to integration-based inductive knowledge. The former has  
the historical function of a dangerous, yet creative force; the latter  
has the historical function of a tranquil, yet moral force. 
CHAPTER 11 
The  Problem  of 
sTanDarD 
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Qian Binsi [钱宾四] wrote in hisChinese Intellectual History 
(Zhongguo  Sixiang Shi,中国思想史, (1991): “中国文化 
过去最伟大的贡献，在于对‘天‘ ’人‘关系的研究.” If you cannot  
read what I just wrote, that means you probably don’t understand  
Chinese. It says: “Among all those past contributions of Chinese  
culture (to mankind), the study of the relation between ‘heaven’ and 
‘man’ is the grandest” (Qian Binsi, 1998). 
Without knowing Chinese, it is, I would argue, very difficult to  
understand Chinese people. Sadly, not knowing Chinese is the  
rule among Western commentators on the East-West discourse:  
from the political thinkers Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755)  
and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), over the great writers Denis  
Diderot (1713-1784) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832),  
the economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790),  
to the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-) and the three  
great ‘fordmakers’ in cultural studies: Francis Bacon (1561-1626,  
he initiated the scientific revolution), Max Weber (1864-1920, the  
founder of the modern study of sociology), and Karl Marx (1818-1883,  
the father of Communism and dialectic materialism). Similarly, in  
philosophy we have the highly gifted Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), Georg Wilhelm  
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), Arthur  
Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). All  
of them wrote passionately about the Confucian and/or Buddhist  
canon, categorized the world’s people, and judged their cultural  
outlook andmodus operandi. 
Now, of all the persons listed above, to my knowledge none of them 
had ever mastered Classical Chinese or Sanskrit, nor had learned  
any other Asiatic language. 
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But then, why should they? Thestandard of Western knowledge  
is Western civilization and, recently, it has become the English  
language, and against that standard all other cultures are measured 
and judged. Western man, not man, it seems, is the measure of all  
things: 
There is something unique here in Europe that is recognized in us by  
all other human groups, too, something that […] becomes a motive 
for them to Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to  
spiritual self-preservation, whereas we, if we understand ourselves  
properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example. (Edmund  
Husserl, 1935) 
It is clear to all Chinese that Western culture is the root of wealth,  
success, development and political survival – it is the essence of  
modernity. (Francesco Sisci, 2008) 
This air of condescension is reflected in Western education systems. 
It is still perfectly conceivable to meet a German, French, Italian, or 
American visiting scholar on the streets of Delhi or Shanghai who  
has never heard of Rammohan Roy, Sri Autobindo, Ramakrishna  
Paramahansa, Si Maqian, Hu Shi, Liang Qichao, or Lu Xun. Outside 
Asia the situation is truly hopeless, with the average American Joe  
or European Karl not being able to name a single living Chinese  
person. 
The histories of China, Japan, and India were not even mentioned  
before 2008 in the syllabus of Germany’s compulsory secondary  
school curriculum. This ignorance of general (Asian) knowledge  
extends to grand literary works such as Journey to the West,Outlaws 
of the Marsh,the Puranas, orthe Ramayana. 
Even to this day, nine out of ten university professors of Chinese  
90 
or Sanskrit/Hindi Studies in Europe are not able to write or  
communicate fluently in those languages, let alone to a level worthy 
of the highest intellectual standard. Most have to employ Chinese  
or Indian translators or assistants to help their ‘white masters’  
carefully dissect those foreign texts as if they were insects on a piece 
of cardboard. 
Another problem is that of prevailing Western (mostly Judeo-Christian or 
Latin-Greek) categories, even in Cultural studies. As a result, unlike animals, 
plants, and materials, cultures were never really classified, with the effect that, 
for example the (Jewish) rabbi, the (Islamic) ulama, the (Confucian) junzi, the 
(Hindu) guru, and the (Buddhist) heshang are all just foreign sort of 'priests.' 
Are Europeans really that ignorant? Of course not. Far from it. In  
fact, they are really busy in all intellectual departments in keeping  
what they have, and maybe learning a bit more about finance,  
information technology, American pop culture, and the other 27  
European Union member states. What they don’t have are the spare 
time and human resources to master Eastern cultures and languages.  
Only so much time and energy can be devoted to the pursuit of  
knowledge of other cultures without other aspects of our own  
culture suffering. In 1964, Germany proudly produced 1,357,000  
children; but in the year 2006, the number shrank to 676,000 –  
out of which close to 30 percent were of non-German nationality  
(destasis, 2006). Therefore, it will be an impossible task for Germany 
to maintain its own culture, let alone learn a lot more new things.  
Take the Swedish nation as an example, a people of merely 8 million 
(of whom 20 percent are foreigners, but this aside). In order to  
preserve Swedish history and knowledge, China could send a mere 
0.5 percent of its population to do the job. On the other hand, if the 
entire Swedish population tried to preserve Chinese history and  
knowledge, they would not only discontinue the Swedish cause, but 
would also venture no further than to preserve a tiny 0.5 percent  
of the Chinese tradition. It is therefore self-evident which countries 
have a greater capacity for cultural preservation. 
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Of all the cultures that have disappeared from this world, to my  
knowledge, not a single farewell letter or suicide note has ever  
been unearthed. It must be a painless, gradual, almost unnoticed  
just process. Some of the Goths, the East Germanic tribes who  
disappeared slowly after the sixth century, must have felt that their 
cities had too many foreigners, that their daughters preferred to  
marry outsiders, that their sons had to learn a foreign language,  
that they consumed more and more goods that they themselves did 
not produce, so that their few survivors suddenly felt the desire to  
belong to something greater than their own narrow turf. 
In this twenty-first century of voyeurism and mass media though,  
we may want to hear and watch some cultures die. In drawing an  
analogy to Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s celebrated ‘five stages of grief’  
(1969) – denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance – certain  
European nations could be considered no longer in ‘denial’ but are  
already experiencing the next stage of their looming exodus, that of 
‘anger.’ 
Contrary to the Confucian laws of good manners or Indian tolerance 
and gentleness, Western media, especially the German, French, and 
British ones – in the name of the European monopoly on freedom,  
democracy, and human rights – leave out no opportunity to  
relentlessly and shamelessly lecture China on human rights, degrade  
Islam, satirize India, demonize the Persians (Iran), and mock all  
Russian ambitions – whatever floats the European boat. 
I have not seen this helplessness and simultaneous finger-pointing  
in India, China, or the USA lately. On the contrary, these great and 
promising powers are optimistic and ambitious about their future.  
This was especially true in 2008 during the Olympic Games in  
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Beijing that commanded the world’s attention: “更 高,更快,更 强” 
(“Higher, faster, stronger,” the Olympic motto). Chinese aiguo zhuyi  
[爱国主义] or “patriotism” has taken up the world stage. Since 1978, 
when Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) proudly announced, “To get rich  
is glorious!” China experienced a 30-year period of unprecedented  
growth of national wealth and power, averaging ten percent annual 
GDP growth. This sudden increase of wealth in such a short period 
of time is considered unprecedented in the history of humankind,  
and it didn’t happen in the West (Khanna, 2008; Kim, 2006): “They  
undergo compulsory Maoism courses but fantasize of little but  
money” (Aiyar, 2008). The Chinese love their country, and they  
embrace life. They also have many serious problems. They know it, 
but they would – as all great powers do – rather continue to be great 
and engage with other great nations, and not waste too much time  
with the negative, nagging, and left-behind former great nations,  
and certainly not with some jealous – but politically irrelevant –  
European demagogues. 
The European nation states’ diminishing roles in world politics, their  
declining populations (Heinsohn, 2004), the brain drain (timeEurope, 
2004/01), and their reluctance to learn from other cultures (Phelps,  
2007) are all irreversible and accelerate year by year. Even the hope 
for a suffering in fragmentary unity – I am talking about the hope for  
a ‘United States of Europe’ (Reid, 2004) – proved short-sighted when 
a European constitution was first ruled out, and finally a European 
Treaty was rejected twice in 2005 by France and The Netherlands,  
and in 2008 by Ireland. Furthermore, in case of a referendum in  
Great Britain, 89 percent of the British public would fervently vote  
against the ‘damn Treaty’ (BBC, 2008/02). A great piece of advice  
will be needed to steer the European boat through these difficult  
times. I have one from Buddhism: “Not to live in living is to endure. 
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Not to die in dying is to live on” (Kumarajiva, 2008). 
What then is the true problem with Europe? Why don’t the  
European nations unite and become ‘one’? I will argue that in the  
past 2,500 years of its history, there has never been the concept of  
‘oneness’ or ‘harmoniousness’ in the European collective mind. The 
powerful poet Johann W. von Goethe said: “There are two peaceful 
powers in this world: Right and Tact” (Goethe, 1833). And Gu  
Hongming observed, “希伯来人的文明宗教教导欧洲人正义的知识，但没 
有教导礼法” (“The Religion in the civilization of the Hebrew people 
taught the people in Europe the knowledge of Right, but it did not 
teach Tact”) (Gu, 1922). The Greeks knew about Tact and taught the 
Romans. The Romans tried to teach the Germanic tribes Tact and  
Right, but the Germanic tribes could only understandRight, notTact. 
Thus, the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806), from the 
King of the Franks Charlemagne (747-814) to Francis II (1768-1835), 
later Emperor of Austria, did not know how to ruletactfully, and  
their subjects did not know how to submittactfully. About that same 
Empire, the French Enlightenment philosopher Francois Voltaire  
remarked that “it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.” For 
a start, despite its name, it never did include Rome. Then, observe  
in all those divided territories, there were quarreling tribes and  
countless families that “live[d] scattered and apart, surrounding  
their dwellings with open space” (Tacitus, 1996)  – the Franks,  
the Dutch, the Swiss, today’s Czech, Flemish, and Polish with no  
unifyinglingua franca, opposing Prussia and Austria as well as the  
Church. It was a total mess. And what did the righteous Napoleon  
do? He did what he knew wasRight: He steamrolled them again,  
thereby diffusing and dividing the already fragmented peoples; but 
he did not know how to unite, rule, or teach them Tact either. 
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The Chinese, on the other hand, knew only little aboutRight, but a  
lot more aboutTact. Lao Zi said: 
故大邦以下小邦，则取小邦；小邦以下大邦，则取大邦。故或下以取 
或下而取。大邦不过欲兼畜人，小邦不过欲入事人。夫两者各得所欲 
大者宜为下。 
When a large country submits to a small country, it will adopt the  
small country. When a small country submits to a large country, it  
will be adopted by the large country. The one submits and adopts,  
the other submits and is adopted. It is in the interest of a large  
country to unite and gain service, and in the interest of a small  
country to unite and gain patronage. If both would serve their  
interests, both must submit. (Lao Zi, 61). 
Thus, there is a tactful bond between the small states imitating the  
large:Submission is a means of union. If you ask any of the fragmented 
27 nation states of Europe today about their European Union, each  
of them would be quick to defend their individualRight, but none of 
them would haveTact enough to submit to the greater cause. 
The ‘fragmentary view’ on the world enjoys the greatest prominence 
in the deductive West, namely in the categorization of the people  
of the world and their regions, followed by a rigorous system  
of classification (Sen, 2006). In other words, the Europeans want  
a similar fragmented Asia. Tibet is classified as Tibet, and its  
people as Tibetan, not as part of China and as Chinese (Economist, 
2007/02). The unifying one-party political systems of Russia,  
Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Iran, and China, or any other large  
concentration of power, offer outrageous non-European conditions. 
These are utterly revolting to the analytical Western intellect, and  
present a security risk to Western hegemony (Barnett, 2004) and the 
Western watchword ofdivide et impera. 
With regard to China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and other  
95 
such nations, the mere thought of ‘Asian values,’ their archaic forms 
of politeness, filial piety, spoiled ‘little emperors,’ submissive doll- 
like women, shyness in adult men, rote-learning, collectivism,  
tendency for authoritarian rule, etc. – all these elicit a specific  
revulsion in the Western psyche. This revulsion is so pervasive and 
ongoing that I do not dare think of the irreversible and dangerous  
course of history that is looming over Asian civilization in case  
Europe and America cannot find themselves at peace with the new, 
Asiacentric world order. During the Cold War, the socialist Guy  
Mollet (1905-1975) is believed to have said, “The communists are not 
of the left but of the East.” 
That statement deserves its own branch of scholarship. First of  
all, it is based on facts. Far into the ‘70, no communist party in  
Western Europe or the USA held any considerable mandates. Apart 
from France, Italy, and Finland, communism was virtually absent  
in Western politics, except, of course, as the bogeyman. I cannot  
discuss the reasons here why collectivism, authoritarian rule, the  
spiritualization of materialism, socialism, and totalitarian concepts  
so easily caught on in the East, and why Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, 
and Kim Jong-Il, are still, despite acknowledged flaws, considered  
‘great leaders’ among many Asian intellectuals and admirers. They  
will probably always be. Yet what I will discuss is how history is  
now repeating itself, after humankind has learned how dichotomy  
unfolds. 
The labeling that took place in Western Europe with regard to  
communism as an ugly Eastern proposition is now taking place in  
Western Europe and the USA with regard toharmoniousness. Let us 
modify Guy Mollet’s alleged statement about the communist and  
say: “The harmonizers are not of the liberals, but of the East.” 
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I will explain this in a minute. Before, let us see what Amartya  
Kumar Sen, the Nobel Laureate in economics, had to say about the 
two civilization modes and their distinct views and approaches  
towards history: 
There are two ways of thinking of the history of civilization  
in the world. One is to pursue the story in an inclusive form,  
paying attention to the divisions as well as the interdependence  
involved, possibly varying over time, between the manifestations  
of civilization in different parts of the world. This I shall call the  
‘inclusive approach.’ The other, which I shall call the ‘fragmentary 
approach,’ segregates the beliefs and practices of different regions 
separately, paying  attention to the interdependences between them 
as an afterthought  (when any attention is paid to them at all). 
(Amartya Kumar Sen, 2006) 
The two ways of thinking in the history of civilization are reflected 
in humankind’s approach towards ‘communism’ and, in this age,  
towards ‘harmoniousness.’ The East is pursuing the human story in the 
inclusive form of a multiverse; the West brutally segregates the  
beliefs of different regions. The West does not identify itself with  
the ‘inclusive approach’ and is now expelling the harmonizers, just 
like it expelled the communists before, from world history. Once  
the rigidity of the Western ‘fragmentary approach’ has been studied 
and understood, the hopelessness of any non-Western attempt to get 
back into world history will become apparent. 
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and non-interference in any nation’s internal affairs, and the desire  
to conquer nature and, if necessary, the traditional peoples and  
tribes that made a pact with nature – how can we not say that the  
deductive West is completely rejecting the inductive Eastern notion 
of ‘harmoniousness’? 
Of course, with statements like “the West is rejecting  
‘harmoniousness’” it seems we are oversimplifying things again.  
Yet, like with all abstracts that seem simple, they are actually very  
complex: If we study the histories of the inductive East and the  
deductive West, and if we understand that the one went down the  
integration-based path while the other took the analysis-based path, 
we will come to understand that ‘harmoniousness,’ just like any  
other mental concept such as ‘democracy,’ must be understood in  
the respective Western context or in the respective Eastern context. 
The abstract concepts of ‘harmoniousness’ or ‘democracy,’ for  
example, behave  non-relative precisely in their respective Western  
or Eastern context where, of course, they may have other names  
and additional meanings, but will almost inevitably behave relative 
in any dialogue between the cultures. Here I will give an example  
of the so-called ‘Golden Rule’ in ethics, also called the ‘Ethic of  
Reciprocity,’ which is supposedly the origin of the Western position 
on human rights. In the Gospel of Luke 6;27-31, Jesus Christ said: “Do  
for others just what you want them to do for you. If you really do  
that, you may just find that your enemy will become your friend.”  
I think this Golden Rule from the Bible is clear: In your own best  
interest, make your enemies friends. But what happens when you  
apply this to friends – will they become enemies? 
Another often used application of the biblical Golden Rule is to warn  
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someone about the pain and punishment that comes from breaking 
the Golden Rule, because once you break it, you cannot rule out that 
someone else is breaking it with regard to you. After all, who wants 
to be accused, beaten, and crucified? Despite the individualistic,  
very moving, and almost selfish touch of the biblical Golden Rule,  
it is among the best examples of ‘harmoniousness’ in the respective 
Western context. Moreover, according to its moral implications,  
all Western nations have encouraged their societies to promote  
the development of individuality by laws and variable decrees  
of punishment that will ensure your systematical punishment if  
another individual was harmed by you or your actions. This could  
be called the Western ‘fragmentary approach’ to the Golden Rule. 
Now we will look at the Eastern ‘inclusive approach’ to the Golden 
Rule. Master Confucius formulated his Doctrine of Reciprocity  
roughly 500 years before Jesus Christ did: “己 所 不 欲，勿 施 于人，在 
邦 无 怨，在 家 无 怨” (“Do not do to others what you would not like 
yourself. In the state there will be no complaints, in the family there 
will be no complaints”) (Confucius, Lun Yu, 12; 2). This Golden  
Rule of Confucius is at the core of ‘harmoniousness’ in the East,  
and according to its moral implications, all East Asian nations have 
encouraged their societies to promote the cultivation of oneself  
as an integrated member of the collective with various decrees of  
obedience and filial piety that will ensure shame and loss of ‘face’ [面 
子, mianzi] if the collective is harmed. 
Few people in China fear punishment by law for one’s misbehavior. 
What is feared most is ‘loss of face’, the ‘feedback from the  
collective,’ the ‘wrath of one’s family,’ one’s ‘father’s judgment,’  
and, yes, sometimes the Communist Party official’s patronizing,  
often infantilizing propaganda: “This disgraceful bad citizen now  
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prefers to feel ashamed.” When one of the disciples of Confucius, Zi 
Gong [子贡], asked the Master: “Is there one word that can serve as 
a principle of conduct for life?,” Confucius replied: “It is the word  
shu (恕) – reciprocity” (Confucius,Lun Yu, 15;23). 
As an interim result, let us say that this simple Golden Rule “Do not 
unto others what you do not like yourself” is enforced in the West  
by laws and punishment, and in the East by morals and a sense of  
shame: 
道之以政，齐之以刑，民免而无耻，道之以德，齐之以礼，有耻且格。 
If the people are governed by laws, and punishment is used to  
maintain order, they will try to avoid the punishment but have no  
sense of shame. If they are governed by virtue, and rules of propriety [ritual] 
are  
used to maintain order, they will have a sense of shame and will  
become good as well. (Confucius, Lun Yu, 2;3) 
Next, let us say that neither Jesus Christ nor Confucius is the voice 
or medium of an almighty God, but that their message was intended 
to become part of the universal code of ethics. What difference  
would it make? We would still have to read the Bible orThe Analects 
to make sense of the real world. The human mind needs context.  
That is the bottom line. In the Western context ‘harmoniousness’ is  
defined by the Judeo-Christian tradition, while in the Sinitic context 
‘harmoniousness’ is defined by the Confucian tradition. This is an  
example of what I meant by understanding harmoniousness in the  
respective Western context and in the respective Eastern context. 
A people’s history, value system, code of conduct, choices and  
priorities, family and spiritual life should always be seen and  
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understood in that people’s socio-cultural context. It means 
that, for example, if one doesn't know the concepts of rishi 
 dharma, and karma, he should not pose as Hindu-expert; 
likewise if the notions of imam, hikmah, and elm sound 
unfamiliar to him, he should not comment on Iranian history; 
and, last, if he finds it objectionable that the Japanese love 
rice, sake, and sushi, and cultivate their cherry-blossom not 
for the fruit but for the flowers, he should not write essays 
on Japanese governance, however unrelated aesthetics and 
politics seem at first to the untrained eye.  
Most scholars  of the cultural sciences and the arts and 
humanities know this  very well. They accept the tremendous 
cultural diversity of our  species, and thus almost as a 
humanistic reflex propose and prefer  
a dialogue among cultures and civilizations as a means to exchange 
ideas and opinions without forcing the other party to accept one’s  
point of view (United Nations, 2001). But does it work? 
As I said before with regards to communist theory, although  
to a large extent ‘made in the West’ by the seemingly singular  
effort of two men, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the entire  
idea of communism was almost immediately rejected by Western  
Europe simply because the context, the West’s cultural mode and  
fragmentary approach, wasn’t suited for it. On the other hand, the  
Eastern context, its cultural mode and inclusive approach, was  
suited for it, and considerable cultural and political will, time,  
and energy were spent to experiment and develop communist  
theories further. Isn’t that remarkable? If you tell someone to “do  
it!” (the communist revolution), he won’t do it. This happened in  
Europe with Karl Marx’s ideas, which were considered utopian  
and dangerous. Conversely, if you really want someone to do it,  
you had better say “don’t do it!” So much for Europe’s warning  
about the dangers of communism in Asia. Doesn’t this explain  
why philosophical systems never last and religions last forever?  
All religions effectively saydon’t: Don’t kill, don’t lie, don’t steal, don’t 
commit adultery, and so on. But of course we do it all the time,  
so we deeply respect religion for its profound universal wisdom.  
The same holds true for the most accomplished spiritual leaders  
and the greatest of all sages. They often say something in the end  
like “Oh, but I reallydon’t know anything,” or “This isnot at all my 
invention” – like Socrates and Confucius did – because precisely  
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such a confession of one’s own shortcomings will produce the exact 
opposite effect in the listener by arousing his sympathy: “Oh, sure  
he does!” 
Likewise, the two great cultural systems of East and West will  
(almost) always try to sabotage each other’s opportune ideas and  
ideologies, compromise hopes, destroy dreams, and say – for  
the sake of humanity – “I want to distinguish myself from you,  
no matter what it takes.” There is a common African wisdom  
called “ubuntu,” which roughly means “I am because you are.”  
In intercultural relations and diplomacy it could also mean “I will  
not be you, but me, because of you.” Let’s recall the Golden Rule:  
Wouldn’t it be, psychologically speaking, more honest to say “Do  
unto others; then they won’t do it unto you.” I am saying it because 
this (andnotwhat the holy scripture recommends) is the reality  
practiced every day in world politics, economics, academia, law,  
and all human relations: It’s about who dominates – and the damn 
law of human relationships. The biblical Golden Rule, Confucian  
reciprocity, and any similar concepts only work in their respective  
cultural context, and not abroad. Abroad, they are called cultural  
imperialism. 
The West, despite all its condescension and sympathy for Asian  
ideas, is fundamentally rejecting the Asian ‘inclusive approach’ right  
in front of our eyes. The more Asia promotes her views on the so- 
called universality of ‘oneness,’ ‘balance,’ ‘harmony,’ ‘integration,’  
or ‘one commonwealth under tianxia,’ the more Asia’s theories  
become hers, and hers alone. The West will not waste its energies  
on anything that is inner-world dependent and all-inclusive; only  
that what the West discovered upon breaking that ‘all-inclusive  
something’ into its parts will make sense to the Western mind. This 
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is the consequence of the deductive Western ‘fragmentary approach’ 
towards nature and all things. 
Not that the USA or European nations do not have their own  
ideas about harmoniousness. Far from it: They have various, often  
fragmentary, even conflicting ideas about it. They always have. After  
the ‘ejection’ of communism from the Western hemisphere, in the  
case of dialectical materialism, all major parties of Western capitalist 
democracies quickly found their own ways to satisfy the people  
and to curb production and the accumulation of material wealth,  
and it all happened without turning human beings into submissive 
production units with no human rights. Today, Germany and France  
are arguably more socialist than socialist China ever will be. 
In the case of universal ‘harmoniousness,’ the major parties in  
deductive Western democracies have already found their own  
ways to cater to the people’s need for ever more ‘international  
flights,’ ‘foreign currencies,’ ‘world trade,’ ‘exchange,’ ‘cooperation,’ 
and ‘tolerance.’ This is where the Western terms ‘globalism,’  
‘multiculturalism,’‘cultural diversity,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘human rights’  
etc., all come in handy; no Asian alternative needed. 
As a consequence, in a Western-dominated world no one could  
care less that “equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and 
harmony is its path” (Zi Si & Zhong Yong, 1) and that “the function 
of rites (li) lies in harmoniousness” (Confucius,Lun Yu 1;12), or  
“to live with a culture is to understand that culture” (Lao Zi, 54). It 
is indeed very difficult to conceive that today’s leaders of the free  
world – Barack Obama of the USA, Francois Hollande of France,  
David Cameron of Great Britain, Angela Merkel of Germany, and  
so on – would favor ‘oneness’ over ‘Westernization,’ not to mention 
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the Chinese dream of ‘tianxia’ (天下, All under Heaven). Again, this 
is the bottom line. There is no need for China’s obsolete sense of  
tolerance, kindness, and gracefulness, Japan’s ‘universal emptiness,’ 
the ancient Indian sense of ‘universal equality,’ ‘universal tolerance,’ 
or indeed any other spiritual ideal, no matter how many hundreds  
of years those great Eastern sages spoke prior to Jesus Christ, Bill  
Gates, or Harry Potter. 
Billions of Asian hearts will have puffed with pride upon hearing  
that their countries were joining the United Nations, the World  
Trade Organization, or could attend yet another international  
conference, all in the name of ‘globalism’ that so much resembles,  
it seems, the eternal Eastern pursuit of interconnectness, oneness,  
balance, and harmoniousness as well as the Eastern need for ‘self- 
cultivation’ that has been the foundation of all traditional Eastern  
societies from the beginning of time. But are they getting more  
than they bargained for by joining a Western world order? The  
material benefits of submitting to the West are obvious: Western  
science, technology transfer, and materialism indeed look like  
freebies. How wonderful if the West also came over to your tent  
and acknowledged your cultural values, beliefs, and your ideas  
in exchange, no? But therein lies the rub: Except for a small circle  
of experts, hardly any educated Westerner has ever heard of the  
following stories of tolerance, which originated in the East, as for  
example in theBook of History (书经, c. 600-300 BC) or the Tipitaka 
(also known as the Pali Canon, c. 500 BC-400 BC). Nor have many  
Westerners heard of the great hero Fu Xi (伏羲, legendary ruler  
and fordmaker of theBook of Changes orI Ching [易经] in 2800-2737 
BC), or the Hindu/Jain traditions of ‘Anekantavada’ (meaning ‘non- 
one-endedness,’ a philosophy of universal tolerance), ‘Syadvada’ (a 
philosophical tradition of subjectivity and relativity in discourses),  
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and so on. 
So, I ask: How can someone appreciate someone else’s cultural  
values if he does not know their content, language, or their origin?  
The answer is no one can; the West refuses to appreciate Eastern  
spirituality and its ways. A good example is that of “religion.”  
Religion is a European word and concept. Therefore, there is  
only one religion. In fact, we are all living in it. We are all living  
in the year 2013 of our Lord, Jesus Christ. Ask a group of Western students, 
"When is the Chinese New Year?" or, "What year is it in Japan?" 
They will most likely reply: "Of course, it's January 1
st
" or, "It's the 
year 2013!'' The correct anwers are: February 10
th
 of Shenian, the 
Year of the Snake, and Heisei 25 Nen, the 25
th
 year of the current 
emperor's reign. The so-called freedom  
of religion in Europe should be read and understood as “as long  
as we live on Christianity’s terms, you may believe in whatever  
you want.” Imagine Europe’s reaction if we were to introduce the  
Chinese taxonomy of jia, jiao, and xue (meaning schools, teachings,  
and learning). Then there wouldn’t be any “religion” at all. Even  
“philosophy,” instead of being the global Western syndicate it is  
today, would be reduced to this: a tiny Hellenic branch of Plato’sjia. 
Was it not Thomas Kuhn, the great American scientist, who  
said that “rival paradigms are incommensurable” (Kuhn, 1970)?  
Incommensurability means that although it is always possible  
to imitate each other, it is almost impossible to understand, for  
example, a Chinese paradigm through let us say the conceptual  
framework and biases of the European looking glass, and vice  
versa. Of course, the inductive East and the deductive West keep  
trying: “Now that thirty million Chinese study piano and another  
ten million study violin, Western classical music well may have  
become the dominant form of transcendental experience for Asians 
even while Western neuroscientists dabble in what they think is  
Buddhism” (aTimes, 2008/07). 
What is in that shiny pot for us at the long end of the rainbow  
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called globalization? I am not talking about material wealth but  
about spiritual enlightenment. It appears that the integration-based 
Eastern traditions search for oneness and harmoniousness, for final 
confirmation that they also belong to this world, in the same pot in 
which the Western traditions know they will find a substance that  
reflects their own image. What can be done, if anything, about these 
completely different attitudes towards knowledge to avoid global  
misunderstandings? 
The psychological conundrum for Asia is that due to its induction- 
based views on the world, it does not perceive those European  
countries as isolated and self-sufficient, but rather as an integrated  
and dependent part of humankind. Thus, because Asia always  
strives for universal tolerance and harmony, it readily believes  
Western views or at least will always consider them as part of the  
solution. 
The West, however, is different. Apart from a few premises that it  
chooses to work with at any specific moment, the West usually does 
not consider other countries’ noises and fusses. It does not take into 
account all the facts, the history, the respective Eastern context, the 
whole picture, but isolates a few propositions each time and draws 
its conclusions accordingly. Its deductive method is precise and  
sharp as a surgeon’s knife. When the official spokesman for ZDF  
(‘Second German Television,’ a German television broadcaster)  
came to Shanghai in 2008 and held a talk on journalism governed  
by public law, he embarrassed the Tongji University of Shanghai,  
and, I believe, many more people than just his host, by laying down 
some abstract German premises about ‘freedom of the press’ and  
‘human rights.’ You see, there are thousands of German expatriates, 
consultants, and students in Shanghai impatiently waiting for the day  
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when China will do as the Germans want them to do. The television 
spokesman drew his conclusion about what any rational man, as  
opposed to a non-rational Chinaman, I suppose, would consider  
‘good journalism,’ following a point-by-point deductive-style hell  
of an argument. In short, he acted like a surgeon transplanting a  
liver. You cannot use Chinese chopsticks to transplant a liver, you  
see. There can be no mistake about what a liver is. And about where 
it is. All the parameters are highly scientific and precise. We know  
what a good operation looks like, and we know what follows if all  
the premises are true: The patient walks out of the hospital. When a 
Chinese professor in broken German informed the audience firstly  
that reality was more complex and that the Chinese position also  
had to be taken into account, and secondly that German media  
coverage of Tibet and other politically sensitive topics was biased  
and often untrue, and that German media evidently even used Nazi- 
German terminology such as ‘Jubelchinesen’ for Chinese volunteers 
who simulated spontaneous joy and cheerfulness during the Bejing 
Olympic Games torch relay, the German lecturer replied in disbelief: 
“Nun seien Sie mal nicht so weinerlich!” meaning “Come on, don’t 
be such a whiner!” 
CHAPTER 12 
a  loveless 
DarWinian  DeserT 
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The great scientists Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) and Karl Popper  
(1902-1994), the venerable Scottish essayist Thomas Carlyle (1795- 
1881), and the great historian Joseph Needham (1900-1995) all  
concluded that the evolution of science isnon-relativistic, which tells 
us that the deduction-based West was more or less predestined to  
pick up the scientific way. 
No matter what those few smart Eastern individuals invented – be it 
the compass in the second millenium before the birth of Jesus Christ; 
the so-called ‘South-pointing carriage’ of the Duke of Zhou of the  
Zhou Dynasty, also in the second millenium before our Lord, and a 
forerunner of the ‘magnetic compass’ which was finally invented in 
China about a decade before the Three Wise Men visited Jesus after 
his birth, obviously without a compass (they used the stars); the so- 
called ‘South-pointing ladles;’ the magnet; the kite; the astronomical 
clock; the pizza; the noodle; or even gunpowder – it all does not  
lead to greatness in the sciences if one’s society is a victim of its own 
inward-looking traditions. 
Once these Asian inventions ‘popped up’ in the West, the European 
nations took their chances, developed the sciences, increased  
industrial output, perfected weaponry, boiled the noodle, and  
set out to conquer and divide the globe among themselves. Only  
afterwards did the West invent patents, copyrights, laws, and ideas 
about intellectual property to ensure it would forever stay in power, 
could forever keep what it took, cunningly assuming that – as I  
explained before – evolution, even the evolution of sciences and  
culture, is but a gradual, developmental progress, like, say, climbing 
a ladder, and whoever takes the first step owns it to the last. 
For obvious reasons, the Western ‘scientific accomplishments’ of  
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the past still confuse many Asians, who, as I said elsewhere, excel  
in so many arts, crafts, and the humanities, but – more importantly 
– outnumber the Europeans today by roughly six to one. In a  
‘democratic’ world order, Asian opinions would clearly outweigh  
European ones. With her sheer numbers, China in particular would 
win any poll against angry Germany, France, and Great Britain:  
“Hey, you Europeans, you want a ‘world democracy’ and ‘global  
equality’? Well, here you are! Where do we vote?” 
Would it be wrong, in a democratic world order, to drastically  
reduce the global influence of Europe’s ‘Great Three’ in terms  
of political, economic, and voting power to 1.28, 0.84, and 0.81%  
respectively, according to their share of the world’s population? I  
think so, because I grew up in a democratic system. Yet, this is not 
going to happen. Not in the United Nations, not in Europe. The  
European mind got itself absolutely accustomed to the idea that it  
constitutes the world’s ‘bourgeoisie’ or ‘global elite,’ the gem among 
stones, while the developing world is human soup. It has no Tact,  
thus no respect for the rest, and it will never know its proper place. 
Western, seemingly universal ideas of ‘democracy’ and ‘equality’  
stop at their own garden’s fences. Beyond that lies a vast and  
lovelessDarwinian desert. 
As someone once wisely observed (Lao Zi, if you must know), “Small  
countries have few people.” Germany, with her 82 million people,  
is not a small country in any European sense. On the world scale,  
however, Germany ranks only fourteenth after the Philippines (93  
million) and Vietnam (86 million). Over 30 percent of Germany’s  
citizens have a migration background. The German language,  
despite being the majority language with regard to native speakers  
in Europe, will not be able to achieve clear supremacy in Europe, let 
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alone in any Asian belief structure, nor does the German culture it  
promotes. The German-Jewish connection before World War II was 
a winning formula for Nobel Prizes, but that, too, has slipped away 
forever. 
Today, China and India want German cars, technology, and  
knowledge, but they certainly do not want German culture. When  
the Social Democratic Party of Germany under Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder in the year 2000 overconfidently announced it would tap  
the vast market of two million Indian software programmers (“We  
want to hire 20,000 by the end of the year!”), only a tiny fraction  
of that, exactly 1,200 Indian experts, applied to Berlin. In the end,  
only 88 of them came. The idea that at any given moment, there are 
“millions” of colored people at the white man’s beck and call is a  
textbook case of European hubris. 
To sum up, it is highly unlikely, for the time being, that Germany, or 
ever smaller European states like France, Britain, or Italy could ever 
be a role model for India, Japan, Korea, or China. In fact, it would  
be foolish to adopt the German way, or the French, or the British.  
To force Asia and say that any single European country should be a 
role model for its nations is a racist stance that we must never ever 
take again. 
CHAPTER 13 
The  Psychology  of 
communion 
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The bias of ‘Western standard’ – after all, the whole project of  
‘Cultural Anthropology,’ eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth  
centuries’ Orientalism, let alone the ‘History of Sciences in China,’  
an objective presentation of “what China herself thought about her  
traditions” (Butler, 1927), are allWestern disciplines – caused some  
difficulties for unabashed historians to distinguish betweengenuine 
Western thought and classyadaptations of Persian, Arabic, East Asian or Hindu  
concepts in the West. There are some prominent examples of the  
latter: Jacques Derrida’s ‘différance,’ Michel Foucault’s ‘archaeology,’  
Edmund Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology,’ even Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s ‘existentialism,’ highly original as it is, all have Orientalist  
themes (Moore, 2003). Some Western protagonists revealed their  
Asian sources; others did not (Wang, 2001). 
 
Georg Hegel’s ‘philosophy of history,’ ‘Weltgeist’ (‘world-spirit’),  
and the ‘great man theory,’ all of which took Europe’s intelligentsia 
by storm, were a blatant extension of Mahayana Buddhist concepts 
such as ‘Brahmatmaikyam’ (the merging of Brahman and Atman)  
and the Hindu tradition of ‘Vardhamana Mahavira’ (The Great  
Hero) or the ‘Tirthankaras’ (Sanskrit for ‘fordmakers’). 
InDie Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819), Arthur Schopenhauer  
wrote (Abelson, 1993), “If I were to take the results of my philosophy  
as the standard of truth, I would have to consider Buddhism the  
finest of all religions.” 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s concepts of ‘Übermensch’ (lit. ‘over- 
man’) and ‘Meister- und Sklavenmoral’ (lit. ‘master- and slave- 
morality’) are heavily influenced by Hindu concepts of ‘vasudeva’  
(‘super-human’) and ‘jatis’ (‘hereditary groups or castes’), while  
he elsewhere confessed, after having read Louis Jacolliot’s 1876  
113 
translation of theManava Dharmasastra, that the VedicLaws of Manu 
was, in his opinion, the “epitome of all civic moral order” (Behler,  
1987). Moreover, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and his philosophy  
of Western ‘beingness and time’ was a direct response to Eastern  
concepts of ‘non-beingness and non-time’ (May, 1996). 
And then there was Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). Like Friedrich  
Nietzsche (1844-1900), Hitler worshipped might, and might was  
what he dreamt about when his utopian ‘Third Reich’ took shape  
in Mein Kampf (1925/26). Nazi ideology was deeply influenced  
by German Orientalism, which flourished from the eighteenth to  
twentieth centuries, and I am not just referring to the metaphysics  
of some Buddhist ‘Swastika’ as the chosen symbol of Aryan  
ascendancy and the spiritual conquest of India. 
The idea of the ‘Third Reich’ did not, as many Western historians  
tend to believe, only derive from studying the Holy Roman Empire, 
or French or British colonial empires in their heydays. Far from  
it. Neither ancient nor recent, highly diversified European history  
had a precursor to the things outlined in the Nazi master plan: the  
Germans’ obsession with Oriental themes and this so-called longing 
for the ‘exotic other’ – romanticism, nostalgia for greatness, and rise 
to great power status during the years of the German Empire (Said, 
1978; Zizek, 1997). All of this impelled the Germans to search for  
their identity and cultural legitimacy, e.g. Hellenic philosophical  
roots, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the Aryan  
invasion of India, the age of European Enlightenment, the invention 
of modern scholarship, the exploitation of Asian thought. They thus 
created a world history with Germany as its spiritual and cultural  
center. 
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The rational, analytical, deductive Germans, consciously or  
unconsciously indulging in a spiritual mission to make Europe  
‘coherent’ and ‘uniform,’ actually wanted toEasternize it. By  
adopting the inductive Eastern ways, some historians believe  
German Orientalism had “helped to destroy Western self- 
satisfaction, and to provoke a momentous change in the culture of  
the West: the relinquishing of Christianity and classical antiquity as 
universal norms” (Marchand, 2001). 
The Germans wanted toundo Europe’s regional, provincial,  
fragmentary character, that is, to write an ethnocentric Aryan  
history. Similarly, in China they wrote the ethnocentric Chinese  
history that connects simultaneously to the past, present, and  
future, that worships its great ancestors and their deeds, that gives  
authority to memory and historians, that sees human action and  
its consequences as reigning over time, rather than just passing  
through time in discrete temporal units – days, hours, minutes. To  
the horror of their Western neighbors, the newly-elected Nazis, well- 
educated in Classics, Philology, and Cultural Anthropology thanks  
to Humboldt’s university reforms starting in the year 1810,despised 
the deductive, rational, and all-fabricated ‘intellect,’and at the same 
timeidealized their newly-found intuitive, spiritual, and all-human  
‘instinct.’ 
It comes as no surprise that even today, the average American  
Joe has great difficulty distinguishing between German-style  
totalitarianism and Soviet- or Maoist-style totalitarianism, and there 
is no blaming him for that. As Hannah Arendt convincingly put it:  
They were two sides of the same coin, not opposing philosophies  
(Arendt, 1973). Germany wanted toundo the East-West dichotomy  
and wanted the two great cultural modes to occupy the same space. 
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And it comes as no surprise either that to this day, the majority of  
Western scientists, who have never sufficiently studied the East- 
West dichotomy, ascribe history’s darkest events to mere outer- 
world, materialistic circumstances like brainlessYouth Bulges 
(Heinsohn, 2003; 2005),Guns, Germs and Steel(Diamond, 2003; 2006), 
or other material convulsions, while ignoring all the evidence that  
suggests that the ultimate cause of history’s darkest events was an  
inner-world, monstrous, deadlyhuman psychology – the communion 
of Eastern and Western souls: 
European “discovery” of India brought the opportunity to  
appropriate its rich tradition for the sake of the Europeans’  
obsession to re-imagine their history and status. Many rival theories 
emerged, each claiming a new historiography. The new European  
preoccupation among scholars was to reinvent identities of various 
European peoples by suitably locating Sanskrit amidst other  
selective facts of history to create Grand Narratives of European  
supremacy […] in order to fulfill their own ideological imperatives  
of reconciling theology with their self-imposed role of world ruler. 
(Kapil Kapoor, 2001, here condemning the promoters of Aryan  
theories such as Max Müller [1823-1900]) 
What the German Orientalists and politicians prior to the Great  
Wars discovered – leaning towards Eastern-inflected concepts such  
as Mackinder’s ‘heartland theory’ (1904), Max Müller’s ‘Aryan  
supremacy’ (1892), and Nietzsche’s prophetic ‘Übermensch’  
(1885)  – was that the Western hemisphere needed a domesticated  
ueber-race of Aryans in order to occupy Eurasia and counter the  
disciplined, ever-increasing, and expanding powers of the Eastern  
hemisphere. Germany feared the inductive, rising East, not her  
western or southern neighbors, among which she was already the  
dominant intellectual power. Germany was somehow right about  
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the challenges from the East, as the Allies and the North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization indeed needed another 46 years (!) until the  
Cold War was won, a Pyrrhic victory, as it turned out: Today the  
West is helpless and in disbelief in the face of the until now peaceful 
rise of not one, recovering Russia, but of about a dozen new players: 
China, India, the nine ‘Tiger States,’ plus the world’s second-largest 
economic superpower, Japan (until 2010). 
In order to understand ‘history’s darkest events’ caused by an inner- 
world, monstrous, deadly psychology, the communion of Eastern  
and Western souls,  we have to again address the topic ofRight and 
Tact. 
As it turned out, the Germans’ pre-war master plan was hard, and  
physically impossible, to execute in the real world, but not at all  
difficult to grasp using our imaginations as serious students of  
world history today. What the Germans –  in reference to what I said  
before aboutRight andTact –  did wasRight, butwithout Tact. Now, 
before you protest against my claim that the Germans were “right,” 
we should carefully examine the meaning of ‘righteousness’ in this  
respective European context. The Germans did theright thing, but  
not in a tactful manner. Order, discipline, submission in the name of 
unity wasRight, so was theunity of Europe led by its most populous, 
industrious, and powerful people, the Germanic people. Was it not 
the Enlightenment thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) who  
suggested to Europeans that every individual must submit to the  
‘general will’ and become an ‘indivisible part’ of the whole or the  
‘national will’ (Rousseau, 1762)? 
Striving for unification, as opposed to separatism, was the ‘right’  
thing to do for Germany, the most populous nation of Europe.  
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China was unified; so were the USA and India. But the Germans did 
not know how to do it; they did know all about Right, but did not  
know aboutTact. They thought that scientific methods and powerful 
materialism could compensate for a lack of Tact and thus caused  
unbelievable suffering and pain. The Germans had to brutally bully 
all Europeans into submission, instead oftactfully leading them  
into submission. This is an example of the inner-world, monstrous,  
deadly psychology of communion: the Western analytical-deductive 
mindset of ‘deconstruction’ combined with Eastern intuitive- 
inductive theories of ‘oneness.’ This led to the Holocaust, just as  
the Japanese with their intuitive-inductive mindset, after adopting  
Western analytical-deductive theories, set out to destroy their  
neighbors with their newly- won, uncontrollable power. 
The Japanese were certainly different from the Germans; traditional 
Japanese culture was familiar withTact. And, before the dawn  
of modernity, they knew aboutRight, too. Before the dawn of  
modernity, Japan knew that it was notRightfor her to rule over  
the ancient and mighty Chinese, Russians, or Koreans – it wasn’t  
Right for her to rule supreme over Asia. But when she adopted the  
Western analytical-deductive mindset, she ignored what was Right 
and set foot on the Asian continent. When Japan was confronted  
with the reality of things, that it was not Right for this tiny island to 
rule over mainland Chinese, she panicked and threw away herTact, 
slaying her prisoners of war (cf. the Rape of Nanking) just because  
this small island was neither physically nor psychologically able to  
rule (let alone to justify rule) over an ancient culture and hundreds 
of millions of Chinese, Koreans, etc. 
Similar to Germany’s misery, this misery of Japan was initiated by  
the careless communion of the inductive Eastern and deductive  
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Western souls, causing untold suffering and pain. Fortunately, when  
Russian and Chinese souls adapted to Western-minded communism 
in the beginning, they refined it in the last minute, calling it  
Stalinism and Maoism. Yet look at what misfortune and destruction 
the communion of Eastern and Western souls still brought upon  
their own kin! 
The German Holocaust, Japanese militarism, Soviet and Chinese  
communism – all these carry gruesome warnings about what I  
meant by saying the ultimate cause of history’s darkest events was  
an inner-world, monstrous, deadly psychology: the communion of  
inductive Eastern and deductive Western souls. 
The main focus of academic attention in the analytical-deductive  
West about those darkest events in history seems to rest, how could 
it be much different, on the ‘methods,’ the ‘what’ and ‘how’ by  
which the suffering and pain were inflicted, not on the ‘who.’Who 
actually committed these deeds? Regarding the ‘methods,’ the ‘what’  
and ‘how’ of the German concentration camps and the heinous  
crimes of the Japanese, so much has already been written that I  
shall only add this observation: Despite the hypocrisy of Western  
moral educators regarding the unbelievably cruel methods used  
to annihilate the enemy, all those methods are the least difficult  
to comprehend for any serious student of history. We are making  
a fuss about nothing. On the contrary, a basic understanding of  
‘how’ to use the cruelest methods available to destroy one’s enemy, 
in this century, is the minimum requirement for any 14-year-old  
‘virtual commander’ who plays a strategic computer game like  
Warcraft (Blizzard, 2001), where distinctive races fight for honor,  
resources, and territory. A basic understanding of this ‘how’ is  
also the only thing required to read about the battle between the  
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races in a bestseller such as J. R. R. Tolkien’sThe Lord of the Rings 
(Shippey, 2002; Garth, 2005) or watch James Cameron’s Hollywood 
blockbuster Avatar (2009), which basically retells the universal  
story of how much fun it is for the European civilization to destroy 
indigenous cultures for material gains, especially when those  
indigeneous people look so different from us (in the movie, they  
have blue skin) and put up a good fight. Again, the what we did  
to them and thehow we did it, be it in reality, be it in the books or 
movies, are quite irrelevant, because they areentertainment and we  
will always find ways to improve our ways and effectivity. What  
should really matter not only to psychologists and theologians, but 
to all scholars in the humanities is thewho. Who commits the cruel 
deeds? And why? If we know about the source, we may find a cure. 
Again, coldly analyzing the facts and methods of history’s darkest  
events, the ‘what’ and ‘how,’ is dehumanizing and requires little  
intellectual effort. What could we possibly learn from it except  
doing it better next time? A more accurate understanding of what  
happened to the people of this world, to those who dominate and  
those who are being dominated, to all of us in our darkest times, can 
only be achieved by also looking at the ‘who,’ i.e. by looking into our 
souls. 
Having talked about the presence ofRight and the absence ofTact of 
the Germans prior to the Great Wars, we must not forget to discuss 
another important component of the German mindset, namely the  
Will – theWill to make great things happen, theWill to Power. 
As said elsewhere, Europe before history’s darkest events was  
fractured, Balkanized, useless,tactless, and in moral decline. The  
only sense of unity came from the Church, but the self-interested,  
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materialistic European nation states had left behind this source  
of spiritual unity in favor of independence, nationalism, and  
sovereignty. Then and before the Great Wars, who could ever  
possibly unite all Europeans in order to face the civilizations of the 
East? The British always knew what wasRight; it was notRightfor 
them to set foot on the continent, nor to aspire to rule over Europe. 
In Europe, they made no great leaders either: The French were few 
in number, had a sorry history of defeat and failures against the  
British, and in any case, similar to the Scandinavian countries, could 
trace back their ancestors to tribes in the Germanic heartland. 
The Germans of central Europe in the year 1930 were by far the  
most populous group in Europe, with over 60 million people within 
Germany, not counting Austria and the Germanic diasporas all over 
Europe. The Germans had been the discredited losers of World War 
I, stripped of all overseas colonies and one third of their former  
territory. With their enormous sense of righteousness, they naturally 
felt that their situation was not right, that no gang-up of (in their  
nationalistic view) mediocre European neighbor-states with their  
tinsel cultures should keep Europe small: 
There is a Chinese saying that all mothers teach their children: Xiao 
Xin “make your heart small!” That really is the basic tendency of  
all later civilizations: I do not doubt the ancient Greeks would spot 
today’s European self-inflicted reduction in size at first sight – this  
alone would be sufficient to disgust them. (Friedrich Nietzsche, [1]  
1909) 
Nietzsche had his own vocabulary for the East-West dichotomy.  
He distinguished between two modes of culture: the (Western)  
individual – the rational, technical, cognitive, useful, and hierarchical  
Apollonian; and the (Eastern) collective –emotional, sexual, mystic,  
fertile, and revolutionary Dionysian (Nietzsche, 1872). Any reader  
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knowledgeable in the history of thought will have noticed that pre- 
war Germany, in an incredible shift of paradigm later supervised  
by the Nazi party and its imitators and followers in Europe and  
beyond, had cultivated upon their soil for the first time ever an  
inherentlyApollonian/Western culture with the acquired mindset  
of a collective, emotional, sexual, mystic, fertile, revolutionary  
Dionysian/Eastern soul. This had disastrous consequences for the  
well-being of Europe and the global community. 
It is helpful to remind ourselves that there is a reason why so many 
of the above-mentioned German thinkers were so admired among  
intellectual circles in the East, most notably in Japan (e.g. the Kyoto 
School,京 都 派), India, but also in China: The intuitive Germans, 
from Goethe over Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, and Schopenhauer to  
Nietzsche and Heidegger were all pregnant with Oriental thought. 
In sum, Eastern concepts have been borrowed and adapted  
throughout European history, sometimes for the worse (as in the  
case of pre-war Germany), but often for the better. However, the  
main standard throughout history remained Eurocentric. Asian  
values were communicated, often ridiculed, but never openly  
acknowledged. Whatever the East offered via its strange languages  
and spiritual terminology, it did not matter much unless it was  
translated and sealed for approval by the dominant civilization:  
the West. Why this Western ‘verbal dominance’ over the course of  
world history? We will discuss this in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 14 
culTural  evoluTion 
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Let us imagine two people,Mr. East andMr. West, who differ  
significantly in their attitudes, behaviors, and ways of perception.  
To find out why, let us use technical terms from ‘Differential  
Psychology’ to describe them. Mr. West is more rationally driven,  
while Mr. East ismore intuitively driven. Although both could have 
developed the whole range of possible talents to a sufficient degree, 
yet each of them chose to display one set of particular talents more 
than the other. Given the limited time span of a single human life,  
many people may become excellent artists or brilliant scientists, but 
rarely does someone excel in both areas. Why? Because in our very 
competitive societies, our time and resources are limited; it is a very 
practical decision for Mr. East to do something different from Mr.  
West. Once that decision has been made, both will start cultivating  
their strengths, while neglecting their weaknesses. It is about finding 
one’s niche, occupation, purpose, or destiny in life. The ideal time  
to make that practical decision is usually at an early age, and thus  
it not only depends on genetic factors or character traits, but is  
often heavily influenced by exterior factors such as family situation, 
parental support, and teachers. Thus, Mr. East became an excellent  
artist, while Mr. West became a brilliant scientist, because the former  
came from a family of artists, and the latter came from a family of  
scientists. If this applies to two individuals, Mr. East and Mr. West, 
why not for whole groups, even entire civilizations? After all, if the 
West were really so superior, how come that the East is still with us, 
and for so long? Surely, East and West do complement each other  
somehow. 
Although Aristotle’sanalytical-deductive method (384-322 BC) and  
Confucius’intuitive-inductive method (551-479 BC) seem to be purely 
accidental, singular, isolated incidents, once they introduced  
those methods, onemore scientific, the othermore intuitive, the  
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two methods helped shape their respective civilizations, and  
unintentionally pushed them apart into two different directions. 
Anthropologists now teach us that powerful individuals or  
important texts that dictate or maintain certain group-level codes  
and behaviors can lead to the evolution of an efficient social system 
(Reynolds, 1983; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Boyd, 2003; Mace, 2005).  
Contrary to popular belief, cultural evolution leads to social systems 
that are more stable than the Mendelian (genetic) ones, because  
culture is less sensitive to migration. That is believable, isn’t it? All  
branches of Buddhism today – most of them found in Japan, China, 
and Korea – are based on Sakyamuni’s teachings (c. 563-483 BC) in 
Nepal, now forming theTipitaka Canon (c. 100 BC) written down  
during the Fourth Buddhist Council in Sri Lanka/India. Buddhism  
slowly declined in India (c. 100-1192), revived in China (starting  
from c. 100 BC-AD 100), and has flourished ever since in Korea  
(from c. 372) and Japan (from c. 467). This example of ‘cultural  
evolution’ shows that any witness of change in turn may change  
his or her group’s beliefs, learn new languages and ideas, or choose 
a new religion, thus promoting cultural evolution faster than that  
same group would be able to change its skin or eye color in genetic 
evolution (Mace, 2005). 
Bearing in mind that groups influence or manipulate each other’s  
development, cultural evolution does not necessarily work strictly  
alongside genetic evolution. Therefore, two societies may have  
developed a similar culture and value system but do not necessarily 
share the same density of certain racial phenotypes, and vice versa  
(Reynolds, 1983; Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994; Mace, 2005). 
It is difficult to say who the greatest individual is in human history. 
But we do know what are the world’s most best-selling books,  
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although this will disappoint a lot of China-bashers: Number one is 
毛主席语录 (Mao Zhuxi Yulu, Quotations from Chairman Mao), with over  
six and a half billion copies sold since its first publication in 1966.  
Number two is the Bible, with close to six billion copies sold since  
its first publication two millenia ago. Numbers three, four, and five 
again are Chinese books:新华字典 (Xinhua Zidian, Xinhua Dictionary, 1957; 
400 million),毛 主 席 诗 抄 (Mao Zhuxi Shichao, Chairman Mao’s Poems, 
1966; 400 million),毛 主 席 文 选 (Mao Zhuxi Wenxuan, Selected Articles of 
Chairman Mao, 1966; 252.5 million) (Wikipedia, 2008). No further comment 
necessary. 
During the cultural evolution of the East-West dichotomy, whoever 
witnessed those important processes – in sociology we speak of  
formations – initiated by Aristotle and Confucius and their successors  
taught those new methods – in sociology we speak of variants – to  
another witness and so on. This way the new method or variant is  
replicated within that group. Generation after generation all imitate 
each other; we say they form logical or intuitive series. Confucius  
was continued by Mencius; Aristotle was continued by Plato; Jesus 
Christ was continued by Saint Paul, etc. 
Now, we might agree that Confucius was the initiator of what we  
now call Confucianism and theConfucian Four Books and Five Classics 
(四 書 五 經, si shu wu jing) and that the pre-Confucian inductive 
method of theI Ching(易 经) was the initiator of Confucius’ Great 
Learning (大 学, da xue). Furthermore, we could say that the  
following great Chinese philosophers somehow form a necessary  
series: Confucius [孔子] (551 -479 BC), Mo Zi [墨 子] (470-391 BC), 
Lao Zi [老 子] (c. 400 BC), and Zhuang Zi [庄 子] (370-301 BC); or 
Zhang Zai [张 载] (1020-1077), Cheng Yi [程 颐] (1033-1107), Sima 
Guang [司 马 光] (1019-1086), Zhu Xi [朱 熹] (1130-1200); Wang 
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Fuzhi [王夫 之] (1619-1692) and so on. Finally, we might agree that 
during the Warring States Period (战国时代, Zhanguo shidai, c. 500- 
221 BC) the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ (诸子百家, Zhuzi baijia) 
emerged in China – among others, Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, 
Legalism, Logicism, Buddhism, and the Yin-Yang School. All those  
Chinese schools of thought, however isolated or original they  
claimed to be, nevertheless form a cultural succession, the so-called 
‘History of Chinese Thought’ (just as the West has its own ‘History 
of Western Philosophy’). And, as most Chinese thinkers usually  
cite their masters and prominent predecessors, we may ultimately  
be able to trace back the very origins of the Chinese tradition to the 
I Ching, also known as theBook of Changes, or, as far as the ancient  
sages are concerned, to the King Wu of Zhou (周 武 王, 1111 BC- 
1105 BC) and his brother, the Duke of Zhou (周 公), also called the 
“God of Dreams” for his exceptional good governance. Therefore,  
in hindsight, the various Chinese schools of thought – even Chinese 
Buddhism that was first introduced via India and quickly Sinicized 
– share certain key Chinese characteristics (such as the concepts of  
道 [dao] and圣人[shengren]), just as all Western philosophies share a 
common Greco-Roman and/or Judeo-Christian origin (such as the  
concept of ‘philosophy’ itself): 
儒、释、道三教，譬如三个铺面挂了三个招牌，其实都是卖的杂货 , 
柴米油盐都是有的，不过儒家的铺子大些，佛、道的铺子小些， 
皆是无所不包的 . 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism… are like the signboards hung  
outside three shops, and although they sell mixed provisions, still  
there is nothing they don’t stock in all the shops. (Liu E, 1909) 
Once the foundations had been laid, what followed had to refer  
to its Confucian initiator(s). Even now, over 2,500 years after theI 
Ching [易经],Lun Yu [论 语], orDao De Jing [道 德 经], the Chinese 
people embrace the Confucian ideal of a ‘harmonious society’ (和谐 
社会, hexie shehui), ‘oneness of man and heaven’ (天人合一, tian ren 
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he yi),  and ‘All under Heaven or Celestial Empire’ (天 下, tianxia). 
This relationship between Confucius, the ‘inductive approach,’  
and the Chinese collective mind is so intimidating, that it makes  
me think that if there had been a great individual much earlier  
than the Duke of Zhou, Confucius, or the mystical Fu Xi, that same 
individual could have paved – similar to bottleneck situations in  
genetic evolution (Maddison et al., 2007) – the way for a continuous 
specialization of the Asiatic people in following the inductive path. 
This would be similar to how simple births/deaths of Buddhist  
sages may correlate quite neatly with the founding of different  
Buddhist subbranches (India) or their separation (China, Korea, and 
Japan). As a random example, in Japan, this led to the founding of  
the Jodo-shu School (净土真宗, Pure Land) in 1133-1212 by Honen (法 
然, 1133-1212) and later Shinran (親鸞, 1173-1263). 
The affinity with ‘sages’ and ‘bodhisattvas,’ that is, enlightened  
beings in the state of pre-Buddhahood, in all South-East and East  
Asian societies is well documented, but by no means uniform. Far  
from it, it is very regional, according to each country’s historical  
context and ability to absorb new schools of thought. Maitreya (弥 
勒 佛), the original ‘next’ Future Buddha, was over the centuries  
demoted to just another bodhisattva among the many bodhisattvas 
in the Hindu/Buddhist universe in India. In Tibet, more local,  
Tibetan deities were introduced, with Maitreya becoming ever less  
significant. In western China, where Buddhism contended with  
Daoism and Confucianism, traditional Chinese culture saw no need 
for a ‘next’ Buddha, and thus used the myth of the Chinese monk  
Budai (布 袋) from ninth-century China during the Five Dynasties 
period as the personification of Maitreya. He is known in the West  
as the big-bellied, happy ‘Laughing Buddha,’ but he is actually not  
a real Buddha. In Japan, Maitreya (Miroku) was in the end unable
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to retain his eminent position as prospective future Buddha, but  
instead became one of the ‘Seven Gods of Fortune’ (Shichi Fukujin, 
七福神), often depicted riding on their ship, the Takarabune (宝船). 
If that allegorical ship would have set sail and crossed the Atlantic  
Ocean to the USA, what kind of promotion would the Enlightened  
One attain in the minds of the American people? Chances are he  
would become yet another wooden decoration in some giant IKEA  
warehouse. In fact, IKEA’s Swedish headquarters already saw about 
10,000 Hindus protesting against the great insult of “featuring a  
toilet seat Buddha” – that’s right, a toilet seat adorned with a round- 
faced Buddha (AP Worldstream, 2002). 
Another example of an Eastern concept being misunderstood 
in the West is the mythical Chinese 'long' [龙]. The long 
is usually translated as "dragon." But a dragon in the European 
tradition is a sinister and fierce, flame-throwing and village 
plundering beast that must be slain by mighty heroes such as 
Siegfried or Beowulf. Accordingly, the imagery of a huge and red, 
clumsy and pear-bodied creature, with tiny 
wings and small flame, is frequently used by Western cartoonists 
to depict the 'China threat' to Western economies that needs to be 
brought down; whereas the 'long' in the Chinese tradition is quite 
the opposite: it is a majestic, divine creature, snake-bodied, and 
a symbol of happiness, virtue, and good fortune. 
Next is the Confucian concept of ‘shengren.’ As the ideal human  
being, the shengren [圣人] is the highest member in the East Asian 
family-based value tradition, a sage that has the highest moral  
standards, or de [德], who applies the principles of ren [仁], li [礼], 
yi [义], zhi [智 ], and xin [信], and interacts with all people as if 
they were, metaphorically speaking, his family. The shengren in  
Confucianism are just as clearly defined and non-European as the  
buddhas in Buddhism are; yet, as of today, the Western public is  
ignorant about the shengren. Worse, people have no way of knowing  
that they don’t know shengren. That’s because when the European  
missionaries came to China to preach the Gospel in the seventeenth 
century, they translated key Chinese concepts into biblical and  
philosophical (European) terminology. Accordingly, people in  
Europe were taught in school that there were ‘philosophers’ and  
‘saints’ all over Asia; yet, upon reflection, evidently there wasn’t a  
single Buddha, bodhisattva, rishi, or shengren in Europe. Think. What is  
that probability? Whose version of ‘History’ (with a capital H) are  
we taught? As Howard Zinn once said, “If something is omitted  
from history, you have no way of knowing it is omitted” (Zinn,  
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1980) 
The evolution of different cultures is real (Dunbar, 1999; Diamond,  
2003), so is the evolution of written texts (Howe et. al., 2005),  
language (Gray et. al., 2000; Mace, 2005; Haspelmath, 2005), and  
religion (Reynolds, 1983). The only major obstacle in anthropology  
– as opposed to archaeology – is to locate manuscripts or records  
written before the fifth or fourth millennium BC (Fischer, 2005). 
After so much ‘what,’ it is high time to ask ‘why?’ Why has the  
evolution of cultures resulted in this equilibrium of the two great  
cultural systems, the Occidental and the Oriental one, the inductive 
East and the deductive West, with no third great cultural system?  
Possibly because a third cultural system does not exist. 
All available evidence speaks for itself, yet let us listen to another  
Nobel laureate: 
中华传统文化的一大特色是归纳法，可是没有推演法。其中归 
纳法的来源是什么？“易者象也”，“圣人立象以尽意”， 
“取象比类：”观物取象“都是贵穿《易 经》的精神内。 
都是归纳法，是向上求整体”象“的方法。徐光启在翻译了 
欧几里德的几何原本以后，了解到推演法一个特点就是”欲前后 
更置之不可得“。就是一  条一条推论不能次 
序颠倒。这跟中国传统不一样。中国传统对于逻辑不注意， 
说理次序不注意，要读者自己体会出来最后的结论。 
The inductive method is a major feature of traditional Chinese  
culture, but not so the deductive method. What is the source of the 
inductive method in China? All these concepts of ‘Yimutology’ are  
described in the Book of Changes. These are inductive methods  
to infer from the particular to the universal ‘form.’ When Xu  
Guangqi translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, he immediately 
understood the strength of the deductive method: “The conclusion  
has to follow from the premises and not otherwise.” That direction of  
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the reasoning process in the deductive method cannot be reversed.  
Chinese tradition, however, was different. Chinese scholars did not 
pay much attention to logical order; the reader would make sense  
of everything once he understood the final conclusion. (Chen Ningyang 
[杨振宁], 2004) 
Recently, three dozen prestigious professors from Peking University 
have completedA History of the Chinese Civilization (中 华 文 明 史, 
2006) after six years of hard work (Yuan Xingpei, 2006). After  
reading some parts of the book, I did not find a political or historical 
framework that could ever be considered in line with the political or 
historical framework of European thought. That has always been the 
case in Chinese history, whether in theRecords of the Warring States, 
compiled in the Han Dynasty, or in theRecords of the Grand Historian 
Si Maqian(司马迁, c. 145 BC-90 BC). In China, there has always been 
an entirely different approach to history, its people, and the notion  
of time (Wu, 2007; 2008): 
So, we should just gently shift the frame from theoretical “time”  
to concrete “history,” and China’s rich millenary blood will at  
once throb into our veins, to flood our pages. We will engage in  
lively inter-communications with all the historic Wise, popular and 
academic among our celebrated Five Chinese Races. We learn from 
ancient Sages, to revise and add to them. (Wu Kuang-Ming, 2007) 
In the history books of ancient China, which often still influence  
the style and way of thought of today’s textbooks, there are  
generalizations over generalizations. In these books you will also  
find the notion that China is a single entity, more generalizations, the  
idea that all Chinese think and feel the same, that all China is ‘one,’ 
all people are ‘one,’ all have ‘one’ moral code, and that ‘China’ pits 
herself and all her history against the ‘other’ barbarians surrounding 
China (Nolde, 1966; Huan et al., 1997). To the typical Western- 
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educated scholar, studying history in China is often a painstaking  
process – many experts despair at the lack of regionalism, objectivity,  
glossaries, reference material, logical structure, punctuation, and  
useful introductions. Instead, sinologists will encounter beautiful  
adjectives, splendid analogies, lovely sceneries, ethical evaluations,  
moving dialogues, personal comments, and practical moral lessons. 
In fact, in Chinese literary tradition (and this is important), if a man’s  
intellect is able to recognize the ‘interconnectedness’ and the ‘greater 
whole,’ this would make him a great scholar, a true gentleman, a junzi, 
while all other lesser men will almost inevitably lose themselves in 
unnecessary details: 
公都子問曰：“鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？” 孟子曰： 
“從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。” 曰：“鈞是人也，或從其大體 
或從其小體，何也？” 曰：”耳目之官不思，而蔽於物，物交物 
則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。 
此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。 
此為大人而已矣。” 
Kung Tu Tzu said, “If all men are equal, how is it that there are  
greater and lesser men?” Mencius said, “Some follow their greater  
part, and some follow their lesser part.” “Why do some follow  
their greater part and some follow their lesser part?” Mencius  
said, “The organs such as the eye and ear cannot discriminate and  
are thus confused by things. Things are interconnected with other  
things, which lead one further away. The function of the mind  
is to discriminate – if you discriminate, you will attain it. If you  
don’t discriminate, you won’t attain it. These are what Heaven has  
bestowed upon us. If you first establish yourself in the greater part, 
then the small part cannot be snatched away from you. This is the  
essential of being a great man.” (Mencius, 6A.15) 
Before the end of the nineteenth century, in China there was no  
philosophy as such, no historiography or literature, only the Classics 
[经], Masters [子], and Historical Records[诗] (Sisci, 2008). The 
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authority of the living was derivative, depending upon the authority 
of the masters, who no longer were among the living (Arendt,  
1993). Only by memorizing the classics could a great man be able  
to comprehend the depth and complexity of human existence (Li  
Wai-Yee, 2008). This is true of China today, where commentators on 
ancient Chinese texts still often treat them as a closed system, with  
complete inner coherence, and assume ‘pan-signification.’ This is  
reflected, of course, in politics – as if the only task of the past was  
to safeguard the future grand unity and authority of China today,  
despite distorting history (Ge, 2001). 
As experience has shown, no man or woman of importance in the  
Western world (sinologists excepted) is going to read a Chinese  
history book unless it is translated into English, that is, unless it is  
incorporated into ‘Western history,’ which is nothing less than ‘world  
history’ itself. Since not a single non-Western society, it seems, can  
produce an alternative to the world history that the West would be 
able to read, it could be tempting to pronounce all other histories  
‘dead.’ Since the striving for different histories, or different versions 
of it, truly has come to an end, leaving only one ‘world history,’  
Westerners might as well continue this as ‘The Chronicles’ or simply 
‘twenty-first century, twenty-second century,… etc.,’ (counting from 
zero, which marks the anniversary of the birth of Jesus Christ and  
the beginnings of Christianity), thus ending the histories of all other 
(Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist etc.) cultures as we used to  
know them (Fukuyama, 1992). 
With just one history left, the Western hemisphere is going to dictate 
how it is written. The content, however, might be saying otherwise, 
as we shall see in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 15 
a  coPernican 
revoluTion 
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Looking at ‘world history’ – on the one side, the rational, incredible 
West that ends all other ‘histories’ and promotes the universal  
language, English, and on the other side the intuitive, incredible East  
that closes the historic circuit and integrates the universal language, 
English – in this twenty-first century, it is nevertheless the East that 
holds a considerable advantage. It is thebigger phenomenon. 
Let us make no mistake: Communism and Capitalism were made  
forscale and themasses, and scale and masses are now inAsia. So  
arenumbers. So are the world’s greatest challenges such as economic 
stability, food shortages, pollution, environmental destruction,  
population explosions, youth bulges, and terrorism, all of which  
are demanding more global attention. The bigger, or, as we are  
talking about history, shall we say the greater the phenomenon a  
theory describes, thegreater that theory becomes. In the past, great  
phenomena often happened in isolation and did not automatically  
call for global attention. For example, the intellectual output of India 
is legendary; her civilization is older than the Greek’s (c. 3300 BC).  
India taught the West how to count; she conquered and dominated 
China, Korea, and Japanculturally (I am talking, of course, about the 
influence of Buddhism) “for twenty centuries without ever having  
to send a single soldier across her border” (Hu Shi [胡适], 1891- 
1962). She was the source of enlightenment for Europe, and the main 
source of German philosophy in the last three centuries. Similarly,  
China during the early Ming Dynasty (1368-1421) accounted for  
roughly 25 to 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product,  
while the combined productivity of the European nations did not  
exceed 20 percent (Needham, 1963; Maddison, 2006; Spence, 2001).  
Once the potential of those ‘great phenomena,’ those two great  
Eastern giants, had been realized in the West, that indeed could have  
been among the most important reasons why the small European  
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states – with all their trials of Eastern expansion, colonialism, and  
imperialism – always seemed to have a greater interest in Asia.  
Those European states were interested in Asia’s technologies,  
wealth, land, and resources, more than the other way around, but  
this, of course, is just speculation. 
What is not speculation is that Europe never paid enough attention 
to where it gets more complicated: the religious, ethical, and  
sociological wisdom of the East. Or better, that religious, ethical,  
and sociological wisdom that had been created by the East, not  
indirectly by the West. Today, times have changed, the great wheel 
of fortune has turned, and China, India, and the other Asian states  
provide golden opportunities for theoretical innovations and the  
creation of new values, categories and taxonomies, more than in any 
other part of the world (Lin, 2006). 
Thus, the twenty-first century is very likely to be the century 
of the Chinese economist and the Indian computer scientist, as  
both countries already produce more university graduates than the 
USA or the European Union. The USA and Europe already heavily 
rely on tens of thousands of Asian graduates and those priceless  
connections these graduates offer for the future competitiveness of  
Western societies. 
Having established that Asia, in this century, evidently constitutes  
a greater phenomenon than Europe or the USA, why then should  
anyone think that Chinese culture, or any other East Asian culture  
for that matter, is a pitiful victim of Westernization? 
On the contrary, isn’t it the case that not the West but the East is  
now nurturing the content of ‘world history’? Where are today’s  
Western politicians, historians, and men of letters who stand up to  
the truth? ‘World history’ is becoming genuine, non-European, let  
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alone American, which is but an extension of the Eurasian people’s 
achievements. Are Western leaders afraid that their countrymen  
are not mature enough to face the ‘other humanity,’ the East, unless 
they are assured it is an inferior one? 
China had numerous invaders, like the Liao (907-1125), the Jurchen 
(during Northern Song, 1115-1234), Yuan/Mongols (1271-1368),  
and the Manchus (1644-1911), yet she absorbed them all. India  
in the tenth century alone was invaded 17 times by the Muslim  
Mahmud Ghaznavi and his successors, by the Mongol Empire  
(1221-1327), and, starting from the fifteenth century onwards, by the 
Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British imperialists. Both China and 
India have either assimilated or expelled each and every invader.  
Furthermore, there are Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, Myanmar, 
and Indonesia – none of these places appears as if the West had  
‘taken over.’ Even Japan, theAmerican Geisha Ally (Shibusawa, 2006), 
is so entirely different in her spiritual, cultural, ideological, and  
psychological makeup, that to call her a Western progeny would be 
an insult to Japan, her long history, and her fine people. Lastly, no  
Muslim or Arab state, not even the occupied Iraq or Afghanistan,  
strike me as Western ‘colonies’ either. Quite the opposite: Many  
people secretly think it was Islam which destroyed U.S. hegemony  
by attacking the Twin Towers and provoking the disproportional  
response of the USA, and that it is Islam and the Middle East which 
are now the forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, many Westerners 
think that Islamic culture is now ‘besieging Europe’ by presenting  
itself as an alternative cultural mode (Minorityinfo, 2008). This could 
mean that Europe's Christians in the future will have to learn entirely 
new archetypes of wisdom: the Islamic imams, ayatollahs, ulamas, 
and hakims, and so on. 
What is this so-called process of ‘Westernization,’ if not the  
destruction or heavy manipulation of non-Western cultures? It is an 
exclusive treatment and reserved for the East. No one would think  
the West is westernizing itself. The East is studying the ways of the 
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deductive West. It learns, internalizes, and gets stronger; I ask: What 
did the West learn from the inductive East to get wiser? 
Not much, because it is not in the nature of the West to easily slip  
into the role of a student if it had been the master previously. That 
particular, aggressively progressive element of the materialistic- 
driven ‘West in the East’ has always been, educationally speaking,  
hopelessly misguided and short-sighted: In the end, a few European 
colonial administrators had either to comply with local culture  
(because Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, etc. civilizations are often quite 
overwhelming to the tiny European cultures, and hard to change),  
use violence, or else, if they didn't use force, the Western occupiers 
had to leave for good – ‘good’ as in ‘de-colonialism.’ Without the  
use of manipulative forces against it, the East is morally superior. It 
is the true master of humankind. It emanates humanity itself. And  
the West hates it for that. 
But the West never lost its self-confidence when it came to rationalizing 
that it was superior. Naturally, the pattern never changed, and the  
destructive, dividing-and-conquering Europeans kept coming back, 
and they are still coming back today (in their latest guise as the war- 
loving, self-righteous Americans). Now, they are not necessarily  
wielding swords and guns, but pens and patents; all the same, the  
West is now all about the East: World history is now all about great 
phenomena; world history is about the final universal ‘oneness,’ and 
the key to it is kept in the East. 
Understandably, there is a most delicate degree of difference  
between, let us say, the prophet tempting the disciple and the  
disciple tempting the prophet; or: Human subjectivity deluding  
the world’s objectivity and the world’s objectivity deluding human  
138 
subjectivity. Does not the East-West relationship, after its great  
derailment, face a similar dilemma too? Is it not high time for a shift 
of paradigm, a ‘Copernican Revolution’ in sociology, similar to that 
of Galileo Galilei in astronomy and that of Immanuel Kant in metaphysics? 
During the 
2,500 years of the East-West discourse we were tempted to believe  
that the human universe consists of the West at its core with all the 
other cultures revolving around this core. ‘World history’ worked  
fine that way. 
Now, after having compiled so much evidence here, I am no longer 
convinced about that Western core. From the Eastern point of view, 
distant, peripheral Europe and the USA had the historical sense  
of mission to manipulate the East – the core. In physics, the core is  
always the most passive, most unwavering element. Passive and  
unwavering are precisely how the West perceives the East. 
According to the definition above, Europe and the USA are  
active, peripheral forces revolving around whatever passive and  
immovable matter makes up the core of the human universe – like  
two hands molding a precious vase. However, the deductive West  
did not add any substance. It only formed, divided, conquered,  
ruled for a time; it invented thousands of new rules and regulations, 
stuck its fingers into the clay, and then did not know what to do  
next. It had no sense for Eastern form, substance, or spirituality.  
Alas, so bad was the West at building human relationships, be  
it by dispatching missionaries, conquerors, soldiers, bankers, or  
businessmen, that it merely left its fingerprints in the clay, emotional 
scars, but nothing that could ever transform the East into West. 
There is a very active Western part: Some Western nations fought  
tooth and nail on Eastern soil during the Cold War, and now  
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the West is back again with thousands of business contracts and  
globalizing catechisms. Asia is indeed very busy, busy studying  
all those new theories and techniques from the various Western  
‘invaders,’ a lot more so than the invaders could possibly learn or  
could possibly be willing to learn from the East. Yet, all the same, it 
is the inductive East that attracts all these energies, all this Western 
attention. This pattern of Western nations revolving around Asia  
makes me think that it is the East that is at the core, in other words: 
The East, roughly since the second half of the twentieth century, has 
not only become the world’s greatest phenomenon, but has also,  
slowly, shifted to the center of gravity of world affairs. The West is 
now looking at that broad, open East and thinks to itself: "I need 
this East in order to better myself," because without this challenge, 
"I am just this unpleasant, destructive force." 
This shift of gravity is recognized by ever more European historians 
and scholars who now feel incomplete, not to say incompetent,  
if they haven’t seen or experienced China. Some already predict  
theUnion of Chinese and Western Ethics (Deng, 1999), with the  
Western idea of ‘human rights’ and the Chinese idea of ‘human  
responsibilites’ forming a new universal ethic: “Equilibrium between  
freedom, equality and participation does not simply happen, but  
must be re-established again, and again” (Küng, 1998). 
The East and the inductive ways in which it excels are seen as the  
solution to humankind’s problems: ‘oneness.’ And the West feels  
incomplete without it. If this world is truly to become a more stable, 
peaceful, albeit more complicated, ‘integrated’ place, a better place, 
as everyone now seems to believe it should, then the ‘integration- 
based’ East and the inductive way are not only destined to play a  
greater role in all human and world affairs, but must also form the 
core. 
CHAPTER 16 
The  Problem  WiTh 
naTure 
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天地万物为一体。   
Forming one body with heaven, earth and myriad things. 
——(WangYangming,1472-1529) 
 
Since the more inductive East and the more deductive West are  
both part of a gigantic ecosystem called Earth, it is important to  
understand how the two cultural hemispheres traditionally regarded  
their relationship with what truly matters to all of us: nature. 
Given that theanalytically-based,deductive West has the advantage  
of “processing information in a linear manner, that is from top to  
bottom, it collects a myriad of pieces, lines them up, and arranges  
them in a logical order before drawing the conclusions,” it is clearly 
the dominant hemisphere when it comes to articulate, explain, and  
write down human history (brain.web, 2007). 
Theintegration-based,inductive East, on the other hand, “processes  
from bottom to top, holistically. It starts with the answer. It sees  
the big picture first, the great harmony, not the details” (brain.web, 
2007). 
As a consequence, the deductive Western hemisphere is “not only  
thinking in a linear manner, processes in sequences, but is also a list 
maker, enjoys making master plans, and learns in sequences” (brain. 
web, 2007). Western culture is “a good speller who makes rules to  
follow, works in the linear and sequential processing of math and  
scientific methods” (brain.web, 2007). 
By contrast, the inductive Eastern hemisphere processes information 
randomly. “It flips from one tack to another, it will get just as much 
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done, but perhaps without having addressed priorities. It pays  
attention to coherence, greater meanings, illustrations and feelings” 
(brain.web, 2007). Its memory is connected to “emotions and  
feelings, not dealing with things the way they are with reality but  
with ideal concepts” (brain.web, 2007). 
The inductive East, which naturally has got a glimpse of the ‘whole 
picture,’ is well aware of the job the deductive Western hemisphere 
is doing in Asia by deconstructing and manipulating the world and 
all things: 
The West is linear, sequential, sharp, concrete, logical, verbal, and 
reality-based. 
However, the deductive West, which experiences the world as  
being made up of a myriad of little details, is not aware of the  
Eastern hemisphere’s goal of striving for a coherent ‘wholeness’ and 
‘interconnectedeness’: 
The East is holistic, random, open, symbolic, intuitive, non-verbal, 
and fantasy-oriented. 
A similar East-West comparison has been made by Li Dazhao [李 
大钊] (1888-1927), philosopher and co-founder of the Communist 
Party of China: 
东洋文明主静，西洋文明主动 , 
一个动，一个静，这是一点。 
东方是为自然的，西方是人为的； 
东方是安息的，西方是战争的； 
东方是消极的，西方是积极的； 
东方是依赖的，西方是独立的； 
东方是苛按的，西方是突进的； 
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东方是因袭的，西方是创造的； 
东方是保守的，西方是进步的； 
东方是直觉的，西方是理智的； 
东方是空想的，西方是体验的； 
东方是艺术的，西方是科学的； 
东方是精神的，西方是物质的； 
东方是灵的，西方是肉的； 
东方是向天的，西方是立地的； 
东方是自然支配人闻的，西方是人闻征服自然的。 
Eastern civilization is static, while Western civilization takes 
initiative; 
One is active, while the other is passive, so much for that. 
The East harmonizes with nature; the West conquers it; 
The East is tranquil; the West is aggressive; 
The East is introverted; the West is extroverted; 
The East is dependent; the West is independent; 
The East is reserved; the West is advancing; 
The East is submissive; the West is creative; 
The East is conservative; the West is progressive; 
The East is intuition; the West is reason; 
The East is spiritual; the West is empirical; 
The East is humanistic; the West is scientific; 
The East is mind; the West is matter; 
The East is spirit; the West is substance; 
The East is inductive; the West is deductive; 
The East takes man and nature as inseparable parts; 
the West takes man as the conqueror of nature. 
(Li Dazhao, 2006) 
Li Dazhao’s observations are in line with how Western scientists  
generally perceive themselves and their abusive relationship with  
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nature: 
Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them  
by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be  
governed by right reason and true religion. (Francis Bacon, 1620) 
The separation of knowledge from ethics, or let us say ‘value-free  
knowledge,’ is what most obviously distinguished the Greek/ 
Hellenistic/European civilization from all the others. For the  
deductive West, everything in the universe can be considered a  
potentially useful object that must be studied and manipulated so  
as to serve ‘man and his cause. This ‘man and his cause,’ in the  
good old days of the British Empire, meant, of course, the ‘British  
aristocracy and its cause.’ But during the European Renaissance, this 
had quickly turned into ‘Western man and his Western cause.’ 
‘Western man and his Western cause’ – this was about as far as it  
could be stretched. Enough human beings and territory were left out 
so that the scientific, deduction-based West could fulfil its mission,  
namely, to force the entire material world and everything non- 
Western to submit. 
The Western ‘scientific way’ implies that there must be a non- 
scientific way, or just a ‘non-scientific other’ – nature and the ‘other 
people’ who value unity with nature. Nature and the traditional- 
minded people who side with nature are thus, by definition, at  
the wrong side of the ‘man-conquers-nature’ equation and must  
therefore be totally subjugated, deconstructed, divided, and  
manipulated by their scientific conqueror. 
The playing out of opposing ideas and attitudes in world history  
thus strikingly resembles the battle between the differences of  
the right and left hemisphere of the human brain, whose power  
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relationship is never quite symmetrical and indeed, between the  
ages, may swing like a pendulum. As Iain McGilchrist argued in his 
book The Master and His Emissary:The Divided Brain and the Making  
of the Western World(2011), both cerebral hemispheres entertain  
“whole, self-consistent versions of the world.” The left hemisphere, 
the rigid, analytical, deductive one (technically slightly inferior  
because of its lack of any inclusive, holistic view, thus rightly  
called the “Emissary”) suppressed the right hemisphere – its true  
“Master” – and “carried us further into the territory of the left  
hemisphere’s world.” That is how, according to the neurosciences,  
the manipulative Western hemisphere came to dominate world  
history. 
In sum, to any non-Western observer, the West and its deeply rigid, 
intolerant ‘scientific way’ appears to be inherently violent (Nandy,  
1989). 
Asia, and by that I mean virtually all societies from the Russians  
over the Indians to the Muslims, Chinese, and Japanese, by  
definition had all been on the receiving end of ‘world history.’ They 
could help row, but not steer that boat. In an allegorical, Faustian  
sense, the political philosophers and scientists Francis Bacon (1561- 
1626), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and Adam Smith (1723-1790)  
were among those great Western Enlightenment philosophers  
trading the Western conscience for the power it meant over those  
who still had to make a compromise with their conscience. 
Until the final Faustian ‘reckoning,’ the Western powers, through  
all those centuries, could almost frivolously humiliate every other  
society on Earth until all ethical grounds were lost. Meanwhile, the 
very Eastern humanitarian notions of ‘wholeness,’ ‘harmoniousness,’  
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and ‘oneness’ became meaningless and undesirable to the average  
Western mind. What is most disturbing, however, is this: Even the  
slightest sign of ‘wholeness,’ ‘harmoniousness,’ and ‘oneness’ is now  
reminding the West of its past ‘failures’ and ‘shame,’ and thus, in  
the eyes of any analytical-deductive Westerner, must be avoided at 
all costs. 
The final reckoning was considered imminent. In Mahatma Gandhi’s  
words, it was only a matter of time until that ‘other,’ be it nature or 
man, subtly strikes back at the tormentor and destroys the illusion  
that only Western sciences are valid: “This [Western] civilization is  
such that one only has to be patient, and it will be self-destroyed”  
(Gandhi, 1938). 
Gandhi was exaggerating; he did not believe that the West would  
simply destroy itself, or be destroyed by others, or that sciences  
would become invalid. But he believed in Eastern concepts of  
positive ‘value-creation’ and ‘non-violence’ that – in the long run –  
like all Eastern concepts of ‘tolerance,’ ‘wholeness,’ or ‘oneness’ –  
would appeal to the Western imperialists’ sense of shame. And so  
they did: 
人不可以無恥。無恥之恥，無恥矣。 
A person cannot do without shame. If you are ashamed of your  
shamelessness, you will not need to be ashamed. (Mencius, 7A.6) 
It is the old pattern again: If the West searches for the power over  
nature (matter), it is the East that searches for the power over man  
(mind), and it is the healthy equilibrium that would benefit both of 
them and thus all of us. 
Sadly, the analytical West is still patronizing ‘its’ spiritual East.  
The facts have changed. Global power has shifted, but the Western 
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feelings of total superiority still linger. That is why the otherwise  
easily predictable rise and dominance of integration-based Asia in  
the twenty-first century still appear unlikely to most Europeans,  
even today. 
CHAPTER 17 
TruThs  anD  values 
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The products of human reasoning are always artificial. Initially,  
any original state does not make much sense to us nor does it seem 
useful until it has been transformed into an artificial state. There are 
only two modes of reasoning: Deductive reasoning will create an  
artificial product of certain but valueless truth. Inductive reasoning 
will create an artificial product of value but uncertain truth. The  
function of human reasoning is to produce two artificial things:  
truths and values. 
CHAPTER 18 
iDeology 
151 
Based on its analytical, deduction-based approach and narrow  
views on the complexities of nature and history, the West lost  
sight of holistic, long-term future relationships, consciously or  
unconsciously indulging in the uncertainties and banalities of a  
postmodern, utterly deconstructed, and individualistic world. The  
East itself has not yet encountered this post-modern insecurity, and, 
as I will argue, it does not necessarily have to. 
After Modernism (c. 1880-1950), which is understood as the age of  
totalities, essentialisms, and meta-narratives, Western societies had  
deconstructed all those past meta-narratives and entered the age of 
Post-modernism (c. 1950-2000) (Hutcheon, 1989). For some Eastern  
observers it seemed that in certain areas of analytical inquiry, the  
West was approaching its limits. Could there be anything smaller  
than Werner Heisenberg’s smallest possible particles, the ‘quarks’?  
What is the meaning of anything once everything is deconstructed? 
西方的自然科学走的是一条分析的道路，越分越细…而对这些细节之间的联系则 
缺乏宏观的概括。 
Western science has walked down the analytical path; the more it  
deduced, the smaller became the deducible…and (they) lost the  
macroscopic general perspective about how those details were  
related to each other. (Ji Xianlin, 2006 [5]) 
Man faces a serious problem in the modern world because science  
has pursued the objective method of cognition and has analyzed  
and classified phenomena until we are left with only the pieces.  
(Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, in Brannen, 1964) 
Werner Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ (1926), Kurt Goedel's  
‘Incompleteness Theorems’ (1931), Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘Language  
Games’ (1926), Edmund Husserl’s ‘Distress in Meaning’ (1970),  
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which he crowned withThe Crisis of European Sciences, Jacques  
Derrida’s ‘Deconstructionism’ (1960), Claude Lévi-Strauss’  
‘Bricolage’ (1962), Edward Norton Lorenz’s ‘Chaos Theory’  
(1792), and the ‘butterfly-effect,’ the whole idea of Franz Boa’s  
‘Cultural Relativism’ (1942), meaning that all beliefs are valid and  
truth relative itself – all of thoseend-of-meaningful-science theories 
contributed to undermine our belief in a society’s certainty,  
consistency, and continuity. If you are preoccupied with minutiae,  
after a century it gets to you: Secular Western societies therefore  
left it all to the individuals and their individual experiences to  
decide how to make sense of the world, and what to do with their  
minuscule lives. 
The spiritual East, however, is different: 
Ganga ca yamuna caiva godavari sarasvati; narmada sindhu kaveri 
stranar-atham prati-grhyatam. 
I am taking a bath with all these rivers Ganga, Yamuna, Godavari,  
Narmada, Indus, Kaveri. 
同一个世界，同一个梦想 
One world, one dream. 
The “Bath Sutra” of the Urdhvamnaya Tantra, which exists in  
various forms all across the Indian subcontinent, is a harmless  
spiritual song about the perceived unity of India and her now 1.2  
billion people. The Chinese slogan for the 2008 Beijing Olympic  
Games is derived from同 一 个 中 国 (one unified China), and thus 
not only confirms the ancient Confucian concept of ‘tianxia’ (天 下, 
All under Heaven) or Dong Zhongshu’s ‘he er wei yi’ (合 而 为 一, 
unite and become one), but also subscribes to China’s two famous  
policies: a) that the world should embrace (Confucian) harmony,  
which alleges that China’s dream is everyone else’s dream, too; and 
b) that China is indeed ‘one’ nation, including all her minorities and 
vital, problematic regions like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. To my  
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knowledge, there is no equivalent of such a spiritual – seemingly  
naïve – sense of unity in recent European history. 
In contrast, Western societies, after a long history of assertiveness  
and expansion, so it seems, do not conquer anymore; they converge. 
While in the analytically-based West today it is inevitably the  
minuscule individual in multiculturalism (European Union, USA,  
Australia, Canada, New Zealand), in the integration-based East it is 
still the collective nation in numbers (China, India, but also Russia, 
Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and the Middle East). 
It is the old problem of either seeing the trees or seeing the forest, as 
reflected in the following two statements: 
From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.  
(Karl Marx, 1875) 
and 
有的国家占的篇幅多一点，有的少一点。这只事实求是。 
Some countries take up more space, others less. That is simply how 
things are. (Ji Xianlin, 2006 [6]) 
The former quote suggests a philosophy for the individual (each  
tree) and hence implies the notion ofself-interest andlimitation; the  
latter suggests a philosophy for the masses (the whole forest) and  
hence impliespublic-spiritedness andcertainty. 
Long-term vision and constancy, as we have seen, are intrinsic  
values of integration-based Eastern societies: 
其实世上本没有路，走的人多了，也便成了路。 
As more people are walking all the time, in the same spot, a path  
appears. (Lu Xun, 1981) 
In 50 years from now Iran, through political consistency, is projected 
to have one hundred million citizens (and possibly the atom bomb). 
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Turkey, by then, is going to be Europe’s biggest negotiating partner 
with the East, and, if accepted into the European Union, it will be its 
most populous nation with about 95 million people, in addition to  
the diaspora of almost 10 million Turks living scattered throughout 
the European Union. Vietnam, with its projected 120 million citizens,  
could become as populous as France and Great Britain combined.  
On a political level, the Communist Party of China has already more 
members than Germany’s population, and since 2006, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Council has been the largest regional grouping in the  
world (and, it should be noted, without U.S. presence), not the North  
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Jairam Ramesh, former secretary of  
India’s Congress Party’s Economic Affairs Department, voiced this  
simple truth: 
We [Indians] must examine our brains, if we are not capable to lead 
one billion people to become the world’s third largest economy!  
(Jairam Ramesh, 2002) 
Although some Europeans have analyzed the problem of declining  
native populations and accepted their ethnic decline, India,  
Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Arab League with  
its 22 member states, Vietnam, Bangladesh, as well as other nations 
have no inclination towards state birth control, and China, facing a 
demographic aging problem, is reconsidering its one-child policy.  
Having too many workers is not China’s problem, because it could 
always export more diasporas to Siberia, Africa, the Middle East, or 
Australia to expand the Chinese world. 
The birth rates in European countries in the first decade of the  
new millenium were merely 1.3 in Germany, 1.29 in Italy, and 1.5  
in France. According to the United Nations Population Division,  
on top of the world's population of 6.5 billion, we are expecting  
an additional 2.85 billion human beings in the next 50 years (UN  
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Population Division, 2007), apparently none of them statistically  
white (although not necessarily non-Western). The percentage of  
white European descendants worldwide will shrink (relatively)  
from 8 percent at the turn of the millenium to just 2 percent 50 years 
later, down from 30 percent a century ago. With the exception of  
some Anglophone nations, notably the USA, Canada, New Zealand, 
and Great Britain, which will all increase in number due to massive 
immigration, the remaining European societies are showing a  
remarkable disinterest in their ownvoluntary decline, not to say  
ethnic and cultural suicide. 
If there is going to be a ‘world democracy’ today, with each world  
citizen having exactly one vote, the declining Europeans had better 
unite with the neighboring Muslim world or else simply become  
irrelevant – if not to say impotent –  in international politics. Anger, 
awe, fear, and the strange feeling of intimidation are relatively new 
to European intellectuals, but now suggested by the facts. 
The last time European culture had been “seriously slackened to its 
bones” was when the Romans assimilated the Greeks around 300  
years before the birth of Jesus Christ (Sisci, 2008). The rise of the East 
is now real and inevitable. 
Having established that after the second half of the twentieth  
century the influence of the East is being felt everywhere, the  
question remains: “Who exactly isthe West?” 
Some say it is the Northern hemisphere, others say it is the white  
man; still others claim it is the First World, the developed world, or 
just the ‘elite.’ Surely we can find a better definition. I have one: The 
West, as I see it, has been victorious. That’s why Japan wisely joined 
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the club after 1900 when she defeated Russia and invaded China,  
Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. In spite of being defeated in World  
War II, she became the world’s second biggest market economy  
after the USA. In 2004, China finally challenged the West too by  
overtaking Great Britain in terms of gross domestic product and  
became the fourth biggest market economy. In 2009, China overtook 
Germany, and two years later she surpassed Japan and is now the  
second largest economy on Earth. With India surpassing Great  
Britain’s gross domestic product last year, has the West become  
nothing more than a mere geographical entity? 
But geography is also misleading if one looks at any Asian map of  
the world: The USA lies to the East. It is only natural to conclude  
that the only distinction between East and West that matters today, 
as I said before, is their different modes of thinking. Also, due to  
the declining population in the West, a number of Easterners will  
(voluntarily or not) immigrate – not to conquer the declining West, 
but to strengthen the equilibrium. And equilibrium it will be, for to 
reform either side’s civilization would mean, let us make no mistake,  
to discount that side’s history, beliefs, and ancestors…everything. 
CHAPTER 19 
genDer 
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Almost alone among barbarians they (the Germanic people) are 
content with one wife, except a very few among them, and these 
not from sensuality, but because their noble birth procures for them 
many offers of alliance. 
--(Tacitus, AD 92) 
 
In the preceding chapters I talked about the common metaphor  
of culture as a living being (e.g. Oswald Spengler, 1922; Arnold  
Toynbee, 1958 etc.). In this chapter I go further by exploring the  
gender, sexual orientation, and maturity of that culture. 
Among the many things that impressed Marco Polo in the thirteenth 
century, and what captured his readers’ imagination throughout  
the centuries, is the absolute correct observation that a Mongol man, 
like the Mussulman, could take as many wives as he wanted: “When 
a husband leaves his wife to go on a journey for more than twenty 
days, as soon as he has left, she takes another husband, in this she is 
fully entitled to do by local custom. And the men, wherever they go, 
take wives in the same way” (Polo, 2007). 
Now, I believe Marco Polo often confused the Mussulmen with  
the Mongols, and the Mongols with the common Chinamen (of  
whom there were countless clans), as there were many hundreds  
of cultures existing side by side in thirteenth century Cathay  
(China). The Mongols took over Cathay and established the Yuan  
dynasty (1264-1368) under Kublai Khan, who ruled from his court  
in Beijing, but they did not introduce polygamy in China. Far from 
it: Although polygamy was accepted in many societies around the  
globe, nowhere was it as common as in Asiatic societies. However,  
by far more popular was the phenomenon of concubinage, that is,  
the maintenance of mistresses. 
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Concubinage does not mean having multiple wives, like in  
traditional polygamy, and it is certainly not a form of prostitution  
either. I will discuss this shortly. Having multiple wives, as long  
as a man could afford such a costly status symbol, was common in 
Hindu societies, too (the mythical Krishna had 16,108 wives!), but  
since monogamy was introduced in the nineteenth century by the  
British imperialists, having multiple wives became illegal in many  
parts of India. Yet in the Muslim world, it is often legal. Until the  
Marriage Act of 1953, the ideal household in China consisted of “one 
man, many wives, and as many children as possible” (Gu, 1922;  
Xia et al., 2003). In Japan, polygamy was declared illegal only after  
the country was defeated in World War II and occupied by the U.S. 
army. But I will stop here and turn to more important facts. 
Whatever the state of law is today, in China, Korea, Japan, and  
South-East Asia in general, a gentleman can only have one legal  
wife, but as many concubines, handmaids, or mistresses as he can  
afford (Gu, 1922). That said, promiscuous young women, even if  
married, as long as they do not have children, are usually ‘available’ 
to powerful men, married or not (Pan, 2004). In fact, there is a  
wealth of data suggesting that a high proportion of Chinese men  
are utilizing the increased access to mistresses and prostitutes (Pan, 
2004) much more often than men living in the USA (Laumann et al., 
1994), where married men tend to turn away from the competition  
for sexual partners, engage in parental activities, and thus stick to  
one woman (Gray, Yang & Harrison, 2006). Now, this open attitude 
towards concubines, handmaids, and mistresses is so omnipresent  
in Asia (especially in Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan etc.) that it  
usually ‘blows’ the average American or European mind: 
The Chinese feminine ideal is for a wife to live absolutely, selflessly 
for her husband. Therefore when a husband who is sick or invalided 
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from overwork requires a handmaid, a hand rack or eye rack [sic]  
to enable him to get well and to make him fit for his life work, the  
wife in China with her selflessness gives it to him just as a good  
wife in Europe and America gives an armchair or goat’s milk to her 
husband when he is sick or requires it. (Gu Hongming, 1922) 
When the West implemented its imperial agenda, like in all  
historical conquest, naturally the conqueror turned to the females  
of the conquered. What happened after this encounter with Asian  
sexuality, especially during the last 150 years of Western hegemony, 
can only be described as the thorough construction of a fabulous,  
sexist ‘Asian exoticism.’ This exoticism, in my view, demotes the  
submissive Asian woman to a plaything, and puts her at the mercy 
of Western master-race dominance. Asia thus became ‘feminized’: 
 “I shall choose a little yellow-skinned woman with black hair and  
cat’s eyes. She must be pretty. Not much bigger than a doll…” 
…are the words of Louis Marie-Julien Viaud (1850-1923), alias Pierre 
Loti, an officer in the French navy stationed in Nagasaki, in his  
bookMadame Chrysantheme (1887). The book talks about short-term  
marriages with Japanese ‘rashamen’ or “concubines of Westerners” 
(Loti, 2001). 
This kind of representation of Asian woman and Asian sexuality  
prevails in hundreds of artworks, books, films, television shows, and  
musicals, and almost always entails interracial romances between  
European or American men with Asian women, for example in John 
Luther Long’sMadame Butterfly (Long, 2002), John Paris’Kimono  
(Paris, 1947), Arthur Golden’sMemoirs of a Geisha (Golden, 1997),  
Max Clavell’sShogun and Tai-pan (Clavell, 1986), and, of course,  
Marguerite Duras’ notorious L’Amant, in which a French teenage  
girl becomes the submissive, Sinicized mistress of a much older  
Chinese gentleman (Duras, 1984). And I haven’t even mentioned  
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more hedonistic works such as Wei Hui’sShanghai Baby (Wei, 2002) 
or Chun Sue’sBeijing Doll (Chun, 2004). 
As Patricia Lin argued in Invented Asia (2007), “sexual encounters  
historically were initially predominantly between Western white  
men and Asian woman given the nature of colonial and business  
ventures which tended to favor situations where primarily men  
were sent out into Asian territories.” This is testified by the fact that 
Chinese and Japanese writers found it natural to depict dominant  
Western men as洋 鬼 子 (yang guizi, foreign devils from the ocean), 
who were evil, stout, and ugly (Zhou, 2000). 
What happened in Asia before and between the First and Second  
Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860), the World Wars (1914-1918;  
1938-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), the occupation of Japan  
(1945-1952), Vietnam (1959-1975), and during the U.S. hegemony in 
Japan (1945-) compelled Western mass media and cultural consumer 
entertainment to strengthen the objectification of Asia: Asia as an  
all-perverted –  animalistic if you like –  place of Western sexual  
dominance versus Asian sexual submission: 
The most obvious use of the postwar American discourse about  
Japanese ‘feudalism’ in justifying the U.S. occupation was to  
render the Japanese as helpless and naive as women and children  
supposedly were. (Naoko Shibusawa, 2006) 
Butterflies, amber, pottery, calligraphy, lotus flowers, cherry trees,  
dolls, silk, kimonos… are those national symbols of a masculine  
or feminine nature? Westerners found them to be of a feminine  
nature, and commented on the absence of more manly sports (soccer,  
football, baseball, basketball, athletics etc.), and the toy-like houses  
and cities they encountered. They started a “discourse of femininity 
and masculinity, or femininity and maturity merged, male activity  
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and female passivity,” or simply about “race and manliness”  
(Shibusawa, 2006). 
However, no such discourse took place in Germany, which was  
defeated in World War I and World War II. Perhaps this was  
because Germany’s population was predominantly white and  
Western. At the heart of Europe, Germany was considered to be a  
grown-up culture comparable to the Anglo-American one; by all  
means the Germans were “a mature people” (Douglas McArthur, in 
Shibusawa, 2006). 
Not only gender and maturity, but also such concepts as ‘love’ and 
‘privacy’ were believed to be of an altogether different nature in  
Asia. In Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China,  
and India it is still the case, even a decade or two into this new  
millenium, that most marriages are arranged or ‘match-made,’  
and that ‘marriage’ is still considered the ‘union of two families’  
rather than of two individuals, and that a man has to marry and  
have a child, preferably a boy, before he is considered a real ‘man.’ 
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that today’s situation in those 
countries is already a huge improvement over what it was 20 to 30 
years ago (Lü, 2005). Some Western authors still argue that ‘Love has  
nothing to do with marriage in Asia’ (Nilson, 1988). Or, in defense of  
Asian values, that the concept of ‘love’ in (Confucian) China, Japan, 
andtutti quantiis inherently different from that in Christianity and 
the West, and can and must be understood ‘in the Asian context’  
only (Lin, 2007). 
Similarly, in Asia’s collective societies, the concept of ‘privacy’  
must be understood ‘in that Asian context’ only (McDougall, 2002). 
It might be helpful to keep this rule in mind: In China, ‘love’ and  
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 ‘privacy’ are best expressed by爱(ai) and私 (si). Korean and  
Japanese speakers can read and understand these two characters,  
but pronounce them differently and also transliterate them into their 
own alphabets, Hangul and Hiragana, respectively. The concept  
of individual ‘privacy’ which we take for granted in the West was  
imported into Hangul and Katakana simply because there was no  
generic word for it in classical Korean and Japanese. Linguistic  
distance correlates with cultural distance – only if one has gone  
through the painful ordeal of mastering a foreign language will  
one understand and appreciate a foreign culture and its distinctive  
values. 
Some feminists (men can also be great feminists) have argued  
that the whole image of ‘Asian playthings’ is the construct of an  
obsessive Western mind. But then, so are the stock market and  
French cuisine. No idea that has occupied so many minds over  
hundreds of years can be that far away from the facts of human life. 
Unless someone speaks a foreign language fluently and is familiar  
with the cultural implications of certain words and expressions,  
one is unlikely to understand the cultural context of, let’s say,  
‘enjo kosai’ in Japan – a compensated dating of young schoolgirls  
by middle-aged men (Goldman, 2008/05) – modern concubinage  
in Hong Kong or Shanghai, or rampant prostitution in most East  
Asian countries. Similarly, an East Asian person will have difficulty 
understanding European ‘swinger culture,’ where couples exchange 
their sex partners, even wives, mixed saunas, or the naturist or  
‘nudist culture’ valued in many European societies. 
But it isn’t all relative: In the past it has always been the Western  
male colonialist or imperialist who came to Asia, not the Eastern  
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male colonialist or imperialist who came to Europe. Where women  
dress like dolls, are submissive, know that their husbands will cheat 
anyway, where prostitution is cheap, people are beautiful, slim,  
young, even easy to marry, where languages are unreadable, and  
where Asian body types, in particular exotic Asian facial features,  
skin color, and genital configurations seem to arouse Western men  
to the very heights of exoticism and bizarreness (Lin, 2007), there  
will be a market for it: 
I have met the plaything which I have, vaguely perhaps, desired  
all my life: a little talking cat. […] her head, the size of your first,  
is poised, and seems unreal, on a child’s neck, a neck too long  
and too thin; and her tiny nothingness of a body is lost in the  
folds of an extravagant dress, hugely flowered with great gilded  
chrysanthemums. (Pierre Loti, 2001) 
Dominant groups, therefore, are able to transmit their ideologies and  
sexual categories through powerful cultural means of subjugation. 
Just as Asia had to bend down and suffer under Western military  
and economic might, so did it have to be submissive to the  
‘dominance vs. submission’ sexuality catechism. As long as those  
occupied cultures did not become ‘Westernized,’ i.e. did not  
conform to a certain level of moral conduct set by Europe and the  
USA, they remained “stripped of all privileges and left with an  
ascribed eroticism that invites sexual engagement, exploitation and  
ultimate abandonment” (Lin, 2007). 
Now, while all the authors and scholars quoted above allude to  
the ‘animal instinct’ of bad Western wolves and innocent Asian  
sheep, I cannot quite get myself to agree with these ‘chronicles  
of victimization’ of Asia that only play further into the hands  
165 
of Western dominance. On the contrary, I do believe that in our  
modern world, civility will prevail over barbarism. Or, as one of  
China’s major entertainers, Jackie Chan, alias Cheng Long [成 龙], 
once said, “We urge more foreigners to marry Chinese women!” 
Well, Mr. Chan, this is what Western men usually do in China. Or, 
at least that is what they aspire to do, not only in China, but in the 
whole of East Asia. To put this into socioeconomic perspective: In  
an international world, Ms. Asia has already claimed Ms. West’s  
boyfriend. Ms. Asia will make sure that her culture prevails, and,  
believe it or not, Mr. West will spend his money on her and, facing the  
shortage of children and crisis back home, he will stake his future on 
her and her Asian kin. 
On a philosophical level, the idea of a masculine West and a  
feminine East that transcends all human experience and forms a  
sense of liberation and harmony – Blaise Pascal called it logique du  
Coeur, or ‘wisdom of the heart’ – is a popular concept of dualism,  
also evident in yin and yang (阴阳): the feminine or negative  
principle in nature, or moon, and the masculine or positive principle 
in nature, or sun. 
Jim Garrison, in hisCivilization and the Transformation of Power, took 
this duality to the most profound level when he analyzed today’s  
gender politics using folk wisdom and mythology (Garrison, 2000). 
He describes how the suppression of ‘Mother Earth,’ the archetypal 
feminine, has led us to the brink of world catastrophe, heralded by 
the ‘Crisis of Europe’ in works such as Donella Meadows’The Limits 
to Growth (1972), Oswald Spengler’sThe Decline of the West(1893),  
and Edmund Husserl’sThe Crisis of the European Sciences (1970). The 
power plays between ‘Mother mind’ and ‘Father force,’ the violent  
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tension between ‘Mahimata’ (Mother Earth) and Lord Shiva (god of 
destruction) – all cultures have their myths about this duality and  
can follow its discourse: 
Here – the destructive power of the short-sighted masculine West  
that narrow-mindedly focuses on objects, not relations, and that  
wants to exploit and manipulate those objects in order to control  
nature and all things. 
There – the gentle power of the long-sighted feminine East that  
holistically perceives the world’s interconnectedness of all objects,  
and that cultivates and appreciates them in order to balance the  
relations among all things. 
CHAPTER 20 
The  DialecTics of 
DichoTomy 
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Having seen that the East-West dichotomy is omnipresent in  
history, philosophy, demographics, religion, culture, ideology,  
even sexuality, let us now, in looking at the dialectics of dichotomy, 
expand its scope to more exotic fields such as physiology,  
geopolitics, and cognition: 
1) Cerebral Determinism 
This notion is linked to human physiology. 
We observe, in most cultures, the grammatical division of nouns into  
masculine and feminine, and in all cultures, the semantic division  
of names and objects into male and female. It means that gender  
is an innate sense people have of themselves and others, including  
animals and objects. This is an example of our human physiology,  
the structure of our sexes, correctly corresponding to and portraying 
categorizations of things in the world we perceive. Next, we all are 
able to distinguish between matter and idea. In philosophy this is  
called Cartesian dualism (Cambridge Dictionary, 1999), which is an  
example of the intimate relationship between our mind and brain  
correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of mind and 
matter in the world we perceive. Likewise, the ways we think about 
the world we perceive with respect to our categorizations of matter 
and idea are causally determined or influenced by our linguistic  
system (Sapir, 1983). Since our physiology projects itself onto the  
world we perceive, this makes me wonder whether our definition of 
an inductive East and an analytical West is another example of the  
structure of our cognitive system – the two cerebral hemispheres –  
correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of the world 
we perceive. The East-West dichotomy is not an invention; it is a  
discovery. 
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2) The Theory of Shared Labor 
The second notion I would like to bring forward is the argument of 
shared labor in a geopolitical context, not in a Marxist or Weberian 
sense to explain labor shared within a society, but to explain labor  
shared among civilizations. 
The definition of the East-West dichotomy (from Greekdicha, ‘apart,’  
andtomos ‘cutting’) is a form of logical division consisting of the  
separation of the geopolitical map into two hemispheres, one of  
which has and the other has not in each case perpetually exhibited  
the tendency for analytically-based reasoning or integration-based  
reasoning. In any population, just as we may divide its members  
along a vertical scale into professional individuals and individuals  
who are not professionals (and each of these may be subdivided  
again), similarly we may divide cultures along a horizontal scale  
into analytically-based societies and societies which are integration- 
based. Because each side has what the other side is lacking, East  
and West together form a whole that is imperfect without both of  
its parts. If we now come to see the division into integration-based  
and analytically-based civilizations as a form of specialization in  
‘cooperative labor’ with specific tasks and roles well adjusted to  
increase efficiency and intellectual output of humankind, we could  
imagine a certain regulatory mechanism or ‘collective consciousness’  
that shifts whole populations – voluntary or involuntary – into their 
respective geopolitical roles and provides them with specific tasks  
so as to serve the greater good of the whole. 
Ideas about a human ‘hive mind’ are not new to us. However,  
comparing insect and human societies still causes confusion  
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 (Cooley & Rieff, 1983; 2003). Not too long after Darwin observed  
group strategies and social organization in animals in hisOrigin  
of Species (1859), modern biologists and sociologists compared ant  
kingdoms (and occasionally, beehives) to human state-building  
and consumerism (Spencer, 1857; Hölldobler & Wilson, 1990, 1994;  
Weber, 1991; Marion, 1999). Philosophers tell us that there is a  
certain unifying moral force within society; psychologists talk about 
‘conformity’ or ‘group identification’ as opposed to a society of total 
egoists and independent individuals (Cooley & Rieff, 1983). If this  
holds true for groups, why not for civilizations? In order to be most 
productive and efficient, labor must be shared. 
To my knowledge, no Western culture has ever produced anything 
like the works of Confucius, and no Eastern culture has ever  
produced anything like Plato’s ideas. The notion of shared labor  
makes me think that the division into an analytically-based West  
and an integration-based East could be no coincidence in human  
evolution, but a collective behavior to fully exploit and develop all  
the cognitive capacities of the human race. Note that there is nothing 
in this world that is not shared by all humankind. It is just that the 
West grew up to excel in this, and the East grew up to excel in that.  
We must only combine them in order to express all the knowledge. 
3) Cognitive Dualism 
The third notion is derived from John Dewey (1859-1952). In his  
bookThe Quest for Certainty(1929) he discusses the ‘doctrine of two 
truths,’ the sacred and the profane, which in turn is derived from  
dualism. 
Dualism, in its simplest notion, is related to binary thinking, that  
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is, to systems of thought that are two-valued: valid/invalid, true/ 
false, good/bad, right/wrong. The doctrine of two truths, however, 
is more concretely used in the dualistic response to the conflict  
between spiritualism and science, the spiritual and the secular.  
Dewey saw all philosophical problems as being derived from  
dualistic oppositions, in particular between the spirit and physical  
matter, but it is his conclusion that is most significant: Dewey  
advocated rejecting Hegel’s dialectical idealism (that recommended 
the synthesis of oppositions seen as theses versus antitheses) on  
the grounds that the whole (synthesis) is never the sum of its parts 
(thesis and antithesis). Conclusively, contradictions are universal:  
It is ‘either-or’ or ‘both but incommensurable,’ as for example ‘ebb  
and flow,’ ‘yin and yang,’ or as the Chinese-English saying goes:  
“鱼和熊掌，不 可兼得” (“You can’t have your cake and eat it, too” – 
unabridged: “鱼 ,我所欲也；熊掌，亦我所欲也，二者不可兼得，舍鱼儿取熊掌 
者也” [Mencius, 11A, 4]). 
The study of the ‘other,’ Jean-Paul Sartre’s xenophobic masochism  
as expressed in “l’enfer, c’est les autres,” Jürgen Habermas’  
paranoid ‘der Blick des anderen,’ or the Indian philosophy of  
‘Deshi-Pardeshi’ (Inhabitor vs. Outsider), the silly but deadly  
communist-capitalist game – all of these simply indicate: I am not  
you, and you are not me. So, what is the argument? Don’t we all  
like to disagree, not because we have the better reasons, but because 
we can disagree? Isn’t it our right to say that “although ‘your’  
country is made of gold, ‘I’ don’t like it!” Don’t I have the right to  
say no? It was in structuralism, famously represented by Claude  
Lévi-Strauss, where one did not only organize human thought and  
culture into binary oppositions, but attached hierarchies to them as 
well. For some reason in the European history of ideas, ‘rational’  
is usually privileged and associated with men, while ‘emotional’ is  
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inferior and associated with women. Blond hair in Western culture  
is privileged and associated with goodness, while black hair is  
inferior and associated with evil, and so on (Boon, 1972; Goddard,  
1982). Was Lévi-Strauss right if one wanted to say that the ‘West’ is 
privileged and associated with ‘mastering the theories,’ while the  
‘East’ is inferior and associated with ‘mastering the arts’? Surely,  
cultural values and prejudices vary over time. What does not is the 
underlying, psychologically calibrated mechanism of all human  
reasoning: its cognitive dualism. 
In 1976, the psychologist Julian Jaynes published his controversial 
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral 
Mind in which he uses the metaphor of the 'bicameral mind,' the idea 
that one side of the brain "speaks" while the other side of the brain 
"listens." In 2009, Iain McGilchrist, the psychiatrist 
and author of the The Master and his Emissary, had this to say 
about the making of the modern world: "Let me make it clear: 
For imagination you need both hemispheres; let me make it very 
clear: For reason you need both hemispheres. So if I had to sum it 
up I’d say the world of the left hemisphere, dependent on denotative 
language and abstraction, it yields clarity and power to manipulate 
things that are known, fixed, static, isolated, decontextualized, 
explicit, general in nature, but ultimately lifeless. The right 
hemisphere by contrast yields a world of individual, changing, 
evolving, interconnected, implicit, incarnate, living beings in the 
context of the lived world, but in the nature of things never fully 
graspable, never perfectly known." (McGilchrist, 2010) 
To sum up, the above three notions demonstrate what seems to  
be a law of nature, namely that the East-West difference has been  
found consistently from the time of the Greeks 2,500 years ago to  
our present day, and that it is consistent with assumptions about  
our anatomy, the cerebral hemispheres, the dual nature of our  
reasoning, and the geopolitical concept of sharing labor (by way of  
collective consciousness) for the greater good and a higher efficiency 
in intellectual output. Because the human geopolitical situation is  
a mere extension of the physical and cognitive systems inherent  
in each of us, we have reason to believe that our societies, our  
planetary civilization, will continue to be predominantly dualistic in 
the near future, with an integration-based Eastern hemisphere and  
an analytically-based Western hemisphere. 
CHAPTER 21 
Problems  WiTh  The 
DichoTomy 
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There are a few problems with the East-West dichotomy as a global 
theory that need to be addressed in order to allow further discussion 
and research. Of all criticisms, these are the urgent ones I shall  
comment on: 
1) Generalizations 
The biggest accusation by scholars is that of ‘generalizations’: ‘East’ 
and ‘West,’ these two categories, so we are told, are oversimplifying 
the current world order and all other cultural, geographical,  
historical, political, and social affairs (Hendry, 2006). 
We oppose the argument by saying that ‘East and West’ indeed  
contain all those subcategories, and many more. However, every  
one of them is true only in the abstract, widest, most universal sense 
of the word, and any definition is subject to change. For example,  
we have explicitly concluded that the West is more deductive,  
while the East is more inductive. In that way, generalizations pose  
no harm to scholarship, which already distinguishes between Western  
philosophy and Eastern philosophy departments. Besides, ‘East and 
West’ as an interdisciplinary concept and historical metaphor has 
been the rough guide for universal historians such as 
Hannah Arendt (1993), Arnold Toynbee (1958), Tu Weiming (2003), 
Joseph Needham (1964), Kitaro Nishida (1989), Okakura Kakuzo (1904), 
and Ji Xianlin (2006), as well as for universal theoreticians such as 
Francis Bacon (1620), Thomas Hobbes (1671), Friedrich Nietzsche (1909), 
Karl Marx (1848), Samuel Huntington (1993), and hundreds more. 
They all did research on the conceptual contrast between Eastern 
and Western societies and, either directly or indirectly, came 
(often independently from each other) to the conclusion that there 
are two cultural modes of humankind: the more rational, deduction- 
driven West, and the more  
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intuitive, induction-driven East. This is simply how things are. 
Still, the East-West dichotomy is occasionally misunderstood by  
prominent individuals or special interest groups who do not like  
to be categorized, which is understandable. Yet, again, its aim is  
not to label individuals, but to describe entire civilizations and  
their cultural evolution, an evolution that is very real (Mace, 2005;  
Reynolds, 1983; Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994). 
Moreover, the branch of social science that effectively uses empirical 
investigation and critical analysis to understand the structure of  
Eastern and Western societies, ‘Sociology’ or ‘Sociology of Cultures,’ 
usually observes developments on the macro level of societies, for  
example: group behavior, social networking, and so on, and never  
attempts to explain individual activity and behavior. The East-West 
dichotomy is a global theory, not a local one; and caution is advised 
when following the recent hype about and around the application of 
the word glocal, meaning global ideas implemented on a local level. 
Individuals occasionally feel victimized by scientific studies, and  
sometimes wronged by anthropological or social scientific findings. 
Yet we need to remind ourselves that categorization, and therefore a 
degree of oversimplification and generalization, are inherent in our 
everyday lives. Individuals as well as small groups are categorized  
by school grades, credit systems, occupation, profession, social  
status, ethnicity, even by the clothes we wear, the quarters we live  
in, the car we drive, and the books we read. In the case of East and 
West we are talking about the cultural evolution, specification, and 
stratification of ideas of civilizations over the last 2,500 years and  
earlier, with billions of very diverse individuals and their various  
actions filling up empty time with living history. 
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If zooming into separate households, naturally we would find each 
individual of that household having many identities. They identify  
themselves, for example, by their faith, profession, social status,  
ethnicity, hobbies, friends etc. 
Looking at humankind from the moon, however, those identities can  
be ascribed to a certain region, cultural group, and civilization, East 
or West. Therefore, no individual today, no group of individuals  
should be offended, or – depending on their point of view –  
disappointed if they cannot see themselves fitting neatly into the  
universal categories of East or West. It is a universal theory, not the 
story of any individual. 
2) Stereotypes 
A cold-blooded scientist would – in the words of Oscar Wilde –  
“know the price of everything but the value of nothing.” It is a  
stereotype, and a bit cynical perhaps, to pitch a trained scientist  
against the notion of God, faith, human feelings, value statements,  
and spiritual or charitable affairs. A scientist who describes God,  
poetry, music, or our love for children using statistical models is –  
you will forgive me for saying so – not an affable companion. But the  
scientist armed with his methods and measuring tools is also limited 
by them, and can often only speak about his branch of knowledge  
and the scientific community. There are other important seekers of  
truth: the artist, the poet, the philosopher, the musician, the sage, the 
father and the mother. They all have slightly different approaches  
to knowledge and wisdom and see things differently from the  
scientist because they have gleaned their knowledge from personal  
experiences, learning, practice, or through poetry, music, exercise,  
177 
or the love of children. We could say then that any activity leads to 
categorization, and any categorization may result in stereotyping. 
The art of stereotyping in cultural studies, like all taxonomies, helps 
us to make sense of the world around us and to attribute to various 
groups of people certain characteristics that sum up our experiences 
and our knowledge about them. That also makes stereotypes very  
flexible, since they change after our experiences and our knowledge 
about them has been modified. Therefore, no stereotype can exist  
that does not have at least some reference point to the factual  
world, to gathered information, or to personal experiences with  
a foreign culture. Stereotypes are inevitable. The only danger, as  
some observers have pointed out, is when they are negative, unfair, 
politically incorrect (we come to that in a minute) or too inflexible.  
This is because stereotypes, like all beliefs, have the tendency to  
become stronger over time, and, when constantly repeated by  
propaganda, can be used to manipulate uninformed public opinion 
to connect people or events that were originally unrelated: 
The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of 
a situation evoking new behavior, which makes the original false  
conception come ‘true.’ This specious validity of the self-fulfilling  
prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the  
actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very  
beginning. (Robert K. Merton, 1968) 
In other words, there is the theoretical possibility that the East-West 
stereotypes, as natural as they appear today, have become true only 
because so many people have acted upon and believed in them for 
thousands of years. 
3) Small Nations and Peripheral Nations 
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Both cultural hemispheres, East and West, are divided into many  
more distinct societies. And those societies are subdivided into  
distinct regions. As said elsewhere here, looking at the trees or  
leaves will divert one’s attention from seeing the whole forest. For  
that reason, it seems unnecessary to discuss each and every society 
or region and their peculiarities. It is their cultural, economical,  
and political affiliation, shared history and values, and general  
relationship that give them a distinct culture, without discussing the 
charms of each independent member community. 
Having said that, I don’t need to elaborate on the role of the  
peripheral regions: The Middle East, Africa, Australia, and  
Latin America all have close cultural, economical, and political  
affiliations, shared history and values, and a general relationship  
with either Europe or Asia, or both on equal terms, in which case the 
relationship may be balanced for a while or else eventually turn in  
favor of one side or the other. 
As for the relationships between large states and small states within 
the cultural hemispheres, they may at times perceive themselves  
as independent, even smaller states which are obviously less  
powerful and more dependent but nevertheless feel they are  
special and unique. In addition, all nations by definition insist on  
their sovereignty or exclusivity. But all the same, together, those  
large countries and small countries are interdependent and form  
civilizations. 
Returning to the world of politics, one could say there is no such  
thing as absolute independence and liberty, not for any state, not for 
any group of people. The French moralist Joseph Joubert (1754-1824),  
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who experienced the French Revolution, called any noble cry for  
liberty a farce: 
Let your cry be for free souls rather even than for free men. […]  
Subordination is in itself a better thing than independence. The  
one implies order and arrangement; the other implies only self- 
sufficiency with isolation. The one means harmony, the other a  
single tone; the one is the whole, the other is but the part. (Jospeh  
Joubert, 1962) 
We could ask: What if one part of the whole fails to participate in  
or commit or contribute to its social environment? I would argue  
that in that case, if a small, solitary state tries to single-mindedly  
change the pattern of the whole empire, it can only do so within  
the limits set by all other neighboring states. Within the global  
community of nations, each of its smaller members will be ruthlessly  
assessed, persistently judged for its performance, and punished if it 
misbehaves or fails to perform: 
今也小国师大国，而耻受命焉；是有犹弟子而耻受命于先师也 
如耻之，莫若师文王；师文王，大国五年，小国七年，必为政于天下矣。 
Now, the small states imitate the large, and yet are ashamed to  
receive their commands: This is like a scholar’s being ashamed to  
receive the commands of his master. If the small states know their  
place, they will benefit from the greatness of their masters. (Mencius,  
7A, 3) 
4) Political Correctness 
Some great negotiators, like former United Nations Secretary Kofi  
Annan, or now his successor, the South Korean Ban Ki-moon, would 
not approve of dividing the world into two cultural hemispheres, or 
at least they would shy away from this for the reasons given above. 
Generalizations, stereotypes, and categorizations lead to separatism 
and isolation, to nationalism, prejudice, and even racism. In short,  
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all these would be bad for the United Nations’ good governance and 
true scholarship. 
The fear of new totalities in itself is not so new. But if Eastern  
and Western values, mutual respect, balance, harmony, and the  
difficulties that we face if the West continues down its aggressive  
path are not addressed, I would argue that even without mentioning 
the concept of the East-West dichotomy, there are still going  
to be the dangers of separatism and isolation, nationalism, and  
other factors that are detrimental to good governance and true  
scholarship. 
Since everyone in world politics seems so concerned about the price 
we have to pay for the different civilization modes of humankind,  
we should find a peaceful place to discuss the value of it all. The  
United Nations, and by inclusion its member states, are committed  
and have been informed countless times by the universal historians 
and philosophers, great thinkers, and Nobel laureates in East and  
West, that there is cultural diversity that not only needs to be  
addressed again and again (because people sadly tend to forget),  
but far betterunderstood, appreciated, and valued. The Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights,The Dialogue Among Civilizations  
(Khatami, 2001),The Declaration of Human Responsibilities (Küng,  
1997), and so on are cases in point. It is important that all nations  
recognize and cherish the two great cultural modes in general and  
the myriads of cultural varieties in particular: thevaluecreated for  
the future of mankind by "being different," (Malhotra, 2011) not the 
price paid in the past for forcing us to conform. 
Asian nations are now a majority in number, opinion, and theory;  
their reviving cultures are now of the greatest political concern to the  
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Western hegemony that still holds sway over the world. Therefore, 
in the near future it will be inevitable in global affairs to separate  
political rhetoric from socio-cultural realities, and we should expect 
more policymakers and historians to talk about ‘cultural politics’  
or ‘political culture,’ because there isn’t just one political or one  
cultural model – there are many, and what works for one does not  
necessarily work for another. As mentioned previously, Asia is  
now a greater phenomenon than the USA or Europe. Unabashed  
resistance to –  or worse, outright denial of – Asian values, Eastern  
thought, cultural achievements, and Asia’s greater participation 
in world affairs and its reformation could lead to a clash of  
civilizations, just like Samuel Huntington had prophesized. The  
concept of ‘political correctness’ exists, but so far, there isn’t such a 
thing ascultural correctness. 
5) Polarities 
There is a well-informed block of political analysts and economists  
who try to convince us that the relationship between Europe’s ‘Big  
Three’ (Germany, France, Great Britain) plus the USA, and Asia’s ‘Big  
Three’ (China, India, Japan) plus maybe Russia, is only superficial,  
toxic, and full of congenital defects (Rosan, 1962; Hendry, 2006). I  
suggest the alternative to this division between a Western league  
and an Eastern one would be inevitable chaos: All nation-states  
would act as separate entities that form alliances at any time with  
whoever is able or willing, thus arbitrarily leading the world into  
unipolarity (one center of power),bipolarity(two centers of power), or 
multipolarity (three or more centers of power), with no such thing as 
a cultural East-West divide. 
Such a theory looks like a deliberately broken glass window to  
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me. Valuable time and energy would be wasted on the analysis  
of shards. The basic unit of human relationships is ‘two.’ One  
cannot have a relationship with nobody. But some people neglect  
this human aspect of relationships, and collect data and produce  
statistics about each country’s human and non-human capital,  
resources, and natural endowments instead, which is nothing less  
than adopting the strictly economic or materialist approach. The  
social materialists see humans as being more guided by the sciences 
and natural laws, and less by the humanities, for example Jared  
Diamond in hisGuns, Germs and Steel (2003) and Gunnar Heinsohn 
in hisSöhne und Weltmacht (2005). 
The social materialistic approach is an extension of Marxist  
materialism, or maybe just another fancy name for bean-counting.  
This very (Western) analytical, deduction-based approach to make  
sense of the world and all relationships does not allow for any value,  
metaphysical discussion, ideologies, and spiritual meaning. It does  
not acknowledge ‘oneness,’  ‘balance,’ or ‘harmoniousness,’ nor does  
it allow for human morals or factors like ‘tolerance,’ ‘respect,’ ‘love,’ 
and ‘forgiveness.’ It does not let man assume a greater role than  
being a mere statistic. It demonstrates once again that particular  
Western lack of ideas and confusion I was talking about earlier: the 
limits of the Western cultural mode and deductive-based science,  
which in essence were almost begging for the re-emergence of the  
spiritual East, its former glories, wisdoms, and its power to heal the 
global imbalance. 
So, the West still thinks it’s all about who’s got the oil, who’s got  
the money, who’s got the guns, or, better, who’s got the biggest  
guns. That’s how our children now think and are trained to reason. 
Ifyour numbers add up, you are at the top of the league. This is a  
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conclusion reached via the deductive way. Let us recall: Indeductive 
reasoning we reach a conclusion from previously known - facts,  
a conclusion that is sound and valid. That is the tragedy of our  
cause, and the cause for our decline. We are totally deluded and  
lost in an artificial world of infinite particulars, of which we do  
not know how to let go and get out. Religious people, no matter of 
which faith, who usually strive to become good, lovable, modest,  
humble, and kind people (in their respective communities) now  
look like total idiots, when some hedge funds managers, bankers,  
or lawyers got wealthy and powerful by ruthlessly destroying  
their competitors, and exploiting their employees and positions in  
society. Families, communities, and religions are corrupted this way 
and fall apart. And this is precisely how some world historians and 
political analysts see the community of nations falling apart into  
self-interested economic zones, political spheres of influence, highly 
specialized manufacturing power bases, and so on: a fragmented,  
multipolar world with nothing more in common than a materialist  
drive for fighting over resources, market shares, and political  
influence. In such a model, the Western model, states may fail like  
business models fail, like many companiesfail. But is this really how 
we should look at humanity? How can a culturefail, if left in peace? 
How can a civilization fail, if not be annihilated? 
All the while, the East with its inductive ways simply allocates new 
relations to recurring phenomenal patterns; it shamelessly makes  
unscientific yet highly humanistic predictions and acts upon them,  
like Zhang Zai (1020-1077), who said: “All humans are my brothers 
and sisters; all things are my companions,” and Tu Weiming: “We  
need to establish a harmonious yet diverse new order of world  
ethics” (Tu, 2012). Now that the East is rising again, few Westerners 
are ready to deal with true cultural diversity upon being confronted 
184 
with thousands of “new” terms, holistic world views, and Eastern  
thought. It may take some time for most Western scholars to adjust 
and fully appreciate, let alone pay tribute to and benefit from the  
South Asian and East Asian traditions: The sole reign of the Western 
hemisphere is coming to an end. 
The East-West dichotomy predicts that if the world were to be  
reshuffled and recreated, under any circumstances it would happen 
all over again: the division of humankind into many various  
cultures that together form two great cultural hemispheres. One  
would bemorerational, analytical, and deductive; the othermore 
intuitive, spiritual, and inductive. It is an evolutionary program that 
runs in all of us. It is not arbitrary. It is either-or, in the same way  
cerebral determinism, cognitive dualism, and shared labor are part  
of our diverse human nature. The dichotomy doesn’t respond to economic  
or political theories; on the contrary, economic and political theories 
respond to the dichotomy. That’s because first there’s humanity, and 
then come the theories. 
According to the East-West dichotomy, there is onlyequilibrium. 
This equilibrium may never be perfect and, at times, may tilt more  
to one side than the other. Yet according to this, the world can never 
be strictly unipolar or multipolar. If there isn't an opposition, we will always 
have to make one. 
6) Incommensurability 
If asked about a single, unified humanity, no reasonable person  
would openly disagree with this possibility. It seems rational: One  
China plus one Germany makes one…what? The two have different 
traditions; they are not similar. Humanity should never be subjected 
toGleichschaltung, a German term which means ‘synchronization’  
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or enforced ‘conformity,’ be it cultural or political co-optation.  
Humanity really meansall of us, the entire range of human beings  
and their diverse cultural and political idiosyncrasies, core values,  
inventions, and contributions. If we look at it this way, the idea  
of humanity is a very beautiful and decent thing. It is unbiased  
and entirely positive. We simply feel we have to be part of that  
humanity; in fact, our humanity is something we can’t escape.  
Sure, we can always improve ourselves and actively promote the  
education of better human beings. 
So what do people in the international arena say when they talk  
about humanity? They talk about East and West. Be they presidents, 
political or business leaders, journalists, or just exchange students  
or tourists, they all talk about cultural differences, nationalities,  
countries and their histories, about supposed similarities. Those  
who deny there are differences are usually those that never studied 
another culture. At some point, the Westerners in Asia are going to 
proudly side with the West: “We in the West…” or “they in the East.”  
How many books have already been written about East and West?  
Why is it that every Westerner knows about ‘East and West,’ talks  
about ‘East and West,’ belongs to either ‘East or West,’ and almost  
anxiously wants to discuss ‘East and West’? 
Here is a possible explanation: Despite the outrageous disunity of  
the European nation states and the dysfunctional bureaucracy of  
the European Union, those 400 million or so citizens do not only  
embrace a common ‘Magna Carta of Liberty’ or ‘Magna Carta of  
Democracy and Human Rights,’ but also a ‘Magna Carta of Loyalty.’ 
What do I mean by ‘Magna Carta of Loyalty’? The European  
powers, after so many centuries of ‘jointly conquering and dividing 
the world,’ in the end had nothing else to do than to ditch their  
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territories or else declare war on each other. They were after power, 
and how to get it. After the two Great Wars that shattered Europe,  
all of their remaining former colonies became independent. It seems 
but a rational choice to me that the Europeans should unite once  
more to jointly face the New World Order, or else get the imperialist 
payback they truly deserve, especially in the face of the rising  
powers of the Muslim/Arabic, Indian, and Chinese civilizations. 
In fact, if I was non-European, and I wanted to manipulate Europe, 
I would do my utmost to distract the Europeans from their ‘Magna 
Carta of Loyalty.’ I would try to undermine their ‘loyalty,’ to play  
them and their interests against each other. Granted, by saying  
“Magna Carta of Loyalty of the European nations” I mean the  
European nations’ faithfulness to the European cause: the forceful  
continuation and domination of their civilization by means of their  
rational, analytically-based ways and deductive cultural mode over 
all worldly affairs, standards, institutions, politics, economics, and  
social issues. The European thinkers will desperately try to cling  
to theirDeutungshoheit, a German term meaning ‘sovereignty over  
the definition of thought.’ It basically means that whatever new  
knowledge the Europeans believe to have ‘discovered’ in foreign  
cultures – indigenous concepts, names, ideas – they almost always  
translated those unique and non-European concepts into familiar,  
convenient European terms. This may be called the greatest intellectual 
property theft of all time. 
Naturally, we are loyal to our common ancestors, heredity,  
language, and community. It is an evolutionary tactic to ensure  
the survival and procreation of our kind. That is why Americans,  
Europeans, and the Commonwealth realm, despite all their internal 
struggles and disputes, nevertheless refer to themselves as the  
‘West.’ The same applies to the various nation states in Asia that,  
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despite all their internal struggles and disputes, nevertheless refer to 
themselves as the ‘East.’ 
That is why East and West are incommensurable concepts: Nothing 
can belong simultaneously to both parts; nor can both parts  
simultaneously occupy the same space. 
CHAPTER 22 
The  fuTure  of  The 
DichoTomy 
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In order to balance the East-West dichotomy and engage in  
meaningful dialogue guided by the principles of peaceful aim,  
mutual respect, tolerance, and patience, we should discourage any  
maneuver designed to ‘cheat,’ ‘take over,’ ‘support hegemony,’ and 
other evil acts by making laws or introducing binding oaths. To this 
end, unchecked Eurocentrism as well as Asiacentrism should be  
avoided at all costs. 
It seems necessary to address some of those areas that in my view  
deserve serious attention: 
1) Education 
Oscar Wilde once said, “Nothing that is worth having can be  
taught,” meaning that everything that is worth having is acquired  
through experience and self-cultivation, and it has to be acquired  
willingly: experience for the purpose of experiencing. Those high- 
profile Western officials, directors, and businessmen who desire to  
govern, trade, research, or teach, should spend some time in Asian  
countries, and attend Asian universities or other institutes of higher 
learning, finance, or trade. This should be made compulsory for  
any foreign leader in Asia. In fact, no executive, expatriate, leader  
of a party, director of a large organization, let alone head of state,  
should be allowed to assume such a post without having spent  
some time in Asia and learnt the local language. Such enlightened  
‘conditions’ are already an unspoken agreement in many scholarly  
circles and practiced in international law-making, but are far from  
being the rule in politics and economics. Therefore it should be  
made mandatory to spend some years abroad, just as a foreign  
postgraduate qualification should be made mandatory for the  
highest scholarly posts. No nation, no matter how big, can afford  
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half-educated leaders. 
2) Politics 
Biology, culture, policies – this is the hierarchy of change. One can  
change one’s biology only through choice of courtship and the result 
of offspring, but one can slowly change one’s culture within one’s  
own lifetime by immigration, marriage, and learning. However,  
one’s policies are the quickest to change. 
Policies, nowadays, are the greatest cognitive intrusion of all, as  
they are the fastest manipulation of memory and information. They 
are widely recognized as the single most important method to deal 
with one’s ‘opponents’ effectively. So, what policies are Western  
politicians carrying out these days? Western politicians have a keen 
interest in making all Asian cultures and traditions conform to  
Western civilization, be it through Capitalism, market globalization, 
democracy, human rights, preemptive wars, sporting events, Santa  
Claus, or Coca-Cola. 
Since globalization and ‘World History’ as an academic discipline, as  
mentioned before, are considered extensions of Western civilization 
and Western history, it is relatively safe for Western politicians,  
negotiators, and scholars to make concessions (e.g. allowing China to  
join the World Trade Organization, despite its authoritarian regime), 
give freebies (e.g. nuclear weapons to India), or occasionally praise, 
however shallow, all kinds of cultural achievements, be they of the 
past or present. How all these niceties will add up to substantial  
Eastern representation in international affairs remains to be seen.  
First, how does any country know if it is ‘in’ if there is no ‘out’ in  
globalism? Second, who will take credit for what comes out of Asia’s  
input? Will it be the West? 
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When Francis Bacon first finished hisNovum Organum (The New  
Instrument) in 1620, he originally had Aristotle’sOrganum in mind  
and quoted only a few of China’s great inventions like printing  
and gunpowder. However, after hearing about the Four Books of  
Confucianism, and especially after reading Confucius’Great Learning 
(Da Xue,大学), is it mere coincidence that Bacon thereupon included 
hisNovum Organum in a six-volume masterpiece which he proudly 
titledThe Great Renewal of Learning? 
All world governments know the hierarchy of change: biological –  
cultural – policy changes. Because Western governments are short- 
lived (and thus, for the pragmatic reason of survival, politically  
short-sighted), they will focus all their energies and efforts on  
new policies,short-time changes, to prove what they can do for  
the moment. Meanwhile, they ignore the long-term effects on the  
culture as a whole. Eastern governments are different: They still  
keep an eye on cultural, long-term changes and maintenance. If a  
government would openly endorse a strategy for biological change, 
this could lead – as it did in the past – to suspicions of xenophobia, 
racism, and isolation, so biological changes are the ones best not  
overtly promoted by any government. 
If we were to improve international cooperation, Eastern and  
Western policymakers, scientists, and economists would have to  
create shared opportunities for growth, consistent with broadly  
accepted economic theories, open markets, and good diplomacy. The  
real problem with fast policy changes is that, if one studies history  
carefully, one will see that violence must follow. In policymaking,  
‘might is right,’ ‘whoever controls the stick controls the buffalo,’ and 
‘small countries have no politics.’ It is cruel, but this is simply how 
192 
things are. It is very likely that a powerful person or group might  
abuse their power through the means ofad-hoc policy changes that  
are very arbitrary, egoistic, and because of their dubious nature,  
often non-negotiable. 
Who was it who said that “the destructive energies of the deduction- 
based warrior culture would be channeled into the safer pursuits  
of a commercial society”? Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, Dugald  
Stewart… another enlightened Scot? That is why we frequently use 
words likewarin economics, e.g. trade ‘ wars,’ andfight in politics, 
e.g. ‘fighting’ for voters. 
In policymaking, the West has to relinquish some power, keep its  
often arbitrary, short-sighted,ad-hoc adjustments more in check,  
and discuss more frequently with its partners on an equal level.  
At the same time, the East should try harder to be less passive and 
conservative and more forceful in policy decision-making, otherwise 
it will always be bullied around by its more pro-active Western  
counterpart(s). 
3) Exchange 
Among all things that are tradable – oil, wood, gold, commodities,  
human capital etc. – culture is the least obvious yet the most  
subversive good. Since the Orient and Occident produced lots  
of sustainable, lasting cultural artifacts, arts, ideas, and theories,  
believe it or not, all these have been the objects of cultural exchange 
and learning even long before the Greek philosopher Platoborrowed 
some ideas from the Persian sage Zarathustra (who lived c. 600 BC), 
Alexander the Great’s conquest (326-323 BC), and Megasthenes’ visit 
to Pataliputra (c. 300 BC). Why cultural exchange? Because, for some 
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reason, Alexander thought it worthwhile to risk his reputation, even 
his empire, by marrying the Bactrian princess Roxane (of today’s  
Northern Afghanistan) in exchange for gold, unity, and political  
stability. What is more, Megasthenes brought maps and descriptions 
back to Macedonia in order to inform the Mediterranean world  
about ‘Indica.’ And Plato, partly inspired by Persian thought, laid  
the foundation for Western moral philosophy. 
Oh, some may scoff, it was always about trade. That's why human  
societies expand. Others may say it was about rule and conquest.  
Human curiosity must have played its part, too. So perhaps did  
love, on Alexander and Roxane’s part. Translation certainly did help 
to communicate, but did it really help to understand each other?  
Universally, the first impression upon meeting other cultures is  
that of amazement and joy, not of fear and anger. It is in the human 
nature to practice cultural exchange. 
So, did this activity of cultural exchange, metaphorically speaking,  
make the world ‘flat’ just as Thomas Friedman argued in his  
bestseller about the effects of globalization and economic exchange? 
Almost certainly not. On the contrary, cultural exchange, like  
economics, may benefit both partners, but it does so in entirely  
different ways. The fundamental psychology beneath all economic  
activity is the often astonishing fact that one person thinks that a  
television set is worth more than the 500 Euros he has to pay for it, 
while the other person thinks that the 500 Euros are worth more  
than the television set and thus is happy to sell it. 
The really fascinating fact, however, is that a society in which  
everyone sells identical television sets to each other is not  
sustainable, nor would anyone make any profit. People have to  
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come up with new ideas and inventions every now and then.  
Coming back from this analogy, East and West will never exchange 
the same commodities, nor the same cultural goods, nor attach the  
same value to them. If culture is a market, it is infinite. And unlike 
money as currency in economics, the currency in cultural exchange 
is knowledge, not only about facts, but about relationships between 
facts, between us and them, and between all people and things  
under heaven. 
A culture includes certain religious practices, places of worship,  
music, festivals, rituals, customs, values, food, clothing, monuments, 
architecture, language, and arts. The two cultures of East and West, 
in fact, will not and cannot entirely overlap, because what they have 
to give is not what they want to take for the same. 
4) Translation 
Some have argued that we need a ‘global language,’ and that in  
today’s world, it should be English. For my part, I believe that the  
proponents of English as alingua franca are crazy, because that is  
exactly what the Germans once did; now it’s the Anglo-Americans  
who close their ‘History’ book and say, “We already know you.”  
No, the true ‘global language’ would be radically different from  
today’s English (or any other major language); it would need to  
adopt the originality and the tens of thousands of words provided  
by humankind’s other language traditions on top of it. 
Every language learner experiences this from time to time: a  
subconscious certainty that something is lost in translation, every  
time, without exception. The vocabularies of the world’s languages 
add up, they don’t overlap. Translation is something else. 
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5) World Affairs 
The idea that Eastern and Western societies should do everything  
together because they’re exactly the same and their interests are  
identical is not, as some would have it, a sign of evolutionary  
maturity or scientific insight, but a desperate form of political  
manipulation, new Western imperialism, and, yes, wishful thinking. 
Surely our cultural differences and identities make the world more  
colorful. 
The belief that Eastern and Western societies have the same interests 
and desires, beliefs and aims, world views, and sense of history  
seems to me to be an odd mixture of Western insecurity, a desire for 
Gleichschaltung (controlling the hearts and minds of Eastern people  
via Western-controlled media propaganda, e.g,  The Economist, 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), American Cable News  
Network (CNN),Times, Hollywood, international standards, etc.),  
and outright narcissism: “If you want McDonald’s and Volkswagen, 
if you want trade with us, that means – or proves – you have to be 
the same as us.” 
Aggressive Westernization thus equals a dehumanization of the  
world community. Ideally, in this world we should maintain two  
modes of civilization, two forces that countercheck each other, two  
voices and two choices,thisandthat – in other words, we always  
should be presented with an alternative view. Otherwise, we are  
left with only one way of reasoning, Western reasoning, that labors 
under the illusion of possessing the single, absolute, and finite truth. 
It would lead to a monopoly on ‘civilization’ as we have seen in  
the Age of Western imperialism, without respect for tolerance or  
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harmony. 
How do East and West engage in a mutually beneficial relationship? 
If they do engage in one, what form should that relationship take? A 
communion maybe? And what are the dangers? Maurice Blanchot, a 
key writer in the twentieth century, expressed this beautifully: 
Wherever two entities temporarily evolve into a communion, to be  
made for each other or not, an engine of war is being built this way. 
Or, to rephrase it, such a communion bears the potential threat of universal 
destruction. (Maurice Blanchot, 1983) 
If two entities are forced to evolve into a single ‘one,’ conflict and  
disaster are inevitable. For all we know, such a union can work  
forever. But chances are it will end in a terrible fight, terror, and  
humiliation, just like an arranged marriage that was not to be. If  
communion fails, if we are left with only one single dominant mode 
of civilization, it will be a totality. 
Regardless of how the universe really is, there is no hope in human 
affairs for the existence of a single truth; in secular as well as in  
religious affairs it all comes down to what we truly believe (and  
want to believe) and how we react towards the ‘other.’ If there were 
only two beings left on Earth, no communion would be called for.  
The two could coexist happily, at a distance. If it is communion that 
is not meant to be because of the incommensurability of the two  
great cultural hemispheres and their distinctive ways, I say don’t  
risk it because mutual destruction could follow. Totalities have done 
us no good. From within itself no civilization offers universal truth. 
Forced and complete Westernization of humankind, just like its  
mother and father, colonialism and imperialism, will not only stand 
trial to the senseless dehumanization of history, it might also create 
the deadliest potential for mutual self-destruction and loss of morals 
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the world has ever experienced. 
Can the West peacefully align itself with the intuitive Eastern  
powers and thus guarantee all of us a peaceful, fair, and tolerant  
equilibrium? I say only if the East emancipates itself from the sorry 
role of a victim of world history. Now is the time to become more  
assertive,now is the moment to make reasonable demands. A  
more powerful Association of Southeast Asian Nations (including  
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea) is a possibility; the dissolution of the  
imbalanced ‘Group of Eight’ (G8) in favor of a new and enlarged  
‘Group of Twenty’ (G20) is another. A lot remains to be done in both 
hemispheres before they can finally focus their complete attention  
on each other. There are the peripheral nations of divided Africa,  
there is Latin America, there is fragile Eastern Europe, and there are 
the U.S.-led occupation of the Middle East and a military buildup  
against Europe’s greatest ancient foe: the Persians (now Iranians).  
Plenty of cultural assimilation is going on, unifications by trade  
and stealth are looming, and lots of pawns are waiting to be moved 
across the great board of geopolitics. 
Without doubt, all cultures and nations have contributed, one way  
or another, to the overall diversity of human civilization. Yet it is  
also obvious that some cultures and nations, depending on their  
antiquity, size, and influence, did contributemore than others in the 
past and, more importantly, will continue to contributemore than  
others in the future. Many will just simply vanish. It is believed that 
the number of classical Greek and Latin manuscripts combined,  
an estimated 30,000, is outnumbered by over one million ancient  
Sanskrit manuscripts that have already been discovered (Taylor,  
2008), not to mention millions of Chinese texts written in the Middle 
Kingdom. However, most Europeans do not want to hear the truth: 
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that they have just been lucky by punching above their weight for  
too long a time. Economic and cultural activities in themselves are  
not inventions that are protected by Western patents, nor is the art  
of statecraft or, for that matter, the art of war. 
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